Can the acquittal of four co accused extinguish the unlawful assembly requirement for a rioting conviction in an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Sources
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Case Analysis: Read case analysis

Suppose a dispute erupts in a small town over the demolition of a community hall that was being used for local cultural events, and a crowd of villagers, estimated at around thirty, gathers to prevent the demolition; during the confrontation, a resident of the town, who is also a member of the crowd, brandishes a firearm and fires a shot that strikes a construction supervisor, causing serious injury, while other members of the crowd, including the accused, use sticks and stones to further assault the supervisor and damage the hall’s property.

The investigating agency files an FIR naming eight individuals as participants in the incident, charging them with offences under the Indian Penal Code that include assault with a deadly weapon, causing grievous hurt, and the offence of rioting under the provision that imposes vicarious liability on every member of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons for offences committed in prosecution of the common object. The trial court convicts all eight accused under the rioting provision and the substantive offences, imposing rigorous imprisonment.

On appeal, the Sessions Court acquits four of the accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their participation beyond reasonable doubt, while upholding the convictions of the remaining four on the basis that the unlawful assembly still existed despite the acquittals. The appellate court reasons that the presence of the other six individuals, as recorded in the FIR, satisfies the statutory requirement of an assembly of five or more persons, and therefore the conviction under the rioting provision remains valid.

The four convicted individuals challenge the judgment, arguing that the acquittal of the four former co‑accused is “good for all purposes” and that, after those acquittals, the remaining persons no longer constitute an unlawful assembly of the requisite size. They contend that the appellate court erred in presuming the existence of additional, unnamed participants without a proper evidentiary foundation, and that the legal test for liability under the rioting provision has not been satisfied.

Because the factual defence that the accused were not part of a five‑person unlawful assembly does not, by itself, overturn the conviction at the appellate stage, the appropriate procedural remedy is to file an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court under the provisions that allow a review of the conviction and the application of the vicarious liability clause. The appeal seeks a thorough re‑examination of the evidence concerning the number of participants present at the time of the offence, the identity of those who actually fired the weapon, and whether the statutory threshold for an unlawful assembly was met after the acquittals.

A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court advises the petitioners that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal under the criminal appellate provisions, and that the relief sought must be framed as a challenge to the conviction on the ground of mis‑application of the rioting provision. The counsel further explains that the High Court can remand the matter to the Sessions Court for a fresh determination of the factual matrix, or set aside the conviction if it finds that the legal requirements for vicarious liability were not satisfied.

Consequently, the accused retain lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court who draft a petition highlighting the procedural irregularities, the lack of credible evidence establishing an assembly of five or more persons after the acquittals, and the consequent untenability of the conviction under the rioting provision. The petition emphasizes that the appellate court’s reliance on the FIR’s initial list of eight participants, without accounting for the acquitted individuals, contravenes the principle that an acquittal is conclusive “for all purposes” unless the prosecution can demonstrate the continued existence of the unlawful assembly.

The High Court, upon receiving the appeal, is tasked with scrutinising the trial record, the charge‑sheet, and the evidence presented at both the trial and the Sessions Court. It must determine whether the prosecution’s case satisfies the four‑fold test for liability under the rioting provision: (i) existence of an unlawful assembly of at least five persons, (ii) membership of the accused in that assembly, (iii) a common object pursued by the assembly, and (iv) commission of the offence in prosecution of that object. If the court finds that the second element fails after the acquittals, it has the authority to quash the conviction and remit the matter for fresh proceedings.

The procedural route chosen—an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court—offers the most effective avenue to address the legal problem because it allows a comprehensive review of both factual and legal aspects of the conviction, something that a simple factual defence or a petition for bail would not accomplish at this stage. By invoking the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the accused aim to obtain relief that could range from setting aside the conviction to directing a retrial, thereby ensuring that the principle of “good for all purposes” acquittals is respected and that vicarious liability is not imposed without proper evidentiary support.

