Case Analysis: Matiullah Sheikh vs The State Of West Bengal
Case Details
Case name: Matiullah Sheikh vs The State Of West Bengal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal
Date of decision: 03 March 1964
Citation / citations: 1965 AIR 132
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 1961; Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1961
Neutral citation: 1964 SCR (6) 978
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Calcutta High Court
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
On the night of 14 November 1950, Haji Ebrar Ali was sleeping on the verandah of his hut in Birbhum when four accused—Matiullah Sheikh, Abdul Odud, Ekram and Habibullah—entered the premises with the common intention of killing him. Abdul Odud pressed the victim’s knees while Ekram and Habibullah pressed his chest and hands. Matiullah Sheikh then inflicted a wound on the victim’s neck with a dagger. The victim awoke, raised a shout, seized Odud, and the remaining three assailants fled. The injury was serious but not fatal; the victim was taken to Rampurhat hospital for treatment.
The trial was conducted before the Additional Sessions Judge, Birbhum, with a jury that returned a unanimous verdict of guilt on charges under sections 449 and 307 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The judge sentenced Matiullah Sheikh to four years’ rigorous imprisonment under section 307/34 and two years under section 449; the other three accused received three years’ rigorous imprisonment under section 307/34 and two years under section 449.
The convicted persons appealed to the Calcutta High Court (Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1961). The High Court dismissed the appeals summarily but issued a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, permitting a further appeal to the Supreme Court of India. The appellants then filed a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 1961), seeking to set aside the convictions and sentences.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court was required to determine two questions of law:
1. Whether a conviction under section 449 of the Indian Penal Code could be sustained when the offence for which the house‑trespass was committed—murder—had not actually been effected.
2. Whether an offence under section 307 read with section 34 could be upheld where the act was performed by several persons acting in concert.
The appellants contended that section 449 required the actual commission of murder and that section 307 together with section 34 could not be applied to a joint act. The State argued that the phrase “in order to” in section 449 denoted purpose, not completion, and that the common‑intention principle in section 34 made each participant liable for the whole act, thereby justifying the application of section 307.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
The Court considered the following provisions of the Indian Penal Code:
Section 449 – Punishment for house‑trespass “in order to” commit an offence punishable with death.
Section 307 – Punishment for attempt to murder.
Section 34 – Liability of each participant when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention.
The Court also referred to sections 448, 450, 451, 454 and 457, which employ the same “in order to” language, and to section 300, which defines murder. The legal tests applied were:
• The “purpose” test for the phrase “in order to,” requiring proof of the accused’s intention to commit the specified offence irrespective of its actual commission.
• The common‑intention test under section 34, which attributes the whole criminal act to each participant when it is performed in furtherance of a shared intention.
• The intention/knowledge test under section 307, which assesses whether the act, if it had caused death, would constitute murder, thereby attracting liability for attempted murder when death does not occur.
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The Court examined the language of section 449 and held that “in order to” signified purpose rather than the actual occurrence of the contemplated offence. It observed that the legislature used the same expression in sections 450, 451, 454 and 457, and that the graded punishments under those provisions indicated that liability arose irrespective of whether the intended offence was completed. Consequently, the Court concluded that the house‑trespass committed with the purpose of murdering the victim attracted the penalty of section 449 even though murder did not occur.
Regarding section 307 read with section 34, the Court rejected the appellants’ contention that the provision could not apply to a joint act. It affirmed the well‑settled principle that when a criminal act is performed by several persons in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is liable as if he had performed the act alone. Applying this principle to the facts, the Court found that the coordinated intrusion, the restraint of the victim, and the dagger wound were all done in furtherance of the shared intention to kill. Therefore, each of the four accused was liable for the entire act of attempted murder under section 307, and the common‑intention provision of section 34 made such liability appropriate.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The Supreme Court refused the relief sought by the appellants. It dismissed the appeal, upheld the convictions under sections 449 and 307 read with 34, and affirmed the rigorous imprisonment sentences imposed by the trial court. The judgment confirmed that liability for house‑trespass “in order to” commit a capital offence does not depend on the actual commission of that offence, and that joint participation in an attempted murder attracts full liability under section 307 in conjunction with section 34.