Can the accused senior corporate officer challenge the trial court’s denial of his request to testify as a defence witness by filing a criminal revision in the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

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Suppose a corporate fraud investigation is launched after a whistle‑blower submits a written complaint to the local police, leading the investigating agency to register an FIR that alleges the accused, a senior officer of a publicly listed company, conspired with three other executives to manipulate the company’s accounts and divert funds to personal accounts, thereby violating provisions of the Companies Act and sections of the Indian Penal Code.

The FIR triggers a criminal trial before a Special Court in a major city of the state. The prosecution, represented by the state’s public prosecutor, presents documentary evidence of the alleged financial irregularities and calls several witnesses, including a senior accountant and an external auditor. The accused, who is also the petitioner, appears in court through a counsel and files a written request under the newly inserted provision of the Criminal Procedure Code that permits an accused to appear as a defence witness, provided the request is made in writing and the court is satisfied that the testimony will not prejudice the trial.

During the early stage of the trial, the Special Court records the first batch of evidence and then proceeds to hear the prosecution’s case. When the accused’s written request is presented, the presiding magistrate dismisses it, relying on the pre‑amendment rule that barred an accused from testifying. The magistrate’s order is recorded in the case diary, and the trial continues without the accused’s testimony, despite the accused’s argument that the amendment, which came into force after the FIR was lodged but before the trial concluded, should apply to the pending proceedings.

The core legal problem that emerges is whether the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code, which expressly allows an accused to be a competent defence witness, operates retrospectively in a trial that was already underway when the amendment became effective. The accused contends that the saving clause in the amendment’s transitional provision does not exclude the new witness‑competence provision, and therefore the amendment should apply to the present case. The prosecution, on the other hand, argues that the transitional clause bars any amendment from affecting proceedings in which evidence has already been recorded, and that the accused’s request must be rejected to preserve the integrity of the trial.

Relying solely on a factual defence—such as challenging the admissibility of the prosecution’s documents—does not address the procedural barrier that prevents the accused from testifying. The denial of the written request is a jurisdictional order that shapes the very framework of the trial, and the accused’s right to present a defence narrative is curtailed unless the order is set aside. Consequently, the appropriate recourse is not a simple objection to evidence but a higher‑level challenge to the trial court’s interpretation of the amendment.

The remedy that naturally follows is to file a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, invoking the provisions that empower the High Court to examine orders of subordinate courts for jurisdictional error. The revision petition seeks the quashing of the Special Court’s dismissal of the written request and urges the High Court to direct that the accused be allowed to testify as a defence witness under the amended provision. By invoking the revision jurisdiction, the petitioner can obtain a definitive interpretation of the amendment’s retrospective operation, thereby ensuring that the trial proceeds in compliance with the current procedural law.

In preparing the revision, the petitioner engages a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court who is well‑versed in criminal procedural amendments and has previously handled similar revision matters. The counsel drafts a petition that outlines the statutory language of the amendment, the scope of the saving clause, and the constitutional guarantee against self‑incrimination. The petition is then filed, and the case is listed before a bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court will scrutinise the trial court’s order for any violation of statutory mandate.

The High Court, upon hearing the revision, is expected to examine the plain meaning of the amendment’s transitional clause, the legislative intent to apply the new witness‑competence provision to pending trials, and the constitutional protection afforded to the accused. If the High Court agrees with the petitioner’s interpretation, it will set aside the Special Court’s order, direct that the accused be permitted to testify, and may also issue directions to record the testimony on oath, thereby preserving the fairness of the proceedings.

Thus, the fictional scenario illustrates how an accused, confronted with a procedural obstacle that cannot be overcome by ordinary evidentiary challenges, must resort to a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The revision serves as the appropriate procedural vehicle to obtain a definitive ruling on the retrospective operation of the amendment and to secure the accused’s right to present a full defence, including personal testimony, in accordance with the current criminal procedural framework.

Question: Does the amendment that permits an accused to appear as a defence witness apply to a trial that was already underway when the amendment came into force, even though the trial court has already recorded some evidence?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the FIR was lodged before the amendment, and the Special Court began recording evidence prior to the amendment’s effective date. The amendment introduced a new procedural right for an accused to testify, subject to a written request, and it also contained a saving clause that sought to preserve the status quo for certain proceedings. The legal issue, therefore, is whether the amendment’s new witness‑competence provision falls within the ambit of the saving clause or whether it operates retrospectively. In interpreting such statutory changes, courts look first to the plain meaning of the language. The saving clause expressly excluded only those provisions that were enumerated, leaving the remainder of the amendment to apply to all pending proceedings. Because the provision allowing an accused to be a defence witness was not listed among the exclusions, it is to be read as having retrospective effect. This reading aligns with the legislative intent to modernise criminal procedure and to ensure that accused persons benefit from procedural safeguards introduced after a case has commenced. Moreover, the constitutional guarantee against self‑incrimination reinforces the view that a procedural amendment expanding the accused’s right to testify should not be narrowly construed. Consequently, the amendment should be deemed applicable to the present trial, and the Special Court’s dismissal of the written request would constitute a jurisdictional error. The practical implication is that the accused can now seek to present his own testimony, and the trial must be adjusted to accommodate this change, subject to the court’s discretion to ensure that the fairness of the proceedings is not compromised. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would typically argue this point by emphasizing the purposive construction of the amendment and the constitutional backdrop, thereby strengthening the case for retrospective application.

Question: What is the appropriate procedural remedy for the accused to challenge the trial court’s order denying his request to testify as a defence witness?

Answer: The order denying the written request is a jurisdictional determination that goes to the core of the trial’s procedural framework. Because the Special Court is a subordinate criminal court, the appropriate avenue for redress is a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. A revision petition is the correct mechanism when a lower court commits an error of law or exceeds its jurisdiction, and it allows the High Court to examine the record without re‑trying the case. The accused, through his counsel, must file a petition that sets out the factual background, the specific order impugned, and the legal basis for seeking its quashing. The petition should argue that the trial court misapplied the amendment and the saving clause, thereby infringing the accused’s statutory and constitutional rights. The High Court, upon receiving the petition, will issue notice to the prosecution and may direct the Special Court to preserve the trial record. If the High Court is persuaded, it can quash the order, direct that the accused be allowed to testify, and may also issue directions on how to record the testimony without prejudice to the prosecution’s case. This remedy is preferable to an appeal on the merits because the issue is not about the evidence itself but about the correct application of procedural law. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court often advise clients to frame the revision in terms of jurisdictional error and statutory interpretation, thereby focusing the High Court’s review on the legal question rather than factual disputes. The practical effect of a successful revision is that the trial proceeds with the accused’s testimony incorporated, potentially altering the evidential landscape and influencing the ultimate verdict.

Question: How does the saving clause in the amendment influence the applicability of the new witness‑competence provision, and what interpretative principles guide its construction?

Answer: The saving clause was drafted to protect certain ongoing proceedings from being disturbed by the amendment, expressly listing the provisions it intended to exclude. The interpretative task is to determine whether the clause’s language extends to the new witness‑competence provision or whether it is limited to the enumerated items. Courts employ the principle of purposive construction, seeking to give effect to Parliament’s intention. If the clause uses language such as “as if this Act had not been passed” only in relation to the listed provisions, the natural reading is that the remaining provisions, including the one allowing an accused to testify, are to be applied to all pending cases. Additionally, the rule against surplusage dictates that every word of the statute must have effect; reading the saving clause to bar the witness‑competence provision would render that provision meaningless for pending trials, contrary to the amendment’s purpose of enhancing procedural fairness. The constitutional context further supports a liberal reading: the amendment aims to align criminal procedure with the right against self‑incrimination, and a restrictive interpretation would undermine that objective. Therefore, the saving clause does not preclude the retrospective operation of the new witness‑competence provision. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would stress these interpretative doctrines, arguing that the clause’s limited scope preserves only the enumerated provisions while allowing the rest of the amendment, including the accused’s right to testify, to apply. This approach ensures that the trial proceeds in conformity with the current procedural regime and respects the legislative intent to modernise criminal justice.

Question: What are the potential consequences for the prosecution if the High Court permits the accused to testify as a defence witness under the amended procedural regime?

Answer: Allowing the accused to testify introduces a new layer of evidence that the prosecution must anticipate and address. The prosecution’s case, built on documentary evidence and witness testimony, may be strengthened or weakened by the accused’s own statements. If the accused provides a credible narrative that explains the alleged financial irregularities, it could create reasonable doubt, compelling the prosecution to reinforce its evidentiary foundation. Conversely, the accused’s testimony could be self‑incriminating, reinforcing the prosecution’s allegations. Procedurally, the prosecution may seek to cross‑examine the accused, challenge the admissibility of any statements, and argue that the testimony should be limited to matters not already covered by existing evidence. The High Court’s direction to permit testimony would also require the Special Court to allocate time for recording the defence witness, potentially extending the trial timeline. From a strategic standpoint, the prosecution may consider filing an application for a protective order if it believes the accused’s testimony could prejudice the trial, though such an application would be subject to the High Court’s interpretation of the amendment’s safeguards against adverse inference. Practically, the prosecution must be prepared to adjust its case strategy, possibly introducing additional documentary evidence or calling further witnesses to counter any narrative presented by the accused. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court representing the prosecution would likely argue that while the amendment expands the accused’s rights, it does not diminish the prosecution’s burden to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and that any procedural accommodation must not compromise the integrity of the trial. The overall effect is a more balanced adversarial process, with both sides adapting to the procedural change.

Question: What procedural steps must the accused follow to file a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and what standards will the High Court apply in reviewing the trial court’s order?

Answer: The accused must first engage a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court who is experienced in criminal revisions. The counsel will draft a revision petition that sets out the factual background, identifies the specific order of the Special Court that is being challenged, and articulates the legal grounds for relief, namely the erroneous application of the amendment and the saving clause. The petition must be filed within the prescribed period, typically 30 days from the date of the impugned order, and must be accompanied by a certified copy of the order, the trial court’s docket, and any relevant documents such as the written request of the accused. The petition is then presented to the registry of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where it is assigned a case number and listed for hearing. Upon receipt, the High Court will issue a notice to the prosecution, inviting a response. The court’s review will be confined to jurisdictional errors, misinterpretation of law, and procedural irregularities; it will not re‑evaluate the factual evidence. The standard applied is whether the trial court acted within its jurisdiction and correctly interpreted the amendment and its saving clause. The High Court will examine the plain meaning of the statutory language, the legislative intent, and constitutional principles, particularly the right against self‑incrimination. If the High Court finds that the trial court erred, it may quash the order, direct that the accused be allowed to testify, and may also issue procedural directions to ensure the trial proceeds fairly. The practical implication for the accused is that a successful revision restores his procedural right to present his defence, potentially altering the evidential dynamics of the case. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court will emphasize the jurisdictional nature of the error to persuade the bench that the revision is the appropriate remedy, thereby avoiding a protracted appeal on the merits.

Question: On what legal and procedural grounds can the accused challenge the Special Court’s dismissal of the written request by filing a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than pursuing a direct appeal?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the Special Court, acting as a trial court, issued an order refusing the accused’s written request to testify as a defence witness. That order is not a final judgment on the merits of the case but a interlocutory determination concerning the admissibility of evidence, which is a jurisdictional question. Under the criminal procedural framework, a higher court possesses the power to examine orders of subordinate courts for jurisdictional error through a revision petition. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, being the apex judicial authority in the state, has the statutory mandate to entertain revisions where a lower court has acted beyond its jurisdiction or misinterpreted a procedural provision. The amendment that now permits an accused to be a competent defence witness is a substantive procedural change that directly affects the trial’s conduct. Because the Special Court’s order was rendered before the amendment could be applied, the accused must seek a declaration that the amendment applies retrospectively to pending trials. A direct appeal is unavailable at this stage because the trial has not concluded and there is no final decree to appeal against. The revision route therefore provides an immediate avenue to obtain a declaratory order that the trial court must reopen the evidence‑recording phase and allow the accused to testify. Moreover, the High Court’s jurisdiction includes the power to quash orders that contravene statutory mandates, ensuring that the trial proceeds in conformity with the current procedural law. By filing a criminal revision, the accused can secure a prompt judicial determination, avoid unnecessary delay, and preserve the right to a full defence, which would otherwise be foreclosed by the trial court’s refusal. This procedural strategy aligns with the principle that higher courts correct errors that affect the fairness of the trial process, rather than waiting for a final conviction to be appealed. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who is familiar with revision practice is essential to articulate these grounds effectively.

Question: Why might the accused specifically look for a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court or lawyers in Chandigarh High Court when preparing the revision petition, and how does the location of counsel influence the filing process?

Answer: The Punjab and Haryana High Court sits in Chandigarh, making the city the natural hub for legal practitioners who regularly appear before that bench. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court possesses practical knowledge of the court’s procedural rules, filing deadlines, and the preferences of the judges who sit on revision matters. This local expertise is crucial because the revision petition must be drafted in a format that satisfies the High Court’s procedural checklist, including the precise language required for a prayer for quashing the trial court’s order and for directing the admission of the accused as a defence witness. Moreover, the High Court’s registry operates on a strict timeline for accepting revision petitions, and a counsel familiar with the Chandigarh High Court’s electronic filing system can ensure that the petition is uploaded correctly, the requisite court fees are paid, and the supporting annexures are indexed as per the court’s specifications. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court also maintain relationships with the court staff, which can facilitate smoother service of notice to the prosecution and the Special Court, thereby preventing procedural objections that could delay the hearing. In addition, the counsel’s standing before the High Court enables them to cite relevant precedents from the same jurisdiction, strengthening the argument that the amendment’s retrospective operation is consistent with prior High Court rulings. By engaging a lawyer who regularly practices before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused benefits from strategic advice on timing the petition to avoid clashing with other matters on the bench’s docket, thereby increasing the likelihood of an early hearing. This localized representation is not merely a matter of convenience; it directly impacts the effectiveness of the procedural challenge and the eventual relief sought.

Question: How does the amendment that permits an accused to be a defence witness shape the jurisdictional basis for the High Court’s intervention, and why does this procedural change outweigh a purely factual defence?

Answer: The amendment introduces a new procedural right for the accused to testify, which fundamentally alters the evidentiary landscape of the trial. This right is not a matter of factual dispute about the alleged fraud; rather, it is a question of whether the trial court correctly applied the governing procedural law. The Special Court’s dismissal of the written request reflects a misinterpretation of the amendment, effectively denying the accused a statutory entitlement. Because the High Court’s jurisdiction includes the power to correct jurisdictional errors and to interpret procedural statutes, it is the appropriate forum to resolve this conflict. A factual defence—such as challenging the authenticity of the financial documents or disputing the intent behind the alleged transactions—does not address the procedural barrier that prevents the accused from presenting his own testimony. Even the strongest factual arguments would remain unheard if the trial court continues to exclude the accused’s evidence. The High Court, therefore, must examine whether the amendment applies retrospectively to pending trials and whether the trial court’s order exceeds its jurisdiction. By granting the accused the ability to testify, the High Court ensures that the trial proceeds with a complete evidentiary record, respecting both the legislative intent of the amendment and the constitutional guarantee against self‑incrimination. This procedural remedy supersedes any factual defence because without the opportunity to testify, the accused cannot fully contest the prosecution’s case, rendering any factual challenges ineffective. Consequently, the revision petition seeks not only a quashing of the trial court’s order but also a directive that the amendment be applied, thereby restoring the balance between procedural fairness and substantive defence. The High Court’s intervention is thus justified on jurisdictional grounds, as it safeguards the procedural rights that are essential for a fair trial.

Question: Why is a factual defence alone insufficient to overcome the trial court’s order denying the accused’s request to testify, and what procedural remedy does this limitation create?