Question: Does the acquittal of four co‑accused extinguish the existence of an unlawful assembly for purposes of the rioting provision, thereby invalidating the conviction of the remaining four accused?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that eight persons were initially named in the FIR for a violent confrontation that resulted in a firearm injury and property damage. The Sessions Court later acquitted four of those persons on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their individual participation beyond reasonable doubt. The legal issue, therefore, is whether the acquittals of those four individuals automatically dissolve the statutory requirement of an unlawful assembly of at least five persons, which is a prerequisite for invoking the rioting provision’s vicarious liability. The principle that an acquittal is “good for all purposes” has been recognised by higher courts, meaning that once a person is cleared, the prosecution cannot later rely on that person to satisfy the numerical threshold of an assembly. In the present case, after the acquittals, only four persons remain whose participation is still affirmed by the trial record. Consequently, the essential element of a five‑person unlawful assembly is not satisfied. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would argue that the appellate court must respect the conclusive effect of the acquittals and cannot presume the existence of unnamed participants without fresh evidence. The procedural consequence is that the conviction under the rioting provision should be set aside, either by quashing the judgment or by remanding the matter for a fresh determination of the assembly’s size. Practically, this would mean the four remaining accused could be released from the rigorous imprisonment imposed for the rioting charge, although any convictions for the substantive offences of assault with a deadly weapon or grievous hurt would still need separate assessment. The High Court’s decision would also reinforce the protective scope of acquittals, ensuring that the prosecution cannot circumvent evidentiary standards by relying on the original FIR list after some accused have been cleared.

Question: What evidentiary burden rests on the prosecution to prove the presence of at least five persons in the assembly after the acquittals, and how must that burden be satisfied in the High Court?

Answer: The prosecution bears the onus of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, each element of the rioting provision, including the existence of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons at the material time. After the Sessions Court’s acquittals, the burden intensifies because the numerical count of participants is reduced. The prosecution must therefore produce credible, admissible evidence—such as eyewitness testimony, video footage, forensic reports, or contemporaneous police sketches—that demonstrates the presence of at least five individuals who were actively engaged in the common object of the disturbance. Mere reliance on the FIR’s initial list of eight names is insufficient if four of those names have been judicially cleared; the High Court expects a fresh evidentiary foundation that is not merely inferential. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would stress that the prosecution must show that the remaining accused were part of a larger, still‑existing crowd, or that other unnamed persons were present and participated in the common object, and that such persons were not among those acquitted. The evidentiary standard is stringent: speculation or uncorroborated statements cannot satisfy the requirement. Procedurally, the High Court will scrutinise the charge‑sheet, trial transcripts, and any supplementary material to determine whether the prosecution met this burden. If the court finds the evidence lacking, it must either quash the conviction under the rioting provision or remit the case for a re‑trial where the prosecution can attempt to meet the burden anew. The practical implication for the accused is that a failure by the prosecution to meet this burden will likely result in the removal of the vicarious liability component, potentially reducing the severity of the punishment. Conversely, if the prosecution successfully demonstrates the requisite assembly, the conviction may be upheld, underscoring the importance of robust evidentiary support at the appellate stage.

Question: Can the appellate court legitimately rely on the original FIR list of eight participants to sustain the conviction of the four remaining accused, despite the acquittals of the other four?

Answer: The appellate court’s reliance on the FIR’s original enumeration of eight participants raises a critical procedural question. The FIR is a preliminary document that records the police’s initial information; it does not, by itself, constitute proof of each named person’s participation at trial. After the Sessions Court acquitted four individuals, the factual landscape changed, and the legal presumption that the acquitted persons are no longer part of the unlawful assembly becomes operative. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the appellate court must not treat the FIR as conclusive evidence of the assembly’s size, especially when the trial record demonstrates that the acquitted persons were found not to have participated in the offence. The High Court is obligated to examine the substantive evidence presented at trial—witness statements, medical reports, and any material corroborating the presence of a five‑person assembly—rather than merely relying on the FIR’s initial list. If the appellate court persists in using the FIR without a fresh evidentiary basis, it risks contravening the principle that acquittals are “good for all purposes.” The procedural consequence is that the High Court may be compelled to set aside the conviction on the ground of insufficient proof of the assembly’s numerical requirement. Practically, this would mean the four remaining accused could obtain relief from the rigorous imprisonment imposed under the rioting provision, while any separate convictions for direct offences would still be evaluated on their own merits. Moreover, a decision to disregard the FIR’s list would reinforce the doctrine that appellate courts must base their findings on the trial record and not on unverified police documentation, thereby safeguarding the rights of the accused against speculative judicial reasoning.

Question: What is the appropriate procedural remedy before the Punjab and Haryana High Court to challenge the conviction under the rioting provision, and what relief can the petitioners realistically seek?

Answer: The procedural avenue most suited to address the legal infirmities identified is an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court under the criminal appellate jurisdiction, specifically a petition for revision or a writ of certiorari challenging the conviction on the ground of mis‑application of the rioting provision. The petition must articulate that the conviction rests on an erroneous factual premise—that an unlawful assembly of five or more persons existed after the acquittals—thereby violating the legal test for vicarious liability. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would draft the petition to request that the High Court either quash the conviction outright or remand the matter to the Sessions Court for a fresh determination of the assembly’s size and the accused’s participation. The relief sought may include setting aside the rigorous imprisonment, ordering a re‑trial, or directing the release of the accused from custody pending further proceedings. Procedurally, the High Court will examine the trial record, the charge‑sheet, and the evidence concerning the number of participants, applying the established four‑fold test for liability under the rioting provision. If the court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the requisite assembly, it will likely grant the petition, resulting in the quashing of the conviction and the restoration of the accused’s liberty. Even if the court does not fully set aside the conviction, it may modify the sentence or order a retrial, which would still constitute a substantial practical benefit for the petitioners. The High Court’s intervention thus offers a comprehensive review of both factual and legal aspects, a remedy unavailable through a simple bail application, and aligns with the principle that acquittals must be respected in subsequent liability assessments.

Question: How will the Punjab and Haryana High Court assess the four‑fold test for vicarious liability under the rioting provision, and what practical outcomes could arise for the accused if the court finds one element unsatisfied?

Answer: The High Court’s assessment will proceed by meticulously evaluating each element of the vicarious liability test: the existence of an unlawful assembly of at least five persons, the accused’s membership in that assembly, the common object pursued, and the commission of the offence in prosecution of that object. The court will first verify the numerical threshold by scrutinising eyewitness accounts, forensic evidence, and any contemporaneous recordings that indicate how many individuals were actively engaged at the critical moment. If the court determines that, after the acquittals, only four persons can be positively identified as participants, the first element fails, rendering the entire liability chain untenable. Next, the court will examine whether the accused were members of the assembly; this is closely linked to the first element because membership presupposes a valid assembly. The common object—preventing demolition of the community hall—must be proven to have been shared by the participants, and the court will assess whether the assault and the firearm discharge were in furtherance of that object. Finally, the court will consider whether the specific offence (the shooting and subsequent assault) was committed in prosecution of the common object. If any one of these elements is found lacking, the doctrine of vicarious liability collapses, and the conviction under the rioting provision cannot stand. Practically, this would result in the quashing of the rigorous imprisonment imposed for the rioting charge, potentially leading to the immediate release of the accused from custody. The court may still uphold convictions for the substantive offences of assault with a deadly weapon or grievous hurt if those are supported by independent evidence. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would therefore argue that the failure of even a single element justifies setting aside the rioting conviction, while also preparing to defend the accused against any remaining charges that are not predicated on the vicarious liability test.

Question: Why does the procedural remedy for overturning the conviction on the rioting provision lie before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than before a subordinate court or tribunal?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the trial court sentenced the accused, the Sessions Court affirmed part of that judgment, and the remaining four convicted persons now seek a higher review. Under the criminal appellate framework, only a High Court possesses the statutory authority to entertain an appeal against a conviction rendered by a Sessions Court when the matter involves substantial questions of law, such as the correct application of the vicarious liability provision for unlawful assemblies. The High Court’s jurisdiction is triggered because the accused are challenging not merely a procedural irregularity but the legal reasoning that the assembly continued to satisfy the statutory threshold after the acquittals. A subordinate court, including a District Court, lacks the power to re‑examine the legal test for liability under the rioting provision, nor can it issue a writ of certiorari or a revision order that would set aside the conviction. Moreover, the High Court can entertain a petition for revision or a criminal appeal that allows a comprehensive scrutiny of both the evidentiary record and the legal principles applied. This is essential where the appellate court must decide whether the prosecution’s reliance on the original FIR list, despite the acquittals, is legally tenable. The Punjab and Haryana High Court also has the competence to direct a remand to the Sessions Court for fresh fact‑finding, a remedy unavailable to lower courts. Consequently, the procedural route must ascend to the High Court to ensure that the accused receive a full and authoritative determination of the legal issues, including the interpretation of the unlawful assembly test, the effect of acquittals, and the appropriate quantum of liability. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court is therefore prudent, as such counsel can navigate the specific appellate rules, draft the petition with precise relief claims, and argue before the bench that the High Court’s jurisdiction is indispensable for a proper adjudication of the contested legal principles.

