Supreme Court Grants Anticipatory Bail on Principle of Parity in Bhagwan Ramdas Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2025)

Case Details

This criminal appeal, arising from a Special Leave Petition, was adjudicated by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan. The order was pronounced on July 16, 2025, in Criminal Appeal No. 2999 of 2025. The proceeding originated from the rejection of an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The substantive legal setting involves allegations of offences punishable under Sections 420 (cheating) and 406 (criminal breach of trust), read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The nature of the proceeding is an appeal against the denial of pre-arrest bail, culminating in the Supreme Court's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to grant relief subject to specific conditions.

Facts

The appellant, Bhagwan Ramdas Pawar, apprehended arrest in connection with Crime No. 311 of 2020 registered on December 11, 2020, at Police Station Kasarvadavli, Thane City, Maharashtra. The First Information Report alleged commission of offences under Sections 420 and 406 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. To forestall his arrest, the appellant filed Anticipatory Bail Application No. 651 of 2022 before the Bombay High Court. The High Court, vide its order dated January 13, 2025, rejected his application. Aggrieved by this rejection, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, which was converted into the present criminal appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court granted interim protection to the appellant on April 16, 2025, while issuing notice to the respondents. A critical factual matrix presented before the Court was that amongst a total of five accused persons in the case, accused nos. 2 and 3 had been granted anticipatory bail, and accused nos. 4 and 5 had been granted regular bail, leaving the appellant as the sole accused denied the relief of anticipatory bail.

Issues

The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on the principle of parity, given that his co-accused had already been extended the benefit of bail, either anticipatory or regular. A corollary to this issue was the determination of whether any distinguishing factors in the appellant's role, as contended by the State, were sufficiently material to justify a departure from the parity principle and warrant the denial of bail. Furthermore, the Court had to consider the appropriate conditions to be imposed upon the grant of bail to ensure the interests of justice, including safeguarding the investigation from witness tampering or evidence destruction.

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Bombay High Court dated January 13, 2025, and granted anticipatory bail to the appellant, Bhagwan Ramdas Pawar. The Court's decision was predicated on a detailed application of the principle of parity, a thorough consideration of the State's objections, and the imposition of a structured set of conditions designed to balance the appellant's liberty with the requirements of a fair and unimpeded investigation.

The Court's reasoning commenced with an acknowledgment of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant's counsel foregrounded the factual circumstance of disparate treatment amongst the accused. It was emphatically submitted that out of the five total accused, two had secured anticipatory bail and two had obtained regular bail, thereby isolating the appellant as the only individual denied similar relief. This factual scenario, the counsel argued, squarely invoked the principle of parity, which is a well-recognized consideration in bail jurisprudence. The counsel urged that, on this basis alone, the appellant deserved the grant of anticipatory bail, with the Court being at liberty to impose any necessary conditions to allay potential concerns regarding investigation integrity.

The State, represented by its counsel, mounted a counter-argument in opposition. With reference to a filed counter affidavit, the State contended that the role attributed to the appellant was "quite clear" and materially distinct from the roles of the co-accused who had been granted bail. The State's submission sought to carve out an exception to the parity principle by asserting that the appellant's involvement in the alleged offences was of a different character or degree, thereby rendering him ineligible for similar relief. The State's plea was for the dismissal of the appeal, thereby upholding the High Court's decision which had implicitly or explicitly accepted this differentiation.

The Supreme Court, after evaluating the competing submissions and the circumstances on record, found merit in the appellant's plea based on parity. The Court held that the appellant was entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail. This conclusion was not a mechanical application of parity but a considered judicial determination. The Court implicitly found the State's attempt to distinguish the appellant's role as insufficient to override the compelling claim of parity arising from the uniform grant of bail to all other co-accused. In bail matters, particularly where multiple individuals are implicated in the same transaction, marked inconsistency in treatment requires a cogent and substantial justification. The Court, in its reasoning, determined that the State's objection regarding the clarity of the appellant's role did not constitute such a justification, especially when the gravamen of the allegations under Sections 420 and 406 IPC would likely be similar against all accused, given the charge of common intention under Section 34 IPC. The Court's decision reinforces the doctrine that parity is a significant factor, and denial of bail to one accused when all similarly situated co-accused are on bail can amount to an arbitrary exercise of discretion, absent compelling reasons grounded in tangible evidence of a specific threat posed by that individual accused.

Having decided to grant bail, the Court meticulously outlined the conditions to give effect to its order. The operative direction was that in the event of the appellant's arrest, the Arresting Officer must release him on bail. This bail was made contingent upon the appellant furnishing a cash security of Rs. 25,000 (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand) along with two sureties of a like amount. The imposition of a cash security condition serves a dual purpose: it acts as a financial deterrent against absconding and provides a tangible assurance of the appellant's availability for the judicial process. The stipulation of two sureties further strengthens this assurance by involving third-party guarantors.

Beyond the financial terms, the Court prescribed two critical behavioral conditions integral to the grant of anticipatory bail. First, the appellant was directed to extend "complete cooperation" in the ensuing investigation. This condition obligates the appellant to make himself available for questioning, comply with lawful directions of the investigating agency, and not obstruct the investigative process in any manner. Second, and paramountly, the appellant was expressly prohibited from misusing his liberty. This prohibition was concretized by specific injunctions against influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence. The order mandates that the appellant "shall not in any way influence the witnesses or tamper with the material on record." This condition addresses the core concern in any bail grant—the preservation of the trial's integrity. By including this explicit prohibition, the Court provided a clear legal basis for the cancellation of bail should the appellant engage in such conduct, thereby protecting the State's interest in a fair investigation and future prosecution.

The Court's decision, therefore, represents a calibrated application of judicial discretion. It recognizes parity as a potent argument for bail fairness while refusing to treat it as an absolute right divorced from the case's context. Simultaneously, it demonstrates that perceived risks associated with an accused's liberty can be adequately mitigated through carefully crafted conditions rather than outright incarceration. The order strikes a balance between the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and the societal interest in ensuring that the processes of criminal justice are not subverted. The setting aside of the High Court's order signifies that the apex court found the denial of bail to be unsustainable in law, given the factual matrix of co-accused having been granted bail and the absence of sufficiently distinguishing factors warranting a contrary result.

Quotes

The judgment encapsulates its core reasoning and directives in the following essential extracts: "Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that out of total five accused, accused nos.2 and 3 have been granted anticipatory bail whereas accused nos.4 and 5 have been granted regular bail; that it is only this appellant who has been denied the relief of anticipatory bail. In the circumstances, on the principle of parity, the appellant herein may also be granted the relief of anticipatory bail..." (Para 7). "Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State, with reference to her counter affidavit contended that the role of the appellant herein is quite clear and he cannot be granted the similar relief on the principle of parity." (Para 8). "Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail sought by him." (Para 9). The operative conditions are set forth as: "We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail, subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only) with two like sureties." and "It is directed that the appellant shall extend complete cooperation in the ensuing investigation. The appellant shall not misuse his liberty and shall not in any way influence the witnesses or tamper with the material on record." (Paras 10 & 11).