Can the accused contest a magistrate’s approver order on the ground that the pardon does not extend to an Official Secrets breach?

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Suppose a senior official of a central government department, acting as the investigating agency, registers an FIR under the Official Secrets Act after discovering that confidential policy drafts have been leaked to a private consultancy firm for monetary gain.

The consultancy, through an intermediary, obtained the drafts and passed them to a commercial entity that later published the information. The intermediary, who received a substantial sum for facilitating the breach, is later apprehended. While in custody, the intermediary applies for a pardon under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure that allow a pardon for certain categories of offences. The magistrate, relying on the pardon, treats the intermediary as an approver and permits the prosecution to call him as a state‑witness who can turn state‑against‑state.

During the trial, the accused—who is charged with the offence of disclosing official secrets in conjunction with conspiracy—objects to the intermediary’s status as an approver. The defence argues that the pardon was granted under a provision that enumerates only specific offences, none of which include violations of the Official Secrets Act. Consequently, the intermediary should be examined merely as a witness, not as an approver whose testimony could convert the proceeding into a commitment trial.

The prosecution, however, maintains that the pardon covers all offences arising from the same set of facts, including the Official Secrets violation, and therefore the intermediary may be examined as an approver. The magistrate’s order to treat the intermediary as an approver is challenged by the accused, who files an application for revision, contending that the statutory scope of the pardon does not extend to the Official Secrets offence.

The crux of the legal problem lies in the interpretation of the statutory provision that authorises a pardon. The provision lists three distinct categories of offences: those triable exclusively by a High Court or Court of Session, offences punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years, and a specific set of offences enumerated in the Indian Penal Code. The offence under the Official Secrets Act does not fall within any of these categories, nor is it triable exclusively by a High Court. Hence, the statutory language suggests that the pardon cannot be validly extended to cover the Official Secrets breach.

Relying solely on an ordinary factual defence—such as disputing the credibility of the intermediary’s testimony—does not address the procedural defect that the magistrate’s order may be ultra vires. The accused must therefore seek a higher‑order remedy that can set aside the magistrate’s decision on the ground of jurisdictional error and statutory mis‑interpretation. This remedy is available only through a criminal revision petition filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which has the authority to examine the legality of the magistrate’s order and to determine whether the pardon can be applied to the offence in question.

The revision petition frames the issue as a question of law: whether the pardon granted under the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. It requests that the Punjab and Haryana High Court quash the magistrate’s order treating the intermediary as an approver and direct that the trial proceed on the basis of the intermediary’s testimony as a regular witness, if at all.

A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, familiar with the nuances of criminal procedure, would advise the accused that the proper avenue for challenging the magistrate’s order is not an appeal against conviction, but a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The lawyer would draft the revision petition, citing precedent that limits the scope of pardons to the offences expressly listed in the statute, and would argue that any extension beyond those categories would be ultra vires.

Similarly, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would emphasize that the High Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain revisions against orders of subordinate courts when a question of law is involved. The counsel would highlight that the revision is not a re‑trial but a review of the legal correctness of the magistrate’s decision, and would seek an order directing the trial court to re‑examine the intermediary solely as a witness, thereby preserving the accused’s right to a fair trial.

In preparing the revision, the lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would attach the original FIR, the pardon order, and the magistrate’s order treating the intermediary as an approver. They would also reference the statutory language of the pardon provision, demonstrating that the Official Secrets offence does not satisfy any of the enumerated categories. By doing so, the petition establishes that the magistrate’s order is founded on a mis‑interpretation of the law.

The High Court, upon hearing the revision, would examine the statutory construction of the pardon provision, the nature of the offence, and the procedural implications of treating the intermediary as an approver. If the Court finds that the pardon cannot be validly applied, it would issue a writ of certiorari or an order of revision quashing the magistrate’s decision, thereby restoring the procedural integrity of the trial.

Such a procedural remedy is essential because the ability to call an approver carries significant evidentiary consequences. An approver’s testimony is deemed to have a higher degree of reliability, and the trial may be converted into a commitment proceeding, which alters the rights of the accused, including the right to bail and the standard of proof. By securing a revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused safeguards against an unwarranted escalation of the proceedings based on a statutory mis‑application.

Finally, the revision route underscores the importance of precise statutory interpretation in criminal law. It illustrates that a seemingly technical issue—whether a pardon covers a particular offence—can have profound ramifications on the conduct of the trial and the rights of the parties. The High Court’s intervention, guided by the arguments of lawyers in Chandigarh High Court and lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court, ensures that the criminal justice process adheres to the limits set by legislation, thereby upholding the rule of law.

Question: Did the magistrate exceed his jurisdiction by treating the intermediary as an approver when the pardon provision expressly limits its application to offences triable only by a High Court, offences punishable up to seven years, or a specific set of offences, none of which include a breach of official secrets?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the intermediary was granted a pardon under a statutory provision that enumerates three distinct categories of offences. The breach of official secrets, as alleged, does not fall within any of those categories. The magistrate’s order therefore rests on a construction of the pardon provision that expands its reach beyond the literal wording. In criminal procedure, a magistrate must interpret statutory language strictly when the legislature has drawn clear boundaries. A liberal reading that would allow the pardon to cover any offence arising from the same factual matrix would effectively rewrite the statute, a power that belongs only to the legislature. Consequently, the magistrate’s decision is vulnerable to being set aside as ultra vires. The accused can argue that the magistrate misapplied the law, and that the intermediary should be examined merely as a witness, not as an approver whose testimony carries a presumption of reliability. This argument aligns with the principle that procedural safeguards cannot be overridden by an erroneous classification of a party’s status. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, familiar with the nuances of pardon provisions, would emphasize that the statutory language is unambiguous and that the magistrate’s order cannot stand. The High Court, on review, would likely find that the magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction, leading to the quashing of the approver order and restoration of the trial’s proper procedural posture.

Question: What is the correct procedural remedy for the accused to challenge the magistrate’s order, and why is a criminal revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court the appropriate avenue rather than an appeal against conviction?

Answer: The accused is not seeking to overturn a conviction but to contest a procedural order that determines the status of a key witness. The law provides that orders of subordinate courts, when they involve a question of law, may be reviewed through a revision petition filed in the High Court having territorial jurisdiction. A revision is distinct from an appeal; it does not re‑examine the evidence or the merits of the case but tests the legality, jurisdiction, and correctness of the lower court’s decision. In this scenario, the magistrate’s order hinges on the interpretation of the pardon provision, a pure question of law. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is a criminal revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. This High Court possesses the authority to issue a writ of certiorari or an order of revision to set aside the magistrate’s decision if it is found to be erroneous. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise that filing an appeal against conviction would be procedurally improper and likely dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the conviction itself has not yet been pronounced. Moreover, a revision allows the accused to obtain immediate relief, preventing the trial from proceeding on an invalid evidentiary basis. The High Court’s intervention would preserve the integrity of the trial, ensuring that the intermediary’s testimony is considered only as that of a regular witness, thereby safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair trial.

Question: How does classifying the intermediary as an approver alter the evidentiary standards and procedural rights of the accused compared with treating him merely as a regular witness?

Answer: An approver’s testimony enjoys a statutory presumption of reliability because the approver has admitted participation in the crime and offered to turn state‑against‑state. This presumption shifts the evidentiary burden onto the prosecution to rebut the credibility of the approver, and it often permits the court to convert a trial into a commitment proceeding, where the standard of proof may be relaxed and bail considerations become more restrictive. Conversely, a regular witness’s testimony is subject to the ordinary rules of evidence; the prosecution must establish the witness’s credibility and relevance without any statutory advantage. The accused therefore retains the full spectrum of defensive tools, including cross‑examination and the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence. If the intermediary is treated as an approver, the accused may face a higher risk of conviction based on the approver’s statements, even if those statements are not corroborated by independent evidence. Additionally, the procedural right to bail may be curtailed, as commitment proceedings often involve stricter bail thresholds. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would stress that the distinction is material because it directly impacts the accused’s liberty and the fairness of the trial. The High Court, upon reviewing the magistrate’s order, would need to consider whether the procedural shift is justified by a correct legal interpretation of the pardon provision. If the court finds the classification erroneous, it will restore the ordinary evidentiary regime, thereby preserving the accused’s procedural safeguards.

