Supreme Court Quashes Rajasthan High Court's Blanket Ban on Bail Listings During Lockdown (2021)
Case Details
This judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court of India on 29 September 2021. The Bench comprised Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose. The appeals, registered as Criminal Appeal Nos. 1113 and 1114 of 2021, arose from Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) concerning orders passed by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur. The appellant was the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan itself, challenging its own judge's orders, and the respondents were the State of Rajasthan and the bail applicants. The core legal setting involved the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 438, 439, 389), the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Information Technology Act, 2000, and fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The nature of the proceedings was an appeal against judicial orders that imposed blanket restrictions on the listing and hearing of bail applications during the COVID-19 lockdown.
Facts
The case originated from two separate bail applications filed before the Rajasthan High Court during the COVID-19 pandemic. The first application (S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Second Bail Application No. 17767 of 2019) was filed by one Shahrukh. On 31 March 2020, the learned Single Judge, while dealing with this application, issued directions to the Registrar (Judicial) not to list "bails, appeals, applications for suspension of sentence in appeals and revisions" in the category of "extreme urgent matters." This order was to remain in force until the Government of India withdrew the complete lockdown order. The judge reasoned that releasing accused persons during a lockdown risked public health and that lawyers were abstaining from work, depriving complainants of representation.
The second application (S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 3125 of 2021) was filed by Than Singh, accused of offences under Sections 457 and 354 IPC read with Section 67 of the IT Act. On 17 May 2021, the same Single Judge, in this anticipatory bail application, directed the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, to instruct police officers not to arrest persons accused of offences carrying a maximum sentence of up to three years and triable by a First Class Magistrate, until 17 July 2021. Concomitantly, the judge directed the High Court Registry not to list anticipatory bail applications under Section 438 CrPC for such offences until the reopening of courts after summer vacation. The stated rationale was to avoid overcrowding in jails and prevent asymptomatic carriers from spreading COVID-19. Ultimately, both bail applications were rejected on their merits on 20 May 2020 and 2 August 2021, respectively. The High Court, as an institution, appealed to the Supreme Court against these interim blanket directions, which were stayed by the Supreme Court during pendency.
Issues
The Supreme Court framed and addressed the following legal questions: 1. Whether a Single Judge of a High Court has the jurisdiction to pass blanket judicial orders directing the court's registry not to list specific categories of cases (like bail applications) by categorizing them as non-urgent? 2. Whether such blanket orders, which effectively prohibit the listing and hearing of bail and suspension of sentence applications, infringe upon the fundamental right to personal liberty and the right to access justice under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution? 3. Whether a Single Judge can issue general directives to police authorities restraining arrests in a class of cases, thereby encroaching upon the domain of the investigating agencies and the legislature? 4. Whether the impugned orders, though infructuous due to the subsequent rejection of the underlying bail pleas and the lapse of their specified duration, required adjudication on merits due to their general and "in rem" character affecting the rights of persons not party to the proceedings?
Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the High Court administration and held the impugned directions to be illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court provided a detailed reasoning on each of the issues raised.
On the Jurisdictional Issue and Encroachment of Administrative Power: The Court held that the power to allocate judicial business and determine the roster of judges is exclusively vested in the Chief Justice of a High Court as the master of the roster. This principle, well-established in precedents like State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India, was reaffirmed. By issuing sweeping directions to the Registry on what categories of cases could or could not be listed as "extremely urgent," the Single Judge usurped the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief Justice. The Court emphasized that it is for the Chief Justice to decide which matters require urgent hearing and which judge should hear them. Furthermore, the Single Judge's conclusion that bail applications and similar matters could never be "extremely urgent" during a lockdown was an overgeneralization. Individual cases could present extreme urgency even during a pandemic, and such a determination should be made by the bench hearing the specific case, not through a blanket judicial order.
On the Violation of Fundamental Rights and Statutory Rights: The Court delivered a robust affirmation of the right to seek bail as an integral part of the fundamental right to personal liberty. It held that a blanket ban on the listing of bail applications or applications for suspension of sentence under Sections 438, 439, and 389 CrPC effectively blocks access to justice and suspends the fundamental rights of individuals under detention or anticipating detention. The right to apply for bail is implicit in Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Such a judicial order, the Court reasoned, takes away personal liberty without complying with "procedure established by law," akin to violating the due process clause. The order had the effect of temporarily eclipsing statutory provisions enacted by Parliament, which was impermissible. The Court cited its judgment in Nikesh Tara Chand Shah v. Union of India, which traces the history of bail jurisprudence, and reiterated that bail is the rule and jail the exception.
On the Directions to Police Authorities: The Supreme Court found the directive to the police not to make arrests in a class of cases equally untenable. The power of arrest is governed by detailed provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure and other statutes. The Court noted that in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, it had already laid down specific guidelines to prevent unnecessary arrests. Furthermore, in the suo motu writ petition concerning prison decongestion during COVID-19, the Court had issued comprehensive directions to High-Powered Committees. In light of these existing frameworks, there was no necessity or jurisdiction for a Single Judge to issue general, sweeping orders restraining police arrests. Such orders placed fetters on the lawful exercise of power by investigating agencies.
On Adjudicating Despite the Orders Being Technically Infructuous: The Court acknowledged that since the underlying bail applications were rejected and the specified duration of the impugned orders had lapsed, the appeals could be considered infructuous. However, it chose to decide the matter on merits because the orders were "in rem" in character—they affected the rights of a vast number of persons not party to the proceedings. These general directions had the potential to breach constitutional and legal rights on a large scale, raising important questions of jurisdiction and principle that needed to be settled to prevent recurrence.
Consequently, while allowing the appeals and disapproving of the impugned directions, the Supreme Court did not formally set aside the orders as they had already ceased to operate. The substantive findings on their illegality were declared for future guidance.
Quotes
"Right to apply for bail is an individual right implicit in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The right of an accused, an undertrial prisoner or a convicted person awaiting appeal court's verdict to seek bail on suspension of sentence is recognized in Sections 439, 438 and 389 of the 1973 Code. Similarly, the factors guiding appeal provision is contained in the 1989 Act. If there is a blanket ban on listing of these applications, even for offences with lesser degree of punishment, that would effectively block access for seekers of liberty to apply for bail and in substance suspend the Fundamental Rights of individuals in or apprehending detention. Such an order also has the effect of temporarily eclipsing statutory provisions."
"In our view, orders under appeal passed on 31st March, 2020 and 17th May, 2021 encroached upon the administrative power of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan in the matter of allocation of business to Hon'ble Judges of that Court."
"It was also improper for the learned Single Judge to come to a general finding that when there is complete lockdown the bail applications, appeal under SC/ST Act and applications for suspension of sentence in appeals and revisions could not be considered to be matters of extreme urgency. Such sweeping orders in our adversarial adjudicatory system would be contrary to law as many persons would be impacted by such orders without having any knowledge of the proceeding."