Can the accused argue that a second extension order issued before the amendment’s commencement is ultra vires in a habeas corpus petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court?
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Suppose a person is placed under detention pursuant to the Public Safety Detention Act on a date in early summer, after the investigating agency files an FIR alleging involvement in activities deemed a threat to national security; the authorities furnish the accused with the grounds of detention and refer the matter to an Advisory Board, which submits its report a few weeks later, confirming the detention for a period of six months.
During the ensuing months the legislature enacts the Public Safety Detention (Amendment) Act, which introduces a new provision allowing the State to extend a detention beyond the original period without fresh advisory board approval, provided the extension is made after the amendment comes into force. The amendment is scheduled to become operative on the first day of the following month. However, before that date arrives, the State issues a second extension order, seeking to prolong the detention for an additional three months, relying on the yet‑uncommenced amendment.
The core legal problem that emerges is whether the State possessed the jurisdiction to issue the second extension order when the amendment had not yet commenced. The question turns on the interpretation of the General Clauses Act, which governs the effect of rules or orders made before an enactment takes effect, and on the meaning of the term “order” in the new amendment provision. If the extension is ultra vires, the detention continues beyond the period authorized by the original Act, infringing the accused’s liberty.
An ordinary factual defence—such as filing a representation before the Superintendent of the detention facility or seeking a review by the Advisory Board—fails to address the substantive statutory defect. The contested extension is not a procedural matter but a substantive order that directly alters the duration of deprivation of liberty. Because the order was issued before the amendment’s commencement, the statutory basis for the extension is absent, rendering the detention unlawful irrespective of any internal review.
Consequently, the appropriate remedy lies in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. A petition for habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution can directly challenge the legality of the detention, compelling the court to examine whether the extension order is valid and, if not, to order the release of the detained person.
The detention took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, making that court the proper forum for the writ petition. The High Court’s power to issue a writ of habeas corpus enables it to scrutinise the statutory construction of the amendment and to determine whether the State acted beyond its authority.
A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would therefore draft a petition that sets out the factual chronology, highlights the statutory conflict, and specifically alleges that the extension order was issued in contravention of the General Clauses Act and the amendment’s commencement clause. The petition would request that the court quash the illegal extension and direct the immediate release of the detainee.
In the petition, the counsel would rely on the principle that the General Clauses Act permits only preparatory or procedural orders before an enactment comes into force, not substantive orders that affect personal liberty. By invoking this principle, the petition seeks to demonstrate that the State’s reliance on the amendment to justify the extension is misplaced.
While the High Court will consider the statutory interpretation, it will also examine the factual record, including the original detention order, the advisory board’s report, and the dates of the amendment’s passage and commencement. The court’s analysis will mirror the approach taken by higher courts in similar preventive‑detention disputes, focusing on the purposive and grammatical construction of the amendment’s language.
Legal practitioners who specialise in such matters, such as lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, frequently encounter the tension between procedural safeguards and executive powers in preventive‑detention regimes. Their experience underscores the necessity of a High Court writ to resolve disputes where the executive attempts to extend detention without clear statutory authority.
The relief sought in the writ petition includes an order directing the Superintendent to set the detainee at liberty forthwith, a declaration that the second extension order is ultra vires, and a direction that any further detention must comply strictly with the procedural requirements of the original Act and its valid amendments. The petition may also request costs and any other appropriate relief.
By filing the habeas corpus petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused can obtain a judicial determination on the legality of the extension, ensuring that any deprivation of liberty conforms to the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and the statutory framework governing preventive detention.
Question: Does the State possess jurisdiction to issue the second extension order when the amendment providing for such extensions had not yet commenced, and what legal principles determine the validity of that order?
Answer: The factual matrix shows that the accused was initially detained under the Public Safety Detention Act, with a six‑month period confirmed by an Advisory Board. While the legislature was amending the Act, it introduced a provision allowing extensions without fresh advisory board approval, but the amendment was scheduled to become operative on the first day of the following month. The State, however, issued a second extension order before that date, relying on the not‑yet‑effective amendment. The core legal issue is whether a substantive order that alters the duration of personal liberty can be issued before the amendment’s commencement. Under the General Clauses Act, orders made before an enactment comes into force are limited to procedural or preparatory matters; they cannot create substantive rights or obligations. Consequently, the second extension order, which directly extends the period of detention, is ultra vires if the amendment was not yet in force. The principle that the State cannot act beyond the authority conferred by existing law governs this analysis. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the State exceeded its statutory power, rendering the order void ab initio. The prosecution, on the other hand, may contend that the amendment’s language permits retrospective effect, but such a construction conflicts with the established rule that substantive orders require a live statutory basis. The High Court, when confronted with this dispute, will examine the chronology of the amendment’s passage, its commencement clause, and the nature of the order. If the court finds the extension order invalid, the detention beyond the original six‑month term becomes unlawful, exposing the State to liability for unlawful detention and entitling the accused to immediate release. This outcome underscores the necessity for the State to adhere strictly to the procedural safeguards embedded in preventive‑detention regimes, and it illustrates why the accused must seek judicial intervention through a writ petition to protect constitutional liberty.
Question: How does the General Clauses Act influence the effect of the State’s second extension order, and can it be interpreted to permit substantive orders affecting personal liberty before the amendment’s commencement?
Answer: The General Clauses Act governs the operation of rules, orders, and regulations made before an enactment takes effect. Its purpose is to allow preparatory measures, such as setting timelines or procedural mechanisms, without conferring substantive rights or duties before the law is operative. In the present scenario, the State’s second extension order sought to prolong the accused’s detention, a substantive deprivation of liberty, on the basis of an amendment that had not yet commenced. The Act’s provision on pre‑commencement orders is limited to “with respect to the time when or the manner in which anything is to be done,” which does not extend to altering the duration of a detention order. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would emphasize that allowing substantive extensions before the amendment’s effective date would undermine the constitutional safeguard of personal liberty and contravene the purposive construction of the General Clauses Act. The courts have consistently held that any order affecting individual rights must rest on a statute that is in force at the time of issuance. Therefore, the second extension order cannot be salvaged by a liberal reading of the General Clauses Act; it remains ultra vires. The prosecution may argue that the amendment’s language was intended to have retrospective effect, but such an interpretation would be strained, as it would effectively create a new substantive right before the law’s commencement, which the Act expressly prohibits. The High Court’s analysis will focus on the nature of the order—whether it is procedural or substantive—and the timing of the amendment’s commencement. If the court concludes that the order is substantive and issued prematurely, it will declare the order void, rendering any detention beyond the original period unlawful. This legal reasoning reinforces the necessity for the State to await the amendment’s operative date before exercising any extended powers, and it provides the accused with a solid basis for seeking immediate release through a habeas corpus petition.
Question: What is the proper interpretation of the term “order” in the amendment’s provision allowing extensions, and does it refer to the original detention order or the confirmed order by the Advisory Board?
Answer: The amendment introduces language permitting extensions of detention “unless a shorter period is specified in the order.” The crux lies in identifying which “order” the provision contemplates. The original detention order, issued at the time of arrest, merely sets the initial grounds and does not fix a definitive period of confinement; that function is performed by the subsequent confirmation order issued after the Advisory Board’s report. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the term “order” must be read in its ordinary statutory context, referring to the order that legally binds the State to a specific period of detention—namely, the confirmed order. This interpretation aligns with the principle that only a finalized, legally enforceable order can be the basis for an extension. The prosecution might assert that the original order, being the first exercise of the State’s power, suffices as the “order” contemplated. However, such a view neglects the procedural safeguards embedded in preventive‑detention statutes, where the Advisory Board’s confirmation is essential to legitimize the detention period. The High Court will examine the statutory scheme, the sequence of events, and the purpose of the amendment. By focusing on the confirmed order, the court ensures that any extension is anchored to a legally vetted determination of the detention period, preserving the procedural rights of the accused. If the court adopts this interpretation, the second extension order, which attempted to extend detention without reference to a confirmed order, would be invalid. Consequently, the accused’s detention beyond the period fixed by the confirmed order would be unlawful, entitling the petitioner to immediate release. This analysis underscores the importance of precise statutory interpretation and the role of the Advisory Board’s confirmation in safeguarding personal liberty within the preventive‑detention framework.