Question: What procedural steps must the accused follow to file an appeal in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and why is it advisable for them to seek the assistance of lawyers in Chandigarh High Court during this process?

Answer: The first step is to obtain certified copies of the Sessions Court judgment, the trial court record, and the charge‑sheet, because the High Court will require a complete factual backdrop to assess the legal error alleged. Next, the accused must prepare a memorandum of appeal that sets out the grounds of challenge, focusing on the mis‑application of the unlawful assembly test, the reliance on the FIR’s original list of participants, and the failure to consider the effect of the acquittals. The memorandum must be filed within the prescribed period, typically sixty days from the receipt of the judgment, and accompanied by a court fee and an affidavit verifying the authenticity of the documents. After filing, the High Court issues a notice to the prosecution, which then files its counter‑affidavit. Both parties may be directed to file written arguments, and the court may schedule a hearing for oral arguments. Throughout this process, procedural compliance is critical; any lapse can result in dismissal of the appeal on technical grounds. Because the High Court sits in Chandigarh, the local legal ecosystem is attuned to its procedural nuances, case management practices, and the expectations of its judges. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court possess practical experience in drafting appeals that satisfy the court’s formatting requirements, citing precedent that aligns with the High Court’s interpretative trends, and presenting oral arguments that resonate with its judicial philosophy. They can also advise on strategic reliefs, such as a petition for quashing the conviction, a revision, or a remand, tailoring the petition to the High Court’s procedural preferences. Engaging such counsel ensures that the appeal is not derailed by procedural missteps, that the factual matrix is presented persuasively, and that the legal arguments are framed in a manner that maximizes the chance of obtaining a favorable order from the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Question: How does the principle that an acquittal is “good for all purposes” limit the effectiveness of a purely factual defence at the appellate stage, and why must the accused rely on a legal challenge instead?

Answer: The factual defence that the accused were not part of a five‑person unlawful assembly after the acquittals is intuitively compelling, but at the appellate stage the High Court does not re‑evaluate the evidence in the same manner as a trial court. Instead, it examines whether the lower courts applied the correct legal test and whether the factual findings were supported by the record. The doctrine that an acquittal is “good for all purposes” means that once a co‑accused is cleared, the prosecution cannot later resurrect that person’s participation to satisfy the statutory threshold for vicarious liability. Consequently, a factual defence that merely points to the reduced number of participants must be couched within a legal argument that the statutory requirement of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons was not met. The High Court’s role is to assess whether the conviction rests on a legal error—specifically, the erroneous presumption that the assembly continued to exist despite the acquittals. A purely factual narrative, without invoking the legal principle, may be dismissed as an attempt to re‑litigate the evidence, which is beyond the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, the accused must frame their challenge as a petition for quashing the conviction on the ground that the legal test for liability under the rioting provision was not satisfied, and that the Sessions Court erred in ignoring the conclusive effect of the acquittals. By presenting a legal challenge, the accused invite the High Court to scrutinize the application of the doctrine, to possibly set aside the conviction, or to remit the matter for fresh fact‑finding. Engaging a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court is essential to articulate this nuanced legal argument, ensuring that the petition aligns with the High Court’s jurisprudential standards and that the court is persuaded that the factual defence alone cannot overturn a conviction without a proper legal basis.