Question: What would be the consequences for the accused if the High Court upheld the magistrate’s decision to treat the intermediary as an approver, particularly regarding bail, the nature of the proceeding, and the overall fairness of the trial?

Answer: An affirmation of the magistrate’s order would convert the trial into a commitment proceeding, a procedural category that typically allows the prosecution to rely heavily on the approver’s testimony. In such proceedings, the court may dispense with the requirement of proving the offence beyond a reasonable doubt to the same extent as in a regular trial, focusing instead on whether the approver’s statements establish a prima facie case. This shift would significantly diminish the accused’s ability to contest the evidence, as the approver’s statements are presumed trustworthy. Moreover, the right to bail becomes more constrained; courts are less inclined to grant bail in commitment proceedings because the accused is deemed to have already admitted participation in the crime. The accused would therefore face prolonged pre‑trial detention, which could prejudice the defense and erode the presumption of innocence. The fairness of the trial would be called into question, as the procedural safeguards that normally protect an accused from uncorroborated testimony would be weakened. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that such an outcome would be inconsistent with the principle of proportionality and the right to a fair trial enshrined in constitutional law. The High Court’s role is to ensure that procedural transformations are grounded in correct statutory interpretation. If the court were to uphold the magistrate’s order despite a clear textual limitation on the pardon provision, it would set a precedent that expands the scope of pardons beyond legislative intent, undermining legal certainty and the accused’s constitutional protections.

Question: On what evidentiary basis can the prosecution justify its claim that the pardon extends to all offences arising from the same set of facts, and what burden of proof must it meet to sustain the approver status of the intermediary?

Answer: The prosecution must demonstrate that the statutory language of the pardon provision is capable of a broad, purposive construction that includes subsidiary offences linked to the primary offence for which the pardon was granted. To meet this burden, it must produce legislative history, policy considerations, and precedent indicating that the legislature intended the pardon to cover the entire factual matrix, not merely the enumerated categories. Additionally, the prosecution must show that the offence of breaching official secrets is intrinsically connected to the other offences covered by the pardon, such that the intermediary’s conduct forms a single continuous transaction. However, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to establish that the pardon legitimately applies to the official‑secrets breach. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would point out that without explicit statutory language or authoritative judicial interpretation extending the pardon, the prosecution’s claim is speculative. The High Court will assess whether the prosecution has met the evidentiary threshold required to sustain the approver status, which includes proving that the pardon’s scope was intended to be expansive and that the intermediary’s admission covers the official‑secrets offence. If the prosecution fails to provide convincing statutory or jurisprudential support, the court will likely reject the claim, thereby denying the approver status and preserving the ordinary evidentiary regime for the trial.

Question: Why is a criminal revision petition the proper avenue for challenging the magistrate’s order treating the intermediary as an approver, and why does that challenge fall within the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than an ordinary appeal against conviction?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the accused is still at the trial stage, with the magistrate having issued an interlocutory order that the intermediary may be examined as an approver. This order does not culminate in a conviction; it merely alters the procedural posture of the trial by converting it into a commitment proceeding. Under the prevailing criminal procedural framework, an appeal against conviction is available only after a final judgment of guilt has been rendered. Consequently, the accused cannot resort to an appeal at this juncture because there is no conclusive finding of guilt to be appealed. Instead, the appropriate remedy is a revision petition, which is a superior‑court review of a subordinate‑court order on a question of law. The Punjab and Haryana High Court possesses statutory authority to entertain revisions against orders of magistrates when the order is alleged to be ultra vires, illegal, or contrary to law. The crux of the legal problem is the interpretation of the pardon provision, a pure question of law concerning whether the statutory categories of offences encompass the Official Secrets violation. Since the High Court is the only forum empowered to interpret such statutory language and to examine the jurisdictional competence of the magistrate, the revision route is indispensable. Moreover, the High Court’s power to quash an illegal order through a writ of certiorari or an order of revision ensures that the trial proceeds on a correct legal footing. Practically, filing a revision safeguards the accused from an unwarranted escalation of procedural stakes, such as the loss of bail or the imposition of a higher evidentiary standard that accompanies an approver’s testimony. While the primary filing must be before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused may also seek preliminary advice from a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court to understand the procedural nuances and to coordinate the preparation of the petition, ensuring that the factual matrix and the statutory argument are meticulously presented.

Question: How does the classification of the intermediary as an approver rather than a regular witness impact the accused’s right to bail and the evidentiary burden, and why cannot a simple factual defence on the intermediary’s credibility suffice at this stage?

Answer: The factual backdrop reveals that the magistrate’s order elevates the intermediary to the status of an approver, which under criminal law carries the presumption that his testimony is reliable and can be used to commit the accused to a higher court for trial. This shift has two immediate procedural consequences. First, the right to bail becomes precarious because courts are generally reluctant to grant bail when the prosecution relies on an approver’s confession, viewing the proceeding as akin to a commitment trial where the stakes are higher and the accused’s liberty is more likely to be curtailed. Second, the evidentiary burden on the prosecution is reduced; the approver’s statement is treated as substantive evidence, and the accused is required merely to rebut the confession rather than to disprove the entire case. A factual defence that merely attacks the credibility of the intermediary—such as alleging bias, monetary motive, or inconsistency—does not address the core procedural defect: the magistrate may have exceeded its jurisdiction by applying the pardon provision to an offence that falls outside the enumerated categories. This jurisdictional error cannot be cured by disputing witness credibility because the legal foundation of the approver’s admissibility is itself flawed. Consequently, the accused must seek a higher‑court intervention to nullify the order, thereby restoring the procedural balance and preserving the right to bail. In preparing this challenge, the accused may consult lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, who can advise on the strategic presentation of the bail argument and on how to frame the evidentiary objections within the broader context of the unlawful classification of the intermediary. Such counsel ensures that the defence does not remain confined to a narrow factual rebuttal but instead targets the procedural illegality that underpins the entire evidentiary regime.

Question: What procedural steps must the accused follow to draft and file a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and which documents are essential to demonstrate the alleged jurisdictional error?

Answer: The procedural roadmap begins with the identification of the specific order that is being challenged—the magistrate’s direction to treat the intermediary as an approver. The accused, through a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, must first obtain certified copies of the original FIR, the pardon order issued to the intermediary, and the magistrate’s interlocutory order. These documents constitute the factual matrix and illustrate the statutory provision invoked. Next, the revision petition must be drafted, commencing with a concise statement of facts, followed by a clear articulation of the legal question: whether the pardon provision can be extended to an offence under the Official Secrets Act. The petition should cite precedent that restricts the scope of pardons to the enumerated categories, thereby establishing that the magistrate’s interpretation is ultra vires. The pleading must also include a prayer for the High Court to quash the order and to direct the trial court to treat the intermediary solely as a witness, if at all. After drafting, the petition is filed in the appropriate registry of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, accompanied by the requisite court fee and a verification affidavit. Service of notice to the prosecution and the investigating agency is mandatory, ensuring that they have an opportunity to respond. Once the petition is admitted, the High Court may issue a notice to the magistrate, inviting a response to the jurisdictional claim. Throughout this process, the accused should maintain communication with the counsel to monitor any interim orders that could affect bail or custody. The procedural diligence in filing the revision not only aligns with the statutory mandate for higher‑court review but also safeguards the accused from procedural prejudice that could arise if the magistrate’s order remains unchallenged.

Question: Under what circumstances can the Punjab and Haryana High Court issue a writ of certiorari to quash the magistrate’s order, and how does this remedy differ from a simple order of revision in terms of its effect on the trial proceedings?

Answer: A writ of certiorari is appropriate when the subordinate court has acted beyond its jurisdiction or has committed a legal error that renders its order illegal, arbitrary, or unconstitutional. In the present scenario, the magistrate’s decision to treat the intermediary as an approver hinges on an erroneous interpretation of the pardon provision, which does not encompass the Official Secrets offence. Because the magistrate lacks authority to expand the statutory categories, the order is ultra vires. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that this jurisdictional overreach justifies the issuance of a certiorari, which is a higher‑order prerogative that not only sets aside the impugned order but also restores the status quo ante, thereby reinstating the trial’s original procedural posture. By contrast, a simple order of revision may merely direct the lower court to reconsider its decision or to amend the order without necessarily nullifying it ab initio. The certiorari, therefore, has a more potent effect: it extinguishes the magistrate’s approver order, prevents any reliance on that order in subsequent proceedings, and can also direct the trial court to re‑examine the intermediary only as a regular witness. This distinction is crucial for the accused because a certiorari eliminates the risk that the approver’s testimony will be used to convert the trial into a commitment proceeding, thereby preserving the right to bail and ensuring that the evidentiary burden remains on the prosecution. Moreover, the issuance of certiorari sends a clear message that the High Court is vigilant in policing jurisdictional boundaries, reinforcing the rule of law and providing the accused with a robust procedural shield against unlawful judicial actions.