Question: What relief can the accused obtain by filing a writ of habeas corpus in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and what procedural steps must be followed to secure immediate release?
Answer: The accused, having been detained beyond the legally authorized period due to an ultra‑vires extension order, can approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court with a petition for habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ seeks a judicial determination of the legality of the detention and, if found unlawful, an order directing the Superintendent to set the detainee at liberty forthwith. The procedural pathway begins with drafting a petition that meticulously outlines the factual chronology: the initial detention, the Advisory Board’s report, the six‑month confirmation, the amendment’s passage, its scheduled commencement, and the premature second extension order. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would ensure that the petition alleges a breach of the General Clauses Act and the statutory requirement that extensions be grounded in a law in force at the time of issuance. The petition must also request a declaration that the second extension order is void and that any further detention is illegal. Upon filing, the court may issue a notice to the State, directing it to show cause why the detention should not be ordered for release. The State will be required to produce the extension order and justify its legality. Given the clear statutory defect, the High Court is likely to quash the order and grant the writ, ordering immediate release and possibly awarding costs. The petition may also seek directions that any future extensions comply strictly with the procedural safeguards of the original Act, thereby preventing recurrence. The practical implication for the accused is swift restoration of liberty; for the State, it means a reminder to adhere to statutory limits and procedural requirements. The prosecution may appeal any adverse decision, but the initial relief of habeas corpus is a powerful tool to protect constitutional rights against unlawful detention.
Question: Can the accused seek bail pending the determination of the writ petition, and what factors will the court consider in deciding whether to grant bail in a preventive‑detention context?
Answer: While the primary remedy is the habeas corpus petition, the accused may also apply for bail to secure temporary liberty pending the court’s final decision. In a preventive‑detention scenario, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary, hinging on considerations such as the nature of the alleged threat to national security, the likelihood of the accused fleeing, and the existence of substantive evidence justifying continued detention. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the detention is already unlawful due to the invalid second extension order, rendering the bail question moot; however, the court may still entertain a bail application to address any residual custodial concerns. The court will assess whether the accused poses a real and imminent danger to public order, whether the investigating agency has presented credible material justifying the original detention, and whether the procedural safeguards—particularly the Advisory Board’s findings—have been satisfied. Since the advisory board’s report confirmed the initial six‑month detention and the subsequent extension order lacks statutory basis, the court is likely to view the continued custody as unjustified. Consequently, the court may grant bail, imposing conditions such as surrender of passport, regular reporting to the police, or surety. The practical effect of granting bail is to alleviate the hardship of incarceration while the writ proceeds, and it underscores the principle that preventive detention must be exercised with strict adherence to legal safeguards. For the State, a bail order signals the necessity to substantiate any future detention with valid statutory authority, and for the prosecution, it may prompt a reassessment of the evidentiary basis for the original allegations. Ultimately, the court’s decision on bail will reflect a balance between safeguarding national security and upholding the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.
Question: Why does the writ petition challenging the second extension of detention have to be filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than any other forum, and what aspects of territorial jurisdiction and constitutional authority make that court the proper venue?
Answer: The factual matrix places the detention within a correctional facility that falls under the administrative control of the State of Punjab and Haryana, and the statutory scheme governing the Public Safety Detention Act expressly designates the High Court of that State as the competent authority for exercising the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Because the alleged unlawful extension was effected by a State order issued by the Superintendent of the detention centre located in Chandigarh, the territorial nexus is clearly established; the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction extends to all districts and institutions within the State, including those situated in the Union Territory of Chandigarh that are administered by the Punjab and Haryana government. Moreover, the Constitution confers upon the High Court the power to entertain habeas corpus applications whenever a person is detained without legal sanction, irrespective of whether the detention originates from a central or state law, provided the detention occurs within the court’s territorial limits. The High Court’s jurisdiction is not limited by the nature of the law invoked; it can scrutinise both the substantive validity of the extension order and the procedural compliance with the General Clauses Act. This jurisdictional reach is reinforced by precedent that holds the High Court to be the appropriate forum for preventive‑detention challenges when the detention takes place within its geographical area, even if the legislation is of national character. Consequently, a petition filed elsewhere would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, forcing the accused to approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court becomes essential because such counsel will be familiar with the local rules of practice, the procedural requisites for filing a habeas corpus petition, and the nuances of the State’s detention statutes, thereby ensuring that the petition is framed correctly, supported by appropriate annexures, and presented within the statutory time‑limits prescribed for challenging detention orders.