Answer: The trial court’s order operates at the procedural level, determining the admissibility of the accused’s testimony, which is a prerequisite for any factual defence to be presented. If the accused is barred from testifying, he cannot introduce personal explanations, clarify ambiguities in the documentary evidence, or rebut the prosecution’s narrative. Consequently, any attempt to challenge the prosecution’s documents or to argue lack of intent remains incomplete, as the accused’s own account is excluded from the record. This procedural obstruction cannot be remedied by cross‑examination or by filing objections to evidence, because the core issue is the denial of a statutory right to be a defence witness. The limitation creates the need for a higher‑level procedural remedy—specifically, a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The revision seeks to set aside the trial court’s jurisdictional error and to compel the trial court to admit the accused’s testimony in accordance with the amendment. By obtaining a writ of certiorari or a quashing order, the accused can reopen the evidentiary phase and present a full defence, thereby transforming the factual contest into a fair hearing. This procedural remedy is essential because it addresses the root cause of the defence’s impotence: the trial court’s misapplication of the procedural law. Only after the High Court validates the accused’s right to testify can the factual defence be meaningfully advanced, ensuring that the trial proceeds on a level playing field and that the accused’s constitutional protections are upheld.

Question: What are the practical steps the accused must follow after filing the revision petition, and how does the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s jurisdiction influence the timeline and possible outcomes?

Answer: Once the revision petition is filed, the first practical step is to ensure that the petition complies with the High Court’s filing requirements, which includes attaching a certified copy of the trial court’s order, the FIR, and the written request made by the accused. The petition must also contain a concise statement of facts, the specific relief sought—quashing the order and directing admission of the accused as a defence witness—and a prayer for any interim relief, such as release on bail if the accused is in custody. After filing, the High Court will issue a notice to the prosecution and the Special Court, inviting them to file their responses. The court may also list the matter for a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether the revision raises a substantial question of law. Because the High Court’s jurisdiction includes the power to grant interim relief, the accused can request that the trial be stayed pending the decision, which, if granted, prevents further evidence‑recording that could prejudice the case. The timeline for a decision varies, but High Courts typically aim to dispose of revision petitions within a few months, especially when the matter concerns a fundamental procedural right. If the High Court finds that the amendment applies retrospectively, it will issue an order quashing the trial court’s dismissal and directing that the accused be allowed to testify. This outcome may also lead to the re‑opening of the evidentiary stage, requiring the Special Court to record the testimony and possibly re‑evaluate the prosecution’s case. Conversely, if the High Court upholds the trial court’s order, the accused may consider filing a further appeal to the Supreme Court, but that would involve additional time and costs. Throughout this process, engaging lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court who are adept at drafting revision petitions and navigating the court’s procedural nuances is critical to ensuring that the steps are executed efficiently and that the accused’s rights are protected at each stage.

Question: What procedural risks arise from relying on the amendment’s retrospective operation, and how should the accused’s counsel assess the trial court’s order for jurisdictional error before filing a revision?

Answer: The factual backdrop shows that the trial commenced under the pre‑amendment regime, which barred an accused from testifying, and that the amendment permitting an accused to be a defence witness became effective after the FIR was lodged but before the trial concluded. The legal problem centers on whether the amendment applies retrospectively to a proceeding already in progress and whether the trial court’s dismissal of the written request constitutes a jurisdictional error amenable to revision. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court must first scrutinise the trial court’s order for any indication that the magistrate interpreted the amendment as inapplicable on the ground of a saving clause. This involves a detailed review of the case diary, the exact wording of the dismissal, and any references to the transitional provision. The procedural risk lies in the possibility that the High Court may deem the amendment non‑retrospective, thereby upholding the trial court’s order and leaving the accused without the benefit of personal testimony. To mitigate this, counsel should assemble a comparative analysis of precedent where similar amendments were held to operate prospectively versus retrospectively, highlighting the legislative intent to enhance fairness in ongoing trials. The revision petition must articulate that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by refusing to apply a mandatory statutory provision, which is a ground for quashing under the revision jurisdiction. Practically, if the High Court finds no jurisdictional error, the accused remains barred from testifying, limiting the defence to documentary challenges and weakening the overall strategy. Conversely, a successful revision would not only restore the right to testify but also signal to the prosecution that any further reliance on the earlier procedural posture is untenable, thereby reshaping the evidential landscape of the case.

Question: Which documents and pieces of evidence should be gathered to demonstrate that the accused’s written request complied with the statutory requirements, and how can a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court use them to argue for quashing the dismissal?