Question: What procedural defects arise from treating the intermediary as an approver despite the statutory limitation of the pardon, and how can a revision petition address them?

Answer: The core procedural defect lies in the magistrate’s order that elevated the intermediary from a mere witness to an approver on a ground that the statutory pardon provision does not legally encompass the Official Secrets offence. Because the provision expressly limits pardons to offences triable exclusively by a High Court, offences punishable up to seven years, or a specific list of offences, the Official Secrets breach falls outside its ambit. This mis‑characterisation renders the magistrate’s order ultra vires, violating the principle that a court may not expand statutory language by implication. A revision petition filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court can directly challenge the legality of the order by invoking the doctrine of jurisdictional error and statutory construction. The petition must articulate that the magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction by interpreting the pardon provision expansively, thereby converting a trial proceeding into a commitment proceeding without statutory authority. It should request that the High Court quash the order, restore the intermediary’s status as a regular witness, and direct the trial court to proceed on the basis of ordinary evidentiary standards. The petition should also highlight that the High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain revisions against subordinate court orders involving questions of law is well‑settled, and that the remedy is not an appeal on the merits but a supervisory review of legal correctness. By framing the issue as a pure question of law, the revision avoids re‑litigating factual disputes and focuses the court’s attention on the statutory construction, thereby increasing the likelihood of a successful quash. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would advise that the petition be supported by precise extracts of the pardon provision, comparative case law, and a clear statement of the procedural prejudice suffered by the accused due to the improper approver designation.

Question: How should the accused evaluate the evidentiary impact of the intermediary’s testimony if the High Court reclassifies him as a regular witness rather than an approver?

Answer: If the Punjab and Haryana High Court reclassifies the intermediary as a regular witness, the accused must reassess the weight and admissibility of his testimony under the ordinary rules of evidence rather than the enhanced reliability accorded to approvers. An approver’s statement is typically deemed corroborative and may be used to substantiate the prosecution’s case without the need for further corroboration, whereas a regular witness’s testimony is subject to cross‑examination and must stand on its own credibility. The accused should therefore focus on undermining the intermediary’s reliability by exposing any inconsistencies, motives for cooperation, or benefits received under the pardon, which now becomes a bargaining chip rather than a shield of statutory immunity. The defence can also seek to introduce independent documentary evidence, such as communication logs, payment records, or internal audit trails, to counter the intermediary’s narrative. Moreover, the accused should request that the trial court issue a detailed direction on the admissibility of the intermediary’s statements, ensuring that the prosecution cannot invoke the procedural advantages of an approver’s testimony, such as the presumption of truthfulness. Practically, this shift may also affect bail considerations, as the conversion of the proceeding to a commitment trial often heightens the perceived seriousness of the case; reverting to a regular trial may improve the accused’s prospects for bail. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would counsel the accused to prepare a robust cross‑examination strategy, to file pre‑trial applications for exclusion of any inadmissible portions of the intermediary’s statements, and to seek a protective order limiting the use of any privileged communications that may have been disclosed under the mistaken approver status.

Question: What documents and forensic evidence must be gathered to support the argument that the pardon does not extend to the Official Secrets offence, and how should they be presented in the revision?

