Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr.: Supreme Court on Anticipatory Bail Under SC/ST Act, 2024
Case Details
This criminal appeal was decided by the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, on 23 August 2024. The proceeding arose from Criminal Appeal No. 2622 of 2024, challenging the Kerala High Court's order which declined anticipatory bail. The case was set within the statutory framework of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Act) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The core nature of the proceedings involved an appeal against the refusal of pre-arrest bail in an FIR registered under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the Act.
Facts
The appellant, Shajan Skaria, was the Editor of an online news channel 'Marunadan Malayali'. On 24 May 2023, he published a video on YouTube levelling serious allegations against the complainant, P.V. Sreenijan, a Member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly from a constituency reserved for Scheduled Castes. The video's transcript contained allegations of corruption, misuse of power, obstruction of sports development, driving an industrialist out of the state, and characterising the complainant as a "mafia don". The complainant, belonging to the Pulaya community (a Scheduled Caste), filed a written complaint alleging that the video was published with the knowledge of his caste identity to deliberately humiliate and ridicule him, thereby committing offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989, and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act. Based on this, FIR No. 899 of 2023 was registered. The appellant's applications for anticipatory bail were rejected by the Special Judge and, on appeal, by the Kerala High Court, primarily citing the bar under Section 18 of the Act. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues
The Supreme Court framed the following issues for determination:
Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and granted anticipatory bail to the appellant subject to conditions deemed fit by the Investigating Officer. The Court's detailed reasoning on each issue is as follows:
1. Nature of the Bar under Section 18 of the Act
The Court held that Section 18 of the Act does not impose an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail. It reaffirmed the principle established in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India that if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for the applicability of the Act's provisions, the bar under Sections 18 and 18A(i) does not apply. The Court elaborated that the bar operates only in cases where a valid arrest can be made as per Section 41 read with Section 60A of the CrPC. An arrest is justified only if there exists a reasonable complaint, credible information, or reasonable suspicion, and the police officer has reason to believe an offence was committed and arrest is necessary. Therefore, the bar under Section 18 is contingent upon the existence of prima facie materials pointing to the commission of an offence under the Act.
2. Determining a Prima Facie Case
The Court explained that the term "prima facie" means "at first sight" or "based on first impression". The expression "where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest" means when, based on a first impression, no offence is made out as shown in the FIR or complaint. The Court emphasized that it is the duty of the courts to conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine if the narration of facts discloses the essential ingredients of an offence under the Act. This application of judicial mind is crucial to prevent unnecessary humiliation and to safeguard personal liberty. The Court specifically noted that in cases based on digital materials like YouTube videos, courts have the discretion to examine the actual content (the video transcript) alongside the complaint to assess if the ingredients of the offence are prima facie made out.
3. Offence under Section 3(1)(r) Not Made Out
The Court conducted a thorough analysis and held that no prima facie offence under Section 3(1)(r) was disclosed. The essential ingredients of this provision are: (a) the accused is not an SC/ST member; (b) he intentionally insults or intimidates an SC/ST member; (c) he does so with the intent to humiliate that person; and (d) the act is in a place within public view. Relying on precedents like Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that not every insult to an SC/ST member amounts to an offence under the Act. The insult or intimidation must be on account of the victim belonging to an SC/ST community. The Court found nothing in the video transcript to indicate, even prima facie, that the allegations were made because the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The allegations appeared motivated by personal or political enmity, aiming to malign or defame the complainant individually. At best, the appellant could be said to have prima facie committed defamation under Section 500 IPC, but not an offence under the Act.
The Court provided an extensive analysis of the phrase "with intent to humiliate". It interpreted this in the historical and social context of the Act, which was enacted to combat the practice of untouchability and caste-based discrimination. The intent to humiliate under Section 3(1)(r) is inextricably linked to the victim's caste identity. It targets humiliation that reinforces historically entrenched ideas of caste superiority, purity, and pollution, not ordinary insults. The Court referred to scholarly works to distinguish systemic, caste-based humiliation from isolated personal insults.
4. Offence under Section 3(1)(u) Not Made Out
The Court also held that no prima facie offence under Section 3(1)(u) was disclosed. This provision punishes acts that promote or attempt to promote feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will against members of SC/ST communities as a group or class. The Court found that the video was targeted solely at the complainant as an individual. There was nothing to indicate, even prima facie, that the appellant promoted hatred against the Scheduled Caste community as a whole. His "target was just the complainant alone."
5. Mere Knowledge of Caste is Insufficient
The Court rejected the argument that the appellant's mere knowledge of the complainant's caste identity was sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r). It engaged in a strict construction of the penal statute. The Court contrasted the wording of Section 3(1)(r) with other provisions in the Act, such as Sections 3(1)(w)(i), (ii), 3(2)(v), and 3(2)(va), where the legislature explicitly used the phrase "knowing that she/he belongs to a Scheduled Caste..." to make knowledge a sufficient element. The absence of such wording in Section 3(1)(r) indicated that knowledge alone was not intended to be sufficient. The offence requires the intentional insult to be for the reason that the victim belongs to an SC/ST community.
Quotes
On the bar under Section 18: "Section 18 of the Act, 1989 does not impose an absolute fetter on the power of the courts to examine whether a prima facie case attracting the provisions of the Act, 1989 is made out or not." On prima facie case: "The expression 'where no prima facie materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR' should be understood as 'when based on first impression, no offence is made out as shown in the FIR or the complaint'." On the intent under Section 3(1)(r): "All insults or intimidations to a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not amount to an offence under the Act, 1989 unless such insult or intimidation is on the ground that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe." On the nature of humiliation: "The words 'with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe' become inseparable from the underlying idea of 'untouchability' which is sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989." On Section 3(1)(u): "The offence under Section 3(1)(u) will come into play only when any person is trying to promote ill feeling or enmity against the members of the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes as a group and not as individuals." On strict interpretation: "A penal statute must receive strict construction... Unless penalties are imposed in clear terms, they are not enforceable."