Case Analysis: Haridas Das and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
Case Details
Case name: Haridas Das and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.R. Mudholkar
Date of decision: 16 March 1964
Citation / citations: 1964 AIR 1773; 1964 SCR (7) 237
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1961; Civil Revision No. 3 of 1957
Neutral citation: 1964 SCR (7) 237
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Calcutta High Court (from which the appeal arose)
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
Haridas Das, the first appellant, owned plot No. 365 in Jagdispur, 24 Parganas. The plot had been sold on 7 April 1951 to respondents 2, 3 and 4, but the sale produced only a paper possession for the respondents. On 25 September 1951 Haridas Das instituted a suit before the Munsif Court at Sealdah seeking a declaration that the sale had not transferred his title, confirmation of his possession and a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from disturbing his possession. The Munsif dismissed the application for a temporary injunction; the decision was affirmed by the Third Additional District Judge at Alipore.
Haridas Das then filed a revision before the Calcutta High Court. By order dated 3 May 1954 the High Court granted a temporary injunction restraining respondents 2, 3 and 4 from disturbing his possession until the suit was disposed of and suggested that the respondents could jointly possess the property with the appellant.
On 12 June 1956 the appellant filed an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, alleging that on 7 June 1956 the respondents, together with others, had forcibly entered the plot, broken open the gate and cut down a tree, thereby breaching the injunction. The application was verified by an affidavit of the second appellant, Jyotish Kumar Seal.
The High Court issued a rule calling upon the respondents to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt. The matter was referred to the Subordinate Judge, Alipore, who examined the witnesses and the Officer‑in‑charge of Rajarhat Police Station. The Subordinate Judge submitted a report to the High Court.
After considering the report, the High Court, on 30 August 1957, held that the allegations made by the appellant were not true; it found that the claim that the respondents had broken the gate and cut down the tree could not be reasonably believed and that the police report made no mention of any disturbance or damage.
On 17 September 1957 respondents 2, 3 and 4 filed an application under Section 466 read with Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court, seeking a complaint against the appellants under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and any other appropriate provisions in relation to the contempt proceedings.
The High Court, concluding that it was expedient in the interest of justice, issued an absolute rule directing the Registrar of the High Court to lodge a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, under Sections 193, 199 and 211 of the IPC.
The Registrar filed the complaint on 16 January 1959. The appellants obtained a certificate of fitness for appeal under Articles 133(1)(c) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution and filed Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1961 before the Supreme Court of India, seeking to set aside the High Court’s order.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court was called upon to determine:
1. Whether the Calcutta High Court was justified in directing the Registrar to lodge a complaint against the appellants under Sections 193, 199 and 211 of the IPC.
2. Whether an application for committal for contempt of court, filed under the Contempt of Courts Act, constituted a “criminal proceeding” within the meaning of Section 211 of the IPC.
3. Whether a false charge made in respect of an offence punishable under a special law (contempt of court) fell within the ambit of “false charge of offence” contemplated by Section 211 of the IPC.
The appellants contended that the High Court’s order did not contain a definite finding of a false statement, that the contempt application was not a criminal proceeding, and that Section 211 required a false charge of an offence triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure. They relied on decisions such as *Express v. Jamoona* and *Karim Bux v. The Queen Empress* to argue that a false charge must be made to a person competent to investigate and must relate to an offence punishable under the IPC.
The respondents argued that the appellants had deliberately made false statements in the affidavits supporting the contempt application, that contempt of court was an offence punishable under a special law and therefore fell within the definition of “offence” in Section 40 of the IPC, and that the contempt application amounted to the institution of a criminal proceeding. They maintained that the High Court had correctly found a prima facie case and that its order directing the complaint was a final order amenable to appeal under Article 134(1)(c).
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
The Court considered the following statutory provisions:
Section 193 IPC – punishment for giving false evidence.
Section 199 IPC – punishment for false statements in declarations made as evidence.
Section 211 IPC – punishment for falsely charging any person with having committed an offence, provided the false charge was made with the intention of causing injury and the accused either instituted or caused to be instituted a criminal proceeding, or knew that there was no lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.
The definition of “offence” in Section 40 IPC and the definition of “special law” in Section 41 IPC** were applied to include offences punishable under statutes such as the Contempt of Courts Act. The Contempt of Courts Act, particularly Sections 3 and 4, characterised contempt as an offence punishable by imprisonment or fine, thereby qualifying as a special law offence.
The three‑fold test embedded in Section 211 was applied: (i) intention to cause injury; (ii) institution of a criminal proceeding or making a false charge; and (iii) knowledge of the absence of any lawful ground.
For judicial review of a High Court’s direction to lodge a criminal complaint, the Court required a finding of a prima facie case, a reasonable prospect of conviction and the expediency of prosecution.
Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution provided the basis for granting a certificate of fitness for appeal.
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The Supreme Court first affirmed the factual backdrop: the appellants had obtained a temporary injunction; they had filed a contempt application alleging breach; the High Court, after an enquiry, had held that the allegations were “not true” and had dismissed the contempt application.
Regarding Sections 193 and 199, the Court held that the High Court’s finding that the statements were “not true” satisfied the factual element required for a complaint under these provisions. The affidavits filed in support of the contempt application constituted false evidence and false statements within the meaning of Sections 193 and 199 respectively.
On the construction of Section 211, the Court rejected the appellants’ narrow interpretation that the false charge must relate to an offence triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It held that the statutory language “falsely charges any person with having committed an offence” did not limit the offence to one defined solely by the IPC. By referring to the definition of “offence” in Section 40, the Court embraced offences punishable under any special law, and consequently held that contempt of court, punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, fell within this definition.
The Court further held that an application for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act amounted to the institution of a criminal proceeding for the purpose of Section 211 because contempt is punishable by imprisonment or fine and is therefore a criminal proceeding, albeit “quasi‑criminal.” The Court dismissed the reliance on the Privy Council decision that committal for contempt was not criminal, observing that the matter was not fully argued and that the statutory scheme treated contempt as a punishable offence.
Applying the three‑fold test, the Court found that the appellants intended to injure the respondents by seeking contempt proceedings on a false basis; that the contempt application constituted the institution of a criminal proceeding; and that the High Court’s finding of falsity demonstrated the appellants’ knowledge of the absence of any lawful ground. Accordingly, all the ingredients of Section 211 were satisfied.
The Court concluded that the High Court had correctly exercised its jurisdiction in directing the Registrar to lodge a complaint under Sections 193, 199 and 211, having satisfied the requirements of a prima facie case, a reasonable prospect of conviction and the interest of justice.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, thereby refusing the relief sought by the appellants. It upheld the Calcutta High Court’s order directing the filing of a criminal complaint against the appellants under Sections 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The direction to lodge the complaint remained in force, and no order was made to quash the complaint already filed before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta.