Can the conviction for selling skimmed curd milk be quashed on a revision petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court because the Food Safety Rules do not prescribe a quality standard?

Sources
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Case Analysis: Read case analysis

Suppose a dairy enterprise that supplies “skimmed curd‑milk” to retail outlets in a northern Indian city is charged under the Food Safety Act for selling the product with added water, the investigating agency having recorded a solids‑not‑fat content well below the level normally required for curd‑milk.

The complainant, a consumer‑rights group, files a complaint alleging that the product is adulterated, leading the police to register an FIR and the prosecution to charge the accused under the provisions that prohibit the sale of adulterated food items. The trial court, after hearing the prosecution’s expert analysis showing a solids‑not‑fat percentage of 5.8 per cent, acquits the accused on the ground that the statutory rules do not prescribe a specific quality standard for “skimmed curd‑milk”. The prosecution appeals, and the appellate tribunal interprets the definition of “curd‑milk” to incorporate the standard applicable to regular curd, thereby convicting the accused, imposing a fine and ordering a short term of imprisonment.

The legal problem that emerges is whether a conviction can stand when the regulatory framework—specifically the Food Safety Rules—fails to fix an explicit quantitative standard for the product in question. The accused contends that the appellate tribunal erred in reading an implied standard into the definition, a step that the statute does not authorize. A simple factual defence based on the laboratory report is insufficient because the core issue is statutory interpretation and the existence (or non‑existence) of a prescribed standard, which is a question of law.

Because the conviction rests on a legal error rather than on the factual matrix, the appropriate remedy is not a fresh trial but a higher‑court intervention to quash the order. The procedural route that naturally follows is a revision petition under the Criminal Procedure Code, seeking a declaration that the appellate tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a standard that the Rules do not contain. Such a petition must be filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the court vested with the authority to examine jurisdictional errors in criminal proceedings.

In drafting the revision, the accused engages a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who frames the argument that the appellate tribunal’s decision contravenes the principle that a conviction under the Food Safety Act requires the existence of a prescribed standard under the Rules. The petition emphasizes that the Rules expressly list standards for milk, skimmed milk, butter and curd, but remain silent on “skimmed curd‑milk”. Consequently, the essential element of the offence—sale of an article that falls below a prescribed standard—is absent.

A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would similarly advise that the revision must demonstrate that the appellate tribunal’s interpretation amounts to a jurisdictional overreach, warranting the High Court’s exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition therefore requests the High Court to set aside the conviction, restore the acquittal, and order the refund of any fine already collected.

The prosecution, represented by lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, argues that the purpose of the Food Safety Act is to protect public health and that the appellate tribunal’s reading of the curd standard is a reasonable construction. However, the revision petition counters that legislative intent cannot fill a vacuum left by the Rules; the absence of a specific standard cannot be cured by judicial implication, a principle affirmed by higher courts in analogous matters.

Because the matter involves a question of law—whether an implied standard can be read into a definition that the Rules leave undefined—the High Court is the appropriate forum to resolve the dispute. The accused therefore files the revision petition, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court, after considering the submissions of the lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, may issue a writ of certiorari to quash the appellate order.

In the course of the proceedings, the court may also entertain a bail application, as the accused remains in custody pending the outcome of the revision. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that continued detention is unwarranted where the conviction itself is legally untenable, and that the accused is entitled to liberty pending the determination of the jurisdictional issue.

The High Court’s decision will hinge on the interpretation of the Food Safety Rules and the principle that a criminal conviction cannot be predicated on a statutory element that the legislature has not prescribed. If the court finds that the appellate tribunal indeed overstepped, it will quash the conviction, restore the original acquittal, and direct the prosecution to reimburse any penalties imposed.

Thus, the fictional scenario mirrors the legal contours of the analyzed judgment: a conviction based on an alleged violation of a quality standard that the Rules do not expressly provide, leading to a procedural challenge before the Punjab and Haryana High Court through a revision petition seeking quashing of the conviction.

Question: Does the appellate tribunal have the authority to read an implied solids‑not‑fat standard for “skimmed curd‑milk” into the Food Safety Rules when the Rules are silent on any quantitative requirement for that product?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the dairy enterprise was charged after a laboratory analysis revealed a solids‑not‑fat (SNF) content of 5.8 per cent in its “skimmed curd‑milk”. The Food Safety Rules enumerate explicit SNF percentages for milk, skimmed milk, butter and curd, but they contain no provision for “skimmed curd‑milk”. The trial court therefore acquitted the accused on the ground that the essential element of the offence – the sale of an article below a prescribed standard – was missing. On appeal, the tribunal interpreted “curd‑milk” to inherit the curd standard, thereby convicting the accused. The legal problem is whether such an interpretative leap is permissible. Under the principle of statutory construction, a criminal conviction cannot rest on a judicially created element that the legislature has not prescribed. The Food Safety Act requires that an article be declared adulterated only when it falls short of a standard fixed by the Rules. When the Rules are expressly silent, the judiciary cannot fill the gap by implication, because doing so would expand the scope of criminal liability beyond legislative intent. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the tribunal’s reading amounts to a jurisdictional overreach, violating the doctrine that penal statutes must be strictly construed. The tribunal’s approach also contravenes the rule that a penal provision cannot be given a meaning that creates a new offence. Consequently, the appellate decision is vulnerable to reversal on the ground that it misapplied the law of interpretation, not merely misappreciated the facts. The practical implication for the accused is that the conviction rests on a legal error, opening the door for a higher‑court remedy to quash the order. For the prosecution, the error undermines the credibility of its case and may compel it to seek clarification of the Rules before proceeding further. The High Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is thus positioned to assess whether the tribunal exceeded its authority by imposing an unwritten standard.

Question: Is a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court the appropriate procedural remedy to challenge the appellate tribunal’s conviction, and what are the legal thresholds for the High Court to entertain such a petition?

Answer: The procedural history indicates that the accused was convicted by an appellate tribunal, a body that functions as a second‑instance criminal court. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, a party aggrieved by a judgment of a tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction may approach the High Court by way of a revision petition, seeking a declaration that the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. The factual basis for the revision is the alleged legal error: the tribunal’s imposition of an implied SNF standard not found in the Food Safety Rules. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would advise that the revision must demonstrate a jurisdictional flaw, not merely a question of evidence, because the High Court’s power under revision is limited to correcting jurisdictional defects, errors of law apparent on the face of the record, or excess of jurisdiction. The petition must therefore set out, with reference to the statutory scheme, that the essential element of the offence was absent, rendering the conviction ultra vires. The High Court will examine whether the tribunal’s decision was based on a misinterpretation of the statutory definition of “skimmed curd‑milk” and whether the Rules’ silence on a quantitative standard precludes liability. If the court is satisfied that the tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction, it may issue a writ of certiorari to quash the conviction. The practical implication for the accused is that a successful revision restores the original acquittal and may also secure a refund of any fine paid. For the prosecution, a dismissal of the revision would compel it to either amend the charge to fit the statutory framework or seek legislative amendment. The High Court’s threshold is thus a clear demonstration of jurisdictional error, which the accused, through a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, must meticulously articulate.

Question: Can the accused obtain bail pending the determination of the revision petition, and what factors will the court consider in deciding whether continued custody is justified?

Answer: The accused remains in custody after the appellate tribunal’s conviction, and the revision petition is pending before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Under the principles governing bail, the court must balance the right to liberty against the interests of justice, considering factors such as the nature of the offence, the likelihood of the accused fleeing, the possibility of tampering with evidence, and the strength of the case on merit. Here, the core issue is a legal one: whether the conviction rests on a statutory element that does not exist. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would argue that continued detention is unwarranted where the conviction is predicated on a legal error, as the accused is effectively being punished for an act that the law does not criminalize. The prosecution may contend that the offence involves public health concerns, justifying custody to prevent further distribution of adulterated product. However, the court will note that the alleged adulteration cannot be established as an offence without a prescribed standard, rendering the conviction vulnerable. Moreover, the accused has no prior criminal record and the alleged conduct is non‑violent, reducing the risk of flight. The High Court, therefore, is likely to grant bail on the ground that the accused’s liberty is being infringed without sufficient legal basis, and that the revision petition itself raises a serious question of law that merits a free status pending resolution. The practical implication is that bail would allow the accused to resume business operations, mitigating economic loss, while the High Court deliberates on the jurisdictional challenge. For the prosecution, granting bail may be seen as a concession but does not prejudice its substantive arguments, which must still be justified on the merits of the statutory framework.

