Case Analysis: Matiullah Sheikh vs The State Of West Bengal
Case Details
Case name: Matiullah Sheikh vs The State Of West Bengal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal
Date of decision: 03 March 1964
Citation / citations: 1965 AIR 132; 1964 SCR (6) 978
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 1961; Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1961
Neutral citation: 1964 SCR (6) 978
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Calcutta High Court
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
On the night of 14 November 1950 Haji Ebrar Ali was sleeping on the verandah of his hut in Birbhum when four men—Matiullah Sheikh, Abdul Odud, Ekram and Habibullah—entered the premises. Abdul Odud pressed his knees against the victim, while Ekram and Habibullah restrained the victim’s chest and hands. Matiullah Sheikh then inflicted a wound on the victim’s neck with a dagger. The victim awoke, raised a shout and attempted to seize Odud; the assailants subsequently fled. The injury was non‑fatal, and the victim was taken to Rampurhat Hospital after lodging an information at the local police station.
The trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Birbhum, proceeded on charges under section 449 (house‑trespass in order to commit an offence punishable with death) and section 307 read with section 34 (attempt to murder with common intention). A unanimous jury returned a verdict of guilt against all four appellants on both counts. The judge convicted each appellant under section 449 and sentenced Matiullah to four years’ rigorous imprisonment under section 307/34 and two years under section 449; the remaining three were sentenced to three years under section 307/34 and two years under section 449.
All four appellants appealed to the Calcutta High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal summarily but issued a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, permitting a further appeal to the Supreme Court of India. The appellants then filed a criminal appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 1961) before this Court, seeking to set aside the convictions under sections 449 and 307/34 and to vacate the sentences.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court was required to decide two questions of statutory interpretation:
First issue: Whether a conviction under section 449 IPC could be sustained when the contemplated murder was not actually effected, i.e., whether the phrase “in order to” required the intended offence to be completed.
Second issue: Whether an offence charged under section 307 read with section 34 IPC was legally viable where several persons acted in concert with a common intention to kill, but the victim did not die.
The appellants contended that (1) section 449 could not apply unless the murder was completed, and (2) section 307/34 could not be invoked against a group because the provision, they argued, punished only an individual act with the requisite intention. The State, on the other hand, maintained that (1) the expression “in order to” denoted purpose alone, making the house‑trespass punishable irrespective of the murder’s outcome, and (2) section 34 extended liability to each participant in a common intention, thereby sustaining the charge of section 307 in conjunction with section 34.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
Section 449 IPC penalises house‑trespass “in order to” commit an offence punishable with death. The same phrase appears in sections 450, 451, 454 and 457, where the legislature intended the graded penalties to be independent of the actual commission of the intended offence.
Section 307 IPC deals with attempt to cause death, and section 34 IPC provides that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is liable as if he had performed the act alone. The purpose test for “in order to” requires proof of the accused’s intention to commit the specified offence, irrespective of its eventual completion. The common‑intention test under section 34 requires (a) a criminal act done by several persons, (b) a shared intention to commit that act, and (c) the act being done in furtherance of that shared intention.
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The Court applied a purpose test to the phrase “in order to” in section 449. It observed that the legislature’s use of the same wording in other sections indicated that the intention to commit the specified offence, not its actual occurrence, triggered liability. Consequently, the Court held that the house‑trespass was punishable even though the murder was not consummated.
Regarding section 307 read with section 34, the Court applied the common‑intention test. It found that the factual matrix established a shared intention among the four accused to kill Haji Ebrar Ali. Although only Matiullah physically inflicted the neck wound, the restraint of the victim by the other three was an essential part of the joint act. Under section 34, each participant was therefore deemed to have performed the entire act of causing the injury, making the charge of attempt to murder sustainable.
The Court rejected the appellants’ submissions that the statutes required the completed offence or that section 307 could not be applied to a joint act. It affirmed that the statutory language and the established principles of purpose and common intention supported the convictions.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The Supreme Court refused the relief sought by the appellants. It dismissed the appeal, upheld the convictions under section 449 IPC and under section 307 read with section 34 IPC, and affirmed the rigorous imprisonment sentences imposed by the trial court. The judgment thereby confirmed that house‑trespass with the purpose of committing a capital offence is punishable even if the intended offence is not completed, and that each participant in a common intention to kill is liable for the entire act of attempted murder.