Case Analysis: Tarachand Damu Sutar vs The State of Maharashtra

Case Details

Case name: Tarachand Damu Sutar vs The State of Maharashtra
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, Raghubar Dayal
Date of decision: 1961-05-04
Citation / citations: 1962 AIR 130, 1962 SCR (2) 775
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1960; Criminal Appeals Nos. 488, 426 of 1960; Review Application Nos. 555, 641 of 1960
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Supreme Court of India

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Tarachand Damu Sutar, had been married to Sindhubai since about 1950. The couple lived in a one‑room tenement within a larger building and had a child born roughly one and a half years before the incident. Their relationship had become strained two years prior to the occurrence, with frequent quarrels and the appellant’s refusal to provide basic necessities.

On 2 November 1959 (Bhaubij day), after Sindhubai had taken her evening meal at her mother’s house, she returned to the marital home and went to sleep. According to the prosecution, while she slept the appellant beat her, sprinkled kerosene on her clothes and set them alight. Sindhubai, with her clothes burning, attempted to reach the house of the appellant’s cousin Shantabai, collapsed near that house, and was found nearly naked. She was taken to the Civil Hospital, Dhulia, where Dr Javeri examined her. While in the hospital she reiterated that her husband had set fire to her clothes. A magistrate, Mhatre, recorded her statement in a question‑and‑answer format at about 5:30 p.m.; the deceased was deemed fit to give the declaration despite being unable to sign because of burnt hands. She died at 8:15 p.m. the same day.

The prosecution’s case rested on three dying declarations: (1) to her mother Chandrabhagabai, (2) to Dr Javeri, and (3) to Magistrate Mhatre. Each identified the appellant as the person who had sprinkled kerosene and set fire to her clothes.

The appellant pleaded an alibi, asserting that he was at a construction site belonging to Mulchand Rajmal in Nehru Nagar at the material time. The alibi was supported only by the testimony of a co‑worker, Gangaram Sitaram, and was rejected by the trial court.

The Sessions Court at Dhulia convicted the appellant under section 304 Part 1 of the Indian Penal Code (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) and sentenced him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 100. The State appealed; the Bombay High Court set aside the conviction, convicted the appellant under section 302 (murder), and sentenced him to death.

The appellant applied for a certificate of appeal under Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution, which was denied. He then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136. The matter proceeded as Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1960, together with review applications Nos. 555 and 641 of 1960.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide two principal issues:

(i) Jurisdictional Issue: Whether the High Court’s judgment fell within the ambit of Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution, thereby giving the appellant a statutory right of appeal, given that the High Court had reversed an earlier acquittal on the charge of murder and substituted a conviction for a lesser offence.

(ii) Merits Issue: Whether the conviction for murder and the death sentence should be upheld, specifically examining the admissibility, reliability and sufficiency of the three dying declarations and the credibility of the appellant’s alibi defence and the alternative theory of suicide.

The appellant contended that “acquittal” under Article 134(1)(a) required a complete discharge of all charges and that his conviction for a lesser offence did not trigger the right of appeal. He also asserted that the dying declarations were prompted, that he was not present at the scene, and that the death was a suicide.

The State argued that “acquittal” embraced a situation where the accused was cleared of the offence charged but convicted of a lesser offence, and that the dying declarations were voluntarily given, unprompted, and reliable. It maintained that the alibi was untenable and that there was no evidence to support a suicide theory.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The Court considered the following statutory provisions:

Constitutional provisions: Article 134(1)(a), which provides a right of appeal to the Supreme Court when a High Court reverses an order of acquittal and imposes the death penalty; and Article 136, under which special leave to appeal was granted.

Substantive criminal law: Sections 302 and 304 Part 1 of the Indian Penal Code, dealing respectively with murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Procedural law: Section 238(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, authorising conviction on a lesser offence, and Section 439(4), which defines “acquittal” for the purpose of revisions and appeals.

The Court relied on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s decision in Kishan Singh v. The King, which held that “acquittal” includes a conviction for a lesser offence.

Legal principles applied were:

• A textual‑interpretation test for the word “acquittal,” adopting the broader construction endorsed in Kishan Singh.

• The established test for admissibility of dying declarations: the declarant must be aware of impending death, must make the statement voluntarily and without prompting, and must be competent to understand the questions posed.

• A factual‑consistency test for rejecting a suicide theory, requiring evidence of self‑inflicted intent and absence of external causation.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue. It held that the term “acquittal” under Article 134(1)(a) did not require a total discharge of all charges; it also covered a situation where the accused was acquitted of the offence originally charged but convicted of a lesser offence. Relying on Kishan Singh, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to a certificate of appeal as a matter of right, and the present proceeding was to be treated as an appeal under Article 134(1)(a).

Having settled jurisdiction, the Court turned to the merits. It examined the three dying declarations and found them to be voluntarily given, free from any prompting, and recorded in a manner that satisfied the competence requirement. The magistrate’s question‑and‑answer format, corroborated by the doctor’s certification of the deceased’s fitness to testify, compensated for the absence of a signature or thumb impression.

The Court evaluated the alibi defence and determined that the sole supporting testimony of Gangaram Sitaram was insufficient to overcome the totality of the evidence, including the dying declarations and the circumstances of the incident. Consequently, the alibi was rejected.

The Court also considered the proposition of suicide. It found no material evidence of self‑inflicted intent, and the surrounding facts—particularly the victim’s identification of the appellant as the perpetrator—contradicted a suicide theory. Accordingly, the suicide hypothesis was dismissed.

Applying the statutory provisions, the Court affirmed that the conviction for murder under section 302 IPC and the death sentence imposed by the High Court were legally sustainable.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court refused the relief sought by the appellant. It dismissed the appeal, thereby upholding the conviction for murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the death sentence imposed by the Bombay High Court. The appellant’s petition for a certificate of appeal was deemed maintainable, but the substantive challenge to the conviction and sentence failed. The conviction and sentence remained in force.