Case Analysis: The State of Uttar Pradesh vs Hafiz Mohammad Ismail and Hafiz Jawed Ali
Case Details
Case name: The State of Uttar Pradesh vs Hafiz Mohammad Ismail and Hafiz Jawed Ali
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: K.N. Wanchoo, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.C. Shah
Date of decision: 09 February 1960
Citation / citations: 1960 AIR 669; 1960 SCR (2) 911
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 129-130 of 1957; Criminal Revisions Nos. 118 and 119 of 1955; Criminal Appeals Nos. 511 and 512 of 1954
Neutral citation: 1960 SCR (2) 911
Proceeding type: Criminal appeal (special leave)
Source court or forum: Allahabad High Court (Lucknow bench)
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The investigation was initiated by Bhagwan Swarup Saxena, a trade‑marks investigator employed by Lever Brothers Limited, who discovered that two soap factories in Lucknow were manufacturing counterfeit Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps. The respondents, Hafiz Mohammad Ismail and Hafiz Jawed Ali, sold these soaps from shops in Yahiaganj. On 19 May 1953 the police raided the respondents’ premises and seized a large quantity of soaps wrapped in labels that closely resembled the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy packaging.
The magistrate examined the seized wrappers, found a close resemblance to the authentic labels, and concluded that the resemblance was likely to deceive a purchaser. Accordingly, the magistrate convicted the respondents under sections 482 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge affirmed the conviction and dismissed the respondents’ appeal.
The respondents then filed revisions before the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow bench). The High Court held that the wrappers were only “colourable imitations” and that the case did not fall within section 482; it therefore acquitted the respondents of both charges.
The State of Uttar Pradesh applied for a certificate of appeal, which the High Court denied. A special leave petition was subsequently granted, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appeal Nos. 129‑130 of 1957). The appeal was limited to the High Court’s acquittal under section 486; the acquittal under section 482 was not pressed by the State.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court was called upon to determine:
Whether the labels and wrappers used by the respondents constituted “counterfeit” within the meaning of section 28 of the Indian Penal Code, thereby attracting liability under section 486.
Whether the High Court’s characterization of the wrappers as “colourable imitations” and its consequent acquittal under section 486 were legally sustainable.
Whether the presumption of intention or knowledge of deception prescribed by Explanation 2 to section 28 applied to the facts as found by the lower courts.
The State contended that the High Court had failed to give full effect to section 28 and its explanations; it argued that the resemblance between the respondents’ wrappers and the genuine trademarks was sufficient to invoke the rebuttable presumption of intent or knowledge of deception.
The respondents contended that the wrappers were merely “colourable imitations,” that no intention or knowledge of deception could be inferred because the imitation was not exact, and that they were protected by the statutory exemptions in clauses (a), (b) or (c) of section 486. They also raised jurisdictional and limitation questions.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
Section 28, Indian Penal Code defined “counterfeit” as a person who causes one thing to resemble another with the intention of practising deception or knowing that deception was likely. Explanation 1 dispensed with the requirement of an exact imitation; Explanation 2 created a rebuttable presumption of intention or knowledge where the resemblance was such that a person might be deceived.
Section 482 dealt with forging a trademark, but the Court did not revisit this provision because the State had not pressed that ground on appeal.
Section 486 penalised any person who sells or offers for sale goods bearing a counterfeit trade‑mark, unless a statutory exemption under clauses (a), (b) or (c) was proved.
The legal test derived from section 28 required: (i) a caused resemblance to a genuine mark; and (ii) a likelihood of deception, which triggered the presumption of intent or knowledge under Explanation 2 unless rebutted.
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The Supreme Court first confirmed that the labels and wrappers seized from the respondents’ shops had been fashioned to resemble the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy trademarks. It then examined whether the resemblance was of a nature that could deceive an ordinary purchaser. Relying on the magistrate’s and Sessions Judge’s findings that the resemblance was close enough to mislead a consumer, the Court held that the statutory test under section 28 was satisfied.
The Court observed that the High Court had confined its analysis to the term “colourable imitation” without assessing the likelihood of deception, thereby neglecting the operative provisions of section 28 and its explanations. Applying Explanation 2, the Court presumed the requisite intention or knowledge of deception because the respondents had not disproved the presumption.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the wrappers were “counterfeit” within the meaning of section 28 and that the respondents were liable under section 486. The Court expressly refrained from deciding the pending jurisdictional, limitation, and exemption issues, noting that those matters required separate determination.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Allahabad High Court’s acquittal of the respondents under section 486, and directed that the matters be remanded to the High Court for further determination of the jurisdictional, limitation, and statutory exemption questions under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 486.
In its final conclusion, the Court held that the respondents had used counterfeit labels and wrappers that were likely to deceive consumers, thereby satisfying the elements of the offence under section 486. The acquittal on that charge was overturned, and the case was returned to the High Court for adjudication of the remaining legal issues.