Question: What specific remedies can the Punjab and Haryana High Court grant—such as quashing the conviction, issuing a revision, or remanding for fresh trial—and how do these remedies correspond to the facts of this case, making it necessary for the accused to retain lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The High Court has the authority to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the conviction if it finds that the legal test for vicarious liability was not satisfied, thereby nullifying the judgment and releasing the accused from custody. It may also entertain a revision petition, which allows the court to examine whether the Sessions Court committed a material error of law or a procedural irregularity that affected the outcome; this is pertinent where the lower court presumed the existence of additional participants without evidentiary support. Additionally, the High Court can direct a remand, sending the case back to the Sessions Court for a fresh determination of the factual matrix, including a re‑assessment of the number of persons present at the time of the offence and the identity of the individual who discharged the firearm. Each of these remedies aligns with the factual scenario: the conviction rests on the assumption that an unlawful assembly persisted after four co‑accused were acquitted, a premise that may be legally untenable. A quash order would immediately relieve the accused of the punitive consequences, while a revision would correct the legal error without reopening the entire trial, and a remand would allow the lower court to re‑evaluate the evidence in light of the acquittals. To secure any of these outcomes, the accused must present a meticulously drafted petition that cites relevant jurisprudence, demonstrates the lack of proof for the assembly’s requisite size, and articulates the impact of the acquittals on the legal test. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court possess the requisite expertise to craft such petitions, to argue persuasively before the bench, and to navigate procedural intricacies such as filing fees, service of notice, and compliance with the court’s case‑management orders. Their specialized knowledge increases the likelihood that the High Court will grant a remedy that appropriately addresses the legal deficiencies identified in the lower courts’ judgments.

Question: How does the uncertainty about the exact number of participants after the acquittals affect the risk of the conviction under the vicarious liability provision, and what evidentiary steps should the defence take to challenge the existence of a qualifying unlawful assembly?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the original FIR listed eight individuals, but the Sessions Court later acquitted four of them. The legal test for vicarious liability requires proof that at least five persons formed an unlawful assembly at the time the offence was committed. Because the acquitted persons are legally deemed “good for all purposes,” the prosecution must demonstrate that the remaining participants still met the numeric threshold. This creates a substantial risk that the conviction may be unsustainable if the defence can show the assembly fell below five after the acquittals. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would first request the complete trial record, including the charge‑sheet, witness statements, and any forensic reports that mention the crowd size. The defence should also seek the police diary and any video or photographic material that captures the scene, as such visual evidence can corroborate the number of people present. Cross‑examination of prosecution witnesses, especially those who testified about the crowd, can be used to highlight inconsistencies or vague estimates. Moreover, the defence can file an application for production of the original FIR and any supplementary reports to verify whether the police ever recorded participants beyond the eight named. If the evidence shows that the prosecution relied solely on the FIR list without independent verification, the High Court may find a procedural defect in the assessment of the assembly’s size. The defence should also consider obtaining statements from neutral by‑standers who can attest to the actual number of individuals actively involved in the assault. By assembling a comprehensive evidentiary dossier that questions the numeric requirement, the defence reduces the risk of the conviction being upheld and creates a strong basis for the High Court to quash the vicarious liability finding.

Question: In what ways does the appellate court’s reliance on the FIR’s initial list of participants, without a fresh evidentiary inquiry, constitute a procedural defect that can be raised in the appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The appellate judgment accepted the FIR’s enumeration of eight participants as a factual foundation, even though the Sessions Court later cleared four of them. This approach bypasses the principle that an acquitted person’s status must be conclusively reflected in any subsequent determination of liability. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the appellate court failed to conduct a fresh assessment of the evidence, thereby violating the procedural requirement to base its findings on the record before it. The defence should highlight that the charge‑sheet, witness testimonies, and forensic reports were never re‑examined to confirm whether the remaining accused still formed an unlawful assembly of the requisite size. The procedural defect lies in the court’s presumption that the assembly continued to exist merely because the FIR listed eight names, ignoring the legal effect of the acquittals. To substantiate this claim, the defence must point to the lack of any fresh material evidence, such as a revised police report or a re‑taken statement, that addresses the changed composition of the crowd. Additionally, the defence can invoke the principle that appellate courts may entertain incidental questions only when supported by a sound evidentiary basis, and that this basis is absent here. By filing a petition that emphasizes the need for a fresh factual determination, the defence seeks a remand for the High Court to re‑evaluate the evidence, ensuring that the conviction is not predicated on a procedural oversight. This strategy not only challenges the legal reasoning but also underscores the importance of adhering to due process, thereby increasing the likelihood of relief.

Question: What are the implications of the accused’s continued custody for bail considerations, given the seriousness of the injury inflicted and the pending appeal, and how should the defence structure a bail application to mitigate custodial risks?

