Case Analysis: Sekendar Sheikh and Another v. State of West Bengal

Case Details

Case name: Sekendar Sheikh and Another v. State of West Bengal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: B.P. Sinha, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah
Date of decision: 1963-02-08
Citation / citations: (1) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 174; (2) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 10
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1961; Reference No. 10 of 1960
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Calcutta High Court

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

On 15 January 1958, the first appellant, Sekendar Sheikh, allegedly forged a Heba‑nama in Berhampore in favour of Ali Hossain. He purportedly executed the document in the name of Kaimuddin of Debkundu and presented it for registration while falsely personating Kaimuddin, affixing his thumb‑impression as if it were Kaimuddin’s. The second appellant, Hasibuddin Sheikh, was charged with abetting the first appellant in both the forgery and the false personation.

The matter was tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Murshidabad. The offences of forging a valuable security (IPC §467) and abetment thereof (IPC §109) were tried by a jury, which returned a guilty verdict by a majority of four to three. The judge rejected the verdict, held that “absolutely no reliable evidence” existed for the forgery charge, and made a reference under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Calcutta High Court.

The Calcutta High Court declined to entertain the reference, convicted both appellants under IPC §467 read with §109, and sentenced each to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. It acquitted them of the offences under Section 82(c) of the Indian Registration Act (false personation and presentation of a document). A certificate of fitness under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution was granted, enabling the appellants to file Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1961 before the Supreme Court of India.

The prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of Swarna Kumar Dey, who stated that he had engrossed the Heba‑nama, that the first appellant had impressed his thumb‑mark on the document, and that the second appellant had identified the first appellant as Kaimuddin. Kaimuddin Sheikh denied executing the document or placing any thumb‑mark. Specimen thumb‑impressions of the appellants, taken by the investigating officer in the presence of a magistrate, were compared with the impressions found in the sub‑registry register; a handwriting expert concluded that the first appellant’s impressions matched those in the register.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was called upon to determine (i) whether the reference made by the Sessions Judge under Section 307 was justified in view of the jury’s majority verdict and the evidence presented; (ii) whether the High Court could rely upon, and assign weight to, the thumb‑impression and documentary evidence that had been deemed unreliable for the registration‑act offence in sustaining a conviction for forging a valuable security; and (iii) whether a conviction for forgery could be maintained notwithstanding the acquittal on the related false‑personation charge.

The appellants contended that the reference was unwarranted because no reliable evidence existed for the forgery charge, that the thumb‑impression evidence should have been excluded as compelled self‑incrimination under Article 20(3), and that the acquittal on the registration offence barred the use of the same evidence for a distinct offence. They further argued that the jury’s narrow majority should have been upheld.

The State maintained that the thumb‑impression evidence was admissible, non‑testimonial, and sufficient to prove the forging offence; that the offences under IPC §467 and Registration Act §82(c) were distinct, permitting the same evidence to be considered for each; and that the reference was unnecessary because a reasonable body of men could have reached the jury’s conclusion.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The appeal involved the following statutory provisions: IPC §467 (forgery of a valuable security), IPC §109 (abetment), Registration Act §82(c) (false personation and presentation of a document), CrPC §307 (reference of a jury verdict to a higher court), Article 20(3) of the Constitution (protection against self‑incrimination), and Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution (certificate of fitness).

Relevant legal principles were: (a) a reference under Section 307 is justified only when the evidence is such that no reasonable body of men could have arrived at the jury’s verdict; (b) the jury’s finding of fact prevails where the evidence could properly support either a guilty or a not‑guilty conclusion; (c) thumb‑impression evidence is not “testimonial” within the meaning of Article 20(3) and therefore does not violate the privilege against self‑incrimination; (d) evidence rejected for one charge may be admitted as corroborative for a distinct charge, the issue being the weight to be assigned, not admissibility; and (e) the distinction between separate offences permits the same piece of evidence to be considered for each.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Supreme Court applied the test for a Section 307 reference and held that the prosecution’s evidence – the thumb‑impression comparison, the clerk’s testimony, and the identification by the second appellant – could properly support a guilty verdict. Consequently, the jury’s majority finding was deemed reasonable, and the reference was declared unjustified.

Regarding Article 20(3), the Court observed that the statutory phrase “to be a witness” required testimonial communication of personal knowledge. The mechanical process of providing thumb‑impressions did not constitute such communication; therefore, the evidence was admissible and did not infringe the constitutional protection.

The Court further reasoned that the acquittal on the registration‑act charge did not render the thumb‑impression evidence inadmissible for the forging charge. Citing the principle articulated in Malak Khan v. King Emperor, it held that evidence rejected for one offence could be considered as corroborative for another distinct offence, provided the trial judge’s finding was that the charge was not proven rather than that the story was baseless.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the High Court was within its jurisdiction to convict the appellants under IPC §467 read with §109, that the thumb‑impression evidence was reliable and admissible, and that the conviction was supported by the material on record.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, refused the relief sought by the appellants, and upheld the conviction and the sentence of two years’ rigorous imprisonment imposed by the Calcutta High Court for the offences punishable under IPC §467 and the corresponding abetment provision. The judgment affirmed the validity of the reference under Section 307 as unwarranted, confirmed the admissibility of thumb‑impression evidence, and clarified that an acquittal on one charge does not preclude the use of the same evidence for a distinct offence. The convictions and sentences remained in force.