Question: In what way does a purely factual defence, such as filing a representation before the Superintendent or seeking a review by the Advisory Board, fail to address the core legal defect in the second extension order, and why must the accused resort to a writ remedy?
Answer: The factual defence strategy relies on the premise that the accused can persuade the administrative authority to reconsider the extension by demonstrating compliance with the procedural steps outlined in the Public Safety Detention Act, such as submitting a representation or invoking the Advisory Board’s review power. However, the contested second extension order is not a procedural irregularity but a substantive statutory violation because it was issued before the amendment that purportedly authorises such extensions had come into force. The General Clauses Act limits pre‑commencement orders to preparatory or procedural matters and expressly excludes substantive orders that affect personal liberty. Therefore, any representation before the Superintendent or a request for the Advisory Board to revisit the order would be futile, as the board’s jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the original detention order and its compliance with procedural safeguards, not to validate an ultra vires extension. Moreover, the Advisory Board’s report, which confirmed the first six‑month detention, does not extend to the second order, leaving a gap that the State cannot fill without statutory authority. Because the legal defect resides in the absence of a valid legislative basis, the remedy must be sought in a forum that can declare the order null and void and order the release of the detainee. The writ of habeas corpus, available under Article 226, is the constitutional instrument designed to test the legality of detention and to command the release of a person when the detention is unlawful. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would advise that the only effective avenue is to approach the High Court with a petition that challenges the ultra vires nature of the extension, thereby bypassing the ineffective administrative remedies and directly confronting the State’s claim of authority before a judicial body empowered to scrutinise both the statutory construction and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.
Question: What are the precise procedural steps that the accused must follow to institute a habeas corpus petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and how should the involvement of lawyers in Chandigarh High Court and a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court be coordinated to ensure compliance with filing requirements?
Answer: The procedural roadmap begins with the preparation of a petition that sets out the factual chronology of the detention, the issuance of the first and second extension orders, the date of commencement of the amendment, and the specific allegation that the second extension was ultra vires. The petition must be drafted on the prescribed court form, signed by an authorized advocate, and accompanied by annexures including copies of the FIR, the original detention order, the Advisory Board’s report, the second extension order, and any correspondence with the Superintendent. The petitioner must also attach an affidavit affirming the truth of the facts and stating that the accused is currently in custody. Once the petition is ready, it must be filed at the registry of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where the filing fee is paid and a court‑generated diary number is obtained. After filing, the petition is listed for hearing, and the court issues a notice to the respondent State authorities, directing them to produce the detainee before the court. Coordination with a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court is advisable for gathering local evidence, obtaining certified copies of the detention orders from the detention centre, and ensuring that the representation before the Superintendent is properly documented. Simultaneously, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court will handle the actual filing, draft the legal arguments invoking the General Clauses Act, the constitutional guarantee of liberty, and the writ jurisdiction, and will appear before the bench to argue the case. The two counsel must communicate to synchronize the annexure preparation, verify that all documents are in the correct format, and confirm that the petition complies with the High Court’s rules on length, language, and service of notice. By aligning the expertise of lawyers in Chandigarh High Court for factual collection and lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court for procedural advocacy, the petitioner ensures that the petition meets all statutory and procedural prerequisites, thereby maximising the likelihood of the court granting relief and ordering the immediate release of the detainee.
Question: Assuming the Punjab and Haryana High Court finds the second extension order ultra vires and grants the habeas corpus relief, what are the subsequent legal consequences for the State, the investigating agency, and the accused, and how might the State seek further recourse through revision or appeal?