Answer: The factual matrix indicates that the accused submitted a written request asserting his desire to appear as a defence witness, a step mandated by the amendment. The legal issue is whether that request satisfied the procedural prerequisites—namely, that it was in writing, signed, and specifically invoked the new provision without prejudice to the trial. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court must compile the original request, the acknowledgment receipt from the trial court, and any correspondence showing the accused’s awareness of the amendment’s effective date. Additionally, the counsel should obtain the statutory text of the amendment, the transitional clause, and any explanatory notes issued by the legislature. Evidence of the amendment’s publication in the official gazette, along with timestamps of when the accused accessed the amendment (e.g., through legal databases or counsel’s notes), will reinforce the argument that the request was timely. The High Court argument should focus on the plain‑language requirement that a written request suffices, and that the trial court’s reliance on a pre‑amendment rule disregards the mandatory nature of the new provision. By presenting the request alongside the statutory language, the lawyer can demonstrate that the trial court’s order was not merely an interpretative error but a procedural overreach, thereby constituting a jurisdictional defect. The practical implication for the accused is that, if the High Court quashes the dismissal, the defence can introduce the accused’s testimony, potentially undermining the prosecution’s documentary narrative and creating reasonable doubt. Moreover, the successful challenge may compel the trial court to re‑record the evidence, ensuring compliance with the current procedural framework and preserving the accused’s constitutional right against self‑incrimination.

Question: How does the saving clause in the amendment affect the admissibility of the accused’s testimony, and what strategic arguments can lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court make regarding its interpretation to secure relief?

Answer: The saving clause, as drafted, states that certain enumerated provisions are excluded from retrospective operation while the remainder of the amendment “shall apply to all proceedings pending…as if this Act had not been passed.” The legal problem is whether the clause bars the new witness‑competence provision from affecting a trial where evidence has already been recorded. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court should adopt a two‑pronged strategy. First, they must argue that the plain meaning of the clause confines the exclusion to the specifically listed provisions, and that the witness‑competence provision is not among them, thereby falling within the ambit of the amendment’s retrospective application. Second, they can invoke the principle of purposive construction, emphasizing that Parliament intended to enhance fairness by allowing accused testimony in ongoing cases, and that a narrow reading would defeat that purpose. Supporting this, the counsel should cite analogous jurisprudence where courts have interpreted similar saving clauses to apply only to expressly mentioned items, rejecting a blanket exclusion. The practical implication of this argument is that, if accepted, the High Court will direct the trial court to admit the accused’s testimony, overturning the earlier dismissal. Conversely, if the saving clause is read broadly, the accused remains excluded, limiting the defence to documentary challenges and possibly weakening the case. By framing the issue as one of statutory interpretation rather than factual dispute, the lawyers can focus the High Court’s review on the correctness of the trial court’s legal reasoning, increasing the likelihood of a favorable revision that restores the accused’s right to testify and aligns the proceedings with the current procedural regime.

Question: What are the implications for bail and custody if the revision is delayed, and how should the accused’s counsel mitigate the risk of continued detention while pursuing the High Court remedy?

Answer: The factual scenario shows that the accused is presently in custody pending trial, and the revision petition may take several weeks or months to be listed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The legal problem is that prolonged detention without the benefit of personal testimony could prejudice the defence, especially if the prosecution’s case proceeds unchallenged. Counsel must therefore assess the bail prospects in light of the pending revision. A strategic approach involves filing an interim application for bail on the ground that the trial court’s order is under serious question and that the accused’s continued confinement undermines the presumption of innocence. The application should highlight that the accused has cooperated with the investigation, that the alleged offences are non‑violent corporate fraud, and that the pending revision raises a substantial question of law that could alter the trial’s trajectory. Additionally, the lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can argue that the amendment’s purpose is to ensure a fair trial, and that denying bail while the core procedural issue remains unresolved contravenes the spirit of the law. The practical implication of securing bail is twofold: it preserves the accused’s liberty and enables active participation in the High Court proceedings, including the ability to attend hearings and coordinate with experts. If bail is denied, the counsel should seek a protective custody order limiting the scope of interrogation, thereby reducing the risk of self‑incriminating statements that could be used against the accused. Ultimately, mitigating custody risk while the revision proceeds safeguards the accused’s constitutional rights and ensures that the High Court’s decision is rendered without the shadow of undue pre‑trial detention.