Answer: The accused remain in custody after being convicted of serious offences involving a firearm injury and assault with deadly weapons. Custody poses a dual risk: the possibility of further prejudice to the defence and the personal hardship of prolonged detention. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would need to balance the gravity of the alleged conduct with the principle that bail is a right unless the court is convinced of a real risk of flight, tampering with evidence, or intimidation of witnesses. The defence should prepare a comprehensive bail memorandum that outlines the accused’s ties to the community, such as stable residence, family responsibilities, and lack of prior criminal record. It should also stress that the appeal focuses on a procedural and evidentiary defect rather than the underlying factual guilt, thereby reducing the perceived danger to the public. The memorandum must address any concerns about the accused’s ability to influence witnesses by noting that the key witnesses are police officers and medical personnel, whose testimony is less susceptible to intimidation. Additionally, the defence can propose conditions such as surrender of passport, regular reporting to the police station, and a monetary surety to assure the court of compliance. Highlighting the fact that the prosecution’s case hinges on the existence of an unlawful assembly, which is now in dispute, can further persuade the court that the accused does not pose a continuing threat. By presenting a well‑structured bail application that anticipates the court’s concerns and offers concrete safeguards, the defence can mitigate custodial risks while the appeal proceeds.

Question: Which documentary materials and procedural filings are essential for the appeal to demonstrate mis‑application of the vicarious liability doctrine, and how should lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court prioritize their preparation?

Answer: The appeal must be anchored on a meticulous compilation of the trial record, the charge‑sheet, the FIR, the judgment of the Sessions Court, and the appellate order. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court should first obtain certified copies of the original FIR and any subsequent police reports that detail the number of participants and the sequence of events. The defence must also secure the witness statements, especially those that describe the crowd size, the identity of the person who discharged the firearm, and the actions of each accused. Medical reports documenting the victim’s injuries are relevant to establish the seriousness of the offence but also to show that the primary culpability may rest with the shooter rather than the other participants. The defence should prepare a comparative chart—without using a list format—illustrating how the appellate court’s reasoning diverges from the evidentiary record concerning the numeric threshold. Procedurally, the appeal should include a petition that specifically raises the ground of mis‑application of the vicarious liability doctrine, citing the legal principle that an acquittal nullifies the accused’s participation for all purposes unless the prosecution can prove the assembly’s continuity. The defence must also attach an affidavit of the accused affirming their non‑involvement in the shooting and their lack of participation in the common object after the acquittals. Prioritization should focus first on securing the police diary and any video evidence, as these are the most persuasive in establishing the actual number of participants. Next, the defence should collate the trial court’s findings on the common object and the prosecution’s evidence of collective intent. Finally, the petition should be drafted with precise legal arguments, emphasizing the procedural defect and the need for a fresh factual determination, thereby strengthening the case for quashing the conviction.

Question: How can the defence articulate the accused’s lack of a common object and the absence of participation in the violent act to undermine the vicarious liability claim, and what strategic arguments should lawyers in Chandigarh High Court employ to persuade the appellate bench?

Answer: The doctrine of vicarious liability requires proof that the accused shared a common object pursued by the unlawful assembly and that the offence was committed in prosecution of that object. In the present facts, the shooting that injured the supervisor was carried out by a single individual who acted independently of the crowd that used sticks and stones. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can argue that the accused who were later convicted did not share the intent to use a firearm and that their conduct was limited to a spontaneous melee, which does not constitute the same common object as the shooting. The defence should highlight witness testimonies that differentiate the shooter’s actions from the rest of the crowd, emphasizing that the latter’s objective was to prevent demolition, not to inflict grievous injury with a firearm. By establishing that the accused’s participation was restricted to non‑lethal resistance, the defence undermines the element of a shared violent purpose. Strategically, the counsel can request that the court scrutinize the prosecution’s evidence linking each accused to the shooting, noting the absence of any forensic or eyewitness identification of the convicted individuals as the shooter. The defence may also point out that the medical report attributes the injury to a bullet, which can only be traced to the person who fired the weapon, thereby isolating liability. Additionally, the counsel can argue that the principle of “good for all purposes” acquittals means that the four cleared individuals cannot be presumed to have continued the common object, and the remaining accused cannot, by themselves, satisfy the numeric requirement for an unlawful assembly. By weaving these factual distinctions with the legal requirement of a common object, the defence presents a compelling narrative that the vicarious liability provision was mis‑applied, increasing the prospect that the appellate bench will set aside the conviction.