Answer: A declaration that the second extension order is ultra vires triggers an immediate directive for the Superintendent to set the accused at liberty, thereby terminating the unlawful detention and restoring the constitutional right to personal liberty. The court’s order will also include a direction that any future detention must strictly adhere to the procedural safeguards of the Public Safety Detention Act and the amendment, effectively nullifying the State’s reliance on the premature extension. For the investigating agency, the judgment serves as a cautionary precedent, compelling it to ensure that any future orders are grounded in valid statutory authority and that the General Clauses Act is not misapplied to create substantive orders before a law’s commencement. The accused, having been released, may seek compensation for the period of unlawful detention, although such a claim would require a separate civil proceeding. The State, dissatisfied with the High Court’s finding, retains the statutory right to file a revision petition before the same High Court, challenging the legal reasoning on points of law, or to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of India on a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the General Clauses Act and the scope of preventive‑detention powers. In preparing a revision or appeal, the State would engage a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court to draft the memorandum of revision, citing precedents that support a broader reading of pre‑commencement powers, while a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court might assist in gathering additional documentary evidence from the detention facility. The appellate process would not stay the operative effect of the habeas corpus order unless the State obtains a stay, which is rarely granted in liberty‑depriving matters. Consequently, the immediate practical effect is the release of the detainee, while the longer‑term impact includes a judicial clarification of the limits of executive power in preventive detention, guiding future legislative and administrative actions.
Question: Does the State possess jurisdiction to issue the second extension order when the amendment providing for such extensions had not yet commenced, and how does the General Clauses Act affect the validity of that order?
Answer: The factual matrix shows that the accused was initially detained under the Public Safety Detention Act, with a six‑month term confirmed by an Advisory Board. While the legislature was in the process of amending the Act to allow extensions without fresh board approval, the amendment was scheduled to become operative on the first day of the following month. The State, however, issued a second extension order three weeks before that date, relying on the not‑yet‑effective amendment. The legal problem therefore centers on whether a substantive order that alters the period of deprivation of liberty can be made before the amendment’s commencement. The General Clauses Act governs the effect of rules, orders or regulations made before an enactment comes into force. Its provision on preparatory orders permits the State to issue directions concerning the time or manner of doing things under the future law, but it does not empower the State to make a substantive order that directly affects personal liberty. Consequently, the second extension order is ultra vires because it is a substantive alteration of the detention period, not a mere procedural direction. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would need to demonstrate, through the petition, the exact dates of the amendment’s passage, its commencement clause, and the issuance of the extension order, establishing the temporal gap that renders the order illegal. Procedurally, the High Court will treat the order as void ab initio, meaning the detention beyond the original six‑month term lacks any statutory basis. Practically, this creates a strong ground for the accused to seek immediate release via a habeas corpus petition, as the continued custody is unlawful. The State’s reliance on the amendment will be scrutinised for prospective operation, and the court is likely to hold that prospective effect cannot be invoked to validate a past order that infringes constitutional liberty. The implication for the prosecution is that any evidence gathered during the unlawful extension may be tainted, and the State may face contempt proceedings for violating statutory limits. The accused, therefore, stands on solid footing to obtain relief and to challenge any further detention attempts that ignore the procedural requirements of the original Act.
Question: What documentary and evidentiary material should be gathered to establish the chronology of the amendment’s passage, its commencement, and the advisory board’s report, and how can these be used to strengthen the writ petition?