Answer: The evidentiary foundation for the revision must rest on a meticulous compilation of statutory texts, the original pardon order, the magistrate’s order, and the FIR that enumerates the charges. First, the exact wording of the pardon provision must be reproduced verbatim, highlighting the three enumerated categories and demonstrating the exclusion of the Official Secrets offence. Second, the pardon order itself should be attached, showing the specific offences listed by the magistrate and any annotations that suggest an over‑broad interpretation. Third, the FIR and charge sheet must be included to establish that the offence under the Official Secrets Act is distinct from the offences listed in the pardon provision. Fourth, any forensic analysis of the draft policy documents, such as metadata confirming the date of creation and the chain of custody, can reinforce that the breach is a separate factual matrix. Fifth, communications between the intermediary and the consultancy, including emails, payment receipts, and bank statements, should be annexed to illustrate that the intermediary’s conduct pertains to a single transaction rather than multiple distinct offences. All these documents should be organized chronologically and referenced in the body of the revision petition with clear headings such as “Annexure A – Statutory Provision,” “Annexure B – Pardon Order,” etc., even though headings are not to be used in the final HTML; the narrative can simply refer to “the attached statutory provision” and “the attached pardon order.” The petition must argue that the statutory construction is literal and that the prosecution’s reliance on a broader reading is untenable. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would ensure that each annexure is authenticated, that the petition cites precedent where courts have rejected expansive readings of similar pardon provisions, and that the submission complies with the High Court’s procedural rules for filing revisions, thereby maximizing the chance of a quash.

Question: What are the risks to the accused regarding bail and custody if the magistrate’s order remains unchallenged, and how can a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court mitigate those risks?

Answer: Should the magistrate’s order stand, the intermediary’s status as an approver transforms the proceeding into a commitment trial, which carries a higher threshold for bail because the accused is deemed to have participated in a conspiratorial framework with a state‑sanctioned approver. The court may view the case as more serious, justify continued pre‑trial detention, and impose stricter conditions on any bail that might be granted, such as higher surety, surrender of passport, or regular reporting. Moreover, the approver’s testimony, being deemed reliable, could accelerate the prosecution’s case, increasing the likelihood of conviction and a harsher sentence, thereby compounding the custodial risk. To mitigate these dangers, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court should promptly file a revision challenging the approver designation, simultaneously moving for interim bail on the ground that the procedural defect renders the current custody unjustified. The bail application should emphasize the presumption of innocence, the lack of concrete evidence beyond the intermediary’s testimony, and the fact that the approver status is under dispute. Additionally, the counsel can request that the court order the production of the pardon order and the statutory provision for scrutiny, thereby creating a factual basis for bail. If the High Court grants the revision, it may stay the magistrate’s order pending determination, which would automatically restore the accused’s eligibility for standard bail conditions. The lawyer should also prepare a detailed affidavit outlining the accused’s ties to the community, lack of flight risk, and willingness to cooperate, thereby strengthening the bail petition. By proactively addressing the procedural flaw, the defence not only reduces the immediate custodial burden but also safeguards the accused’s right to a fair trial.

Question: How can the prosecution’s reliance on a broad interpretation of the pardon provision be countered strategically, and what precedent or legal principle should be emphasized in the High Court filing?

Answer: The defence’s strategic counter must focus on the principle of strict statutory construction, arguing that the legislature’s intent is to limit pardons to the expressly listed categories and that any deviation would amount to judicial overreach. By invoking the doctrine of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*—the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another—the defence can demonstrate that the omission of the Official Secrets offence from the statutory list is intentional. Precedent from higher courts where similar literal interpretations were upheld should be cited, especially decisions where courts refused to extend pardon provisions to offences not enumerated, emphasizing that the courts have consistently rejected expansive readings that undermine legislative clarity. The High Court filing should also reference the *rule of noscitur a sociis*, showing that the offences listed share a common characteristic of being triable in particular courts or carrying specific punishments, a characteristic the Official Secrets offence lacks. By framing the argument around these well‑established interpretative tools, the defence can portray the prosecution’s broad reading as an attempt to circumvent statutory limits. Additionally, the defence can highlight the policy rationale behind the pardon provision—to encourage cooperation in certain offences—contrasting it with the public interest in safeguarding official secrets, thereby underscoring that extending the pardon would be contrary to legislative purpose. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would advise that the revision petition meticulously set out these interpretative doctrines, attach the statutory text, and include comparative case law, thereby presenting a compelling legal narrative that the prosecution’s reliance on a broad interpretation is untenable and that the magistrate’s order must be quashed.