Case Analysis: Sekendar Sheikh and Another v. State of West Bengal

Case Details

Case name: Sekendar Sheikh and Another v. State of West Bengal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah
Date of decision: 08/02/1963
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1961; Reference No. 10 of 1960
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Calcutta High Court

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The first appellant, Sekendar Sheikh, was alleged to have forged a Heba‑nama on 15 January 1958 in Berhampore, presenting it as a valuable security in favour of Ali Hossain and falsely personating Kaimuddin Sheikh to obtain registration. The second appellant, Hasibuddin Sheikh, was charged with abetting the first appellant. The trial was conducted before the Additional Sessions Judge, Murshidabad, with a jury on the forging charge (section 467 IPC) and without a jury on the false‑personation charge (section 82(c) Registration Act). The jury returned a majority guilty verdict (four to three) on forging and abetment, while the judge acquitted the appellants of the registration offences and, finding the evidence “absolutely not reliable,” made a reference under section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Calcutta High Court.

The High Court declined the reference, convicted both appellants under section 467 read with section 109 of the IPC, and sentenced each to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. After obtaining a certificate of fitness under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, the appellants filed Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1961 before the Supreme Court of India, seeking to set aside the conviction and sentence.

The prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of Swarna Kumar Dey, who stated that he had engrossed the Heba‑nama, that Sekendar Sheikh had executed it while claiming to be Kaimuddin Sheikh, and that the appellant’s thumb‑impression was found on the document. Kaimuddin Sheikh denied executing the document or placing his thumb‑impression on it. Specimen thumb‑impressions of the appellants, taken by the investigating officer in the presence of a magistrate, were compared by a hand‑writing expert with the impressions recorded in the sub‑registry; the expert concluded that the first appellant’s impressions matched those in the register and did not match the genuine Kaimuddin Sheikh’s specimens.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was called upon to determine (i) whether the reference made by the Sessions Judge under section 307 was justified in view of the jury’s majority guilty verdict; (ii) whether the High Court could uphold the convictions for forgery and abetment on the basis of thumb‑impression evidence that had been rejected for the separate false‑personation charge; and (iii) whether evidence deemed insufficient to sustain an acquittal on one offence could be used as corroborative evidence for a different offence arising from the same transaction.

The appellants contended that the Sessions Judge’s reference was unwarranted because the evidence was unreliable, that an acquittal on the registration charge barred the use of the same thumb‑impression and testimonial material for the forging charge, and that the thumb‑impression evidence violated article 20(3) of the Constitution as compelled self‑incriminating evidence.

The State argued that the thumb‑impression evidence was admissible, did not infringe article 20(3), and could be considered for the forging offence despite its rejection for the registration offence; it further maintained that the reference under section 307 was proper because the trial judge had found no reliable evidence, and that the High Court was entitled to review that finding.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The Court considered section 467 of the Indian Penal Code (forgery of a valuable security) and section 109 IPC (abetment), section 82(c) of the Indian Registration Act (false personation), and section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (reference to a higher court). Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self‑incrimination, and article 134(1)(c) (certificate of fitness) were also examined.

The legal test for a section 307 reference required that the evidence be such that no reasonable body of men could have reached the jury’s verdict. The Court reiterated that thumb‑impression specimens, being non‑testimonial identification material, did not fall within the protection of article 20(3). It further held that an acquittal on one charge did not render the same evidence inadmissible for another distinct charge; the issue was the weight to be assigned, not admissibility.

These principles were articulated in the ratio decidendi that a jury’s verdict must stand unless it is shown that no reasonable jury could have arrived at it, and that evidence may be used as corroborative for a different offence arising from the same transaction.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court observed that the jury, as the judge of fact, had accepted the testimony of Swarna Kumar Dey and the expert comparison of thumb‑impressions, and that a reasonable jury could have done so. Consequently, the reference under section 307 was deemed unjustified because the evidence could properly support a guilty verdict.

Regarding the thumb‑impression evidence, the Court applied the constitutional test and concluded that the compulsory taking of specimens for identification did not constitute testimonial communication; therefore, article 20(3) was not violated.

The Court applied the principle that acquittal on the false‑personation charge did not preclude the use of the same thumb‑impression and testimonial material for the forging charge. The evidence was admissible, and its weight was to be assessed separately for each offence. Accordingly, the High Court’s reliance on that evidence to uphold the conviction under section 467 read with section 109 was affirmed.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The appellants had prayed that the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s conviction and the two‑year rigorous imprisonment sentences. The Supreme Court refused the relief, dismissed the appeal, and affirmed the convictions and sentences imposed by the Calcutta High Court for forging a valuable security and for abetment thereof.