Answer: The factual context requires a meticulous compilation of the original detention order, the advisory board’s report confirming the six‑month period, the text of the amendment as passed by the legislature, the official gazette notification indicating the date of commencement, and the second extension order itself. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would first obtain certified copies of the FIR, the detention order, and the advisory board’s minutes to demonstrate that the original statutory framework was properly followed up to the expiry of the six‑month term. Next, the practitioner must secure the amendment’s legislative history, including the bill, the assent date, and the specific clause stating that the amendment becomes operative on the first day of the following month. The official gazette is critical because it provides conclusive proof of the commencement date, which is the linchpin in establishing that the extension order predates the amendment’s effect. Additionally, the second extension order must be produced, showing its date of issuance and the statutory basis cited by the State. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would also seek any correspondence between the investigating agency and the State’s legal department that references the amendment, as such internal memos may reveal the State’s awareness of the commencement schedule. The evidentiary strategy involves filing the writ petition with annexures of all these documents, highlighting the temporal discrepancy in a chronological timeline. The court will be asked to verify the dates and to apply the principle that a substantive order cannot be retroactively validated. By presenting the gazette and the extension order side by side, the petition demonstrates that the State acted beyond its authority. The practical implication is that the High Court can readily see the statutory defect, making it more likely to grant relief. Moreover, the thorough documentary record precludes the State from claiming procedural irregularities or inadvertent error, thereby strengthening the accused’s position for immediate release and possibly for costs against the State for unlawful detention.
Question: How should a criminal lawyer craft a habeas corpus petition to maximize the chances of quashing the illegal extension and securing the accused’s release, and what reliefs beyond immediate liberty can be sought?
Answer: The strategic approach begins with a clear statement of facts, outlining the initial detention, the advisory board’s confirmation, the amendment’s passage, its scheduled commencement, and the premature issuance of the second extension order. The petition must allege that the extension order is ultra vires, contravenes the General Clauses Act, and violates the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would structure the prayer clause to request that the court declare the second extension order void, order the immediate release of the accused, and direct the Superintendent to set the detainee at liberty forthwith. Additionally, the petition can seek a declaration that any future detention must strictly adhere to the procedural safeguards of the original Act, thereby preventing the State from repeating the error. The counsel may also ask for costs and an order directing the State to maintain a record of all future detention orders for judicial scrutiny. To reinforce the petition, the lawyer should attach the documentary evidence described earlier and cite precedents where courts have invalidated pre‑commencement orders. The practical implication of seeking costs is to deter the State from frivolous extensions and to compensate the accused for the unlawful deprivation. The petition may further request that the court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the investigating agency to review any evidence obtained during the unlawful extension, ensuring that any subsequent prosecution does not rely on tainted material. By framing the reliefs comprehensively, the criminal lawyer not only secures immediate liberty but also establishes protective measures against future procedural violations, thereby safeguarding the accused’s rights throughout any ensuing trial. This holistic strategy aligns with the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 and leverages both substantive and procedural arguments to achieve a robust outcome.
Question: What arguments might the State raise, such as the doctrine of prospective operation or reliance on a broader interpretation of “order” in the amendment, and how can the defence effectively counter these positions?
Answer: The State is likely to contend that the amendment’s provisions are intended to have prospective effect, allowing the executive to apply the new extension power immediately upon passage, even before formal commencement, to avoid a gap in enforcement. It may also argue that the term “order” in the amendment refers to the original detention order, not the advisory board’s confirmation, thereby permitting the extension without fresh approval. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court must anticipate these contentions and prepare counter‑arguments grounded in statutory interpretation and constitutional principles. First, the defence can point out that the General Clauses Act expressly limits pre‑commencement orders to procedural matters, and a substantive extension of liberty cannot be justified under a prospective operation doctrine because it would undermine the constitutional safeguard of personal liberty. The counsel can cite jurisprudence where courts have refused to allow retrospective validation of orders that affect fundamental rights. Second, the defence can argue that the ordinary grammatical construction of “order” in the amendment, within the context of preventive detention statutes, refers to the order confirmed by the advisory board, as that is the only order that specifies a period of detention. The original detention order merely initiates the process and lacks a defined term, making it illogical to treat it as the operative “order” for extension purposes. By emphasizing the purposive reading of the amendment, the lawyer can demonstrate that the legislature intended to streamline extensions only after the advisory board’s confirmation, not to bypass it. Moreover, the defence can highlight that the amendment’s commencement clause was explicit, and any deviation would be a legislative overreach. Practically, these counter‑arguments reinforce the petition’s claim that the second extension order is void, thereby compelling the High Court to quash it and order release. The State’s reliance on prospective operation will be seen as an attempt to circumvent statutory safeguards, weakening its position and supporting the accused’s claim for immediate relief.