Criminal Lawyer Chandigarh High Court

Case Analysis: Narain Das vs The State of Uttar Pradesh

Case Details

Case name: Narain Das vs The State of Uttar Pradesh
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Raghu Bar Dayal J.
Date of decision: 14 September 1960
Proceeding type: Memorandum of Appeal under Section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Source court or forum: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

Narain Das had instituted a civil writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. He subsequently moved an application under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to lodge a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against Phanish Tripathi on the ground that a statement in Tripathi’s affidavit dated 14 May 1959 was false. The single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 476, dismissed the application, holding that Das had not demonstrated any falsity in the affidavit.

Discontented with that order, Das filed a memorandum of appeal under Section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging the High Court’s decision. The memorandum, together with a report from the Supreme Court Registry, was transmitted to the Supreme Court of India for determination of its competence. The relief sought by Das was that the Supreme Court admit the appeal, set aside the High Court Judge’s order, and permit the filing of the criminal complaint against Tripathi.

The State of Uttar Pradesh appeared as respondent No. 1, represented by counsel G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal. The matter was before the Supreme Court on a jurisdictional and maintainability stage, without any examination of the merits of the underlying criminal complaint.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was called upon to determine:

Whether the memorandum of appeal filed under Section 476B was maintainable before the Supreme Court of India.

Whether the order passed by the single Judge of the Allahabad High Court under Section 476 constituted a “decree” within the meaning of the Letters Patent, thereby attracting the appellate scheme of Section 195(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Whether Section 195(3) applied to the order in question, and consequently, which court was the proper forum for the appeal.

The appellant contended that the order was not a decree, that Section 195(3) was inapplicable, and that Section 476B conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to entertain the appeal. He relied on the decision in M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras and argued that a certificate under Article 132 could further justify Supreme Court jurisdiction.

The respondent argued that the order of the single Judge was appealable under the ordinary appellate route prescribed by the Letters Patent and Section 195(3), which made the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad the appropriate forum. It distinguished the earlier precedent on the ground that it involved a Division Bench, not a single Judge.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowered a civil, revenue or criminal court to lodge a complaint before a magistrate when an offence under Section 195(1)(b) or (c) of the Indian Penal Code appeared to have been committed in relation to a proceeding before it. Section 476B provided a remedy for an aggrieved person to appeal an order made under Section 476. Section 195(3) defined the concept of “subordinate” courts, stipulating that an appeal from an order of a court was to be filed in the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decrees of that court.

The appellate jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court was derived from clause 10 of its Letters Patent read with clause 13 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, which prescribed that decrees of a single Judge of the High Court were ordinarily appealable to the High Court itself.

Consequently, the legal test to be applied was whether the order of the single Judge fell within the category of decrees whose appeals ordinarily lay to the High Court, as required by Section 195(3).

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court examined the statutory scheme linking Sections 476, 476B and 195(3). It held that the decisive factor was the “court to which appeals ordinarily lie” from the order in question, as prescribed by Section 195(3). The Court observed that a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, although exercising civil jurisdiction, was a court whose decrees were ordinarily appealable to the High Court itself under the Letters Patent.

Applying this test, the Court concluded that the order made under Section 476 by the single Judge was an order of a court whose appeals ordinarily lay to the High Court. Therefore, the memorandum of appeal under Section 476B was not maintainable before the Supreme Court. The Court distinguished the earlier decision in M. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, noting that that case dealt with an appeal from a Division Bench and did not address the present situation involving a single Judge.

The Court further held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the order constituted a “decree” within the meaning of the Letters Patent, because the statutory hierarchy under Section 195(3) already determined the appropriate forum.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court refused to entertain the memorandum of appeal filed under Section 476B. It held that the appeal was incompetent before the Supreme Court and directed that the appeal be returned to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for proper adjudication. Accordingly, the relief sought by Narain Das was denied, and the High Court’s order dismissing the Section 476 application remained in force pending consideration by the appropriate appellate forum.