Question: What is the scope of the High Court’s supervisory power under Article 226 of the Constitution in this context, and can it issue a writ of certiorari to set aside the appellate tribunal’s order?

Answer: The constitutional provision granting the High Court supervisory jurisdiction empowers it to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. In criminal matters, the High Court may entertain a revision petition and, if satisfied that the lower court has acted without jurisdiction, may issue a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order. The factual scenario presents a conviction based on an implied standard not found in the Food Safety Rules, raising a question of jurisdictional overreach. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would contend that the appellate tribunal exceeded its authority by creating a statutory element, thereby violating the principle that penal statutes must be strictly construed. The High Court’s analysis will focus on whether the tribunal’s decision was ultra vires, i.e., whether it misapplied the law of the offence. If the court finds that the essential element – a prescribed SNF standard – is absent, it can conclude that the tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction and thus may issue a certiorari. The practical effect of such a writ is the nullification of the conviction, restoration of the original acquittal, and possible direction for the return of any fine. For the prosecution, the issuance of a certiorari would mean that the case cannot proceed on the present charge, compelling it either to withdraw the prosecution or to amend the charge to align with an existing statutory standard. The High Court’s supervisory power, therefore, serves as a vital check on lower courts, ensuring that criminal liability is not imposed in the absence of a clear legislative mandate.

Question: How might the prosecution argue that the public‑health purpose of the Food Safety Act justifies reading an implied standard into “skimmed curd‑milk,” and what are the limits of such an argument?

Answer: The prosecution, represented by lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, will likely emphasize that the overarching objective of the Food Safety Act is to protect consumers from adulterated food, and that allowing a loophole for “skimmed curd‑milk” could undermine that purpose. It may argue that the legislative intent was to cover all dairy products, and that the omission of an explicit SNF standard for this specific product was inadvertent, not intentional. By invoking the principle of purposive interpretation, the prosecution may claim that the tribunal’s reading of the curd standard into “skimmed curd‑milk” is a reasonable construction necessary to fulfill the Act’s protective aim. However, the limits of this argument are grounded in the rule of strict construction of penal statutes: courts cannot create a criminal offence by implication. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would point out that while public‑health considerations are compelling, they cannot override the requirement that a statutory element be expressly prescribed. The Food Safety Rules are the instrument through which standards are fixed; their silence on “skimmed curd‑milk” indicates a legislative decision not to impose a quantitative requirement. Moreover, allowing the tribunal to fill the gap would set a precedent for judicial law‑making in criminal matters, contravening the principle of legality. The High Court, therefore, must balance the public‑health rationale against the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be punished for an act not clearly defined as an offence. The practical implication for the prosecution is that, even with a strong policy argument, it must demonstrate that the Rules implicitly incorporate the standard, which is unlikely to succeed given the strict interpretative rules governing criminal statutes. Consequently, the High Court is expected to prioritize the clear statutory language over policy considerations in deciding the revision petition.

Question: Why is the appropriate remedy a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than a fresh trial, given the facts of the dairy enterprise case?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the appellate tribunal convicted the accused by reading an implied solids‑not‑fat standard into the definition of “skimmed curd‑milk”, a step that the Food Safety Rules do not expressly authorize. Because the conviction rests on a question of law—whether a statutory element exists—the remedy must address jurisdictional error, not re‑examine evidence. A revision petition is the statutory vehicle designed to correct errors of law committed by a subordinate criminal court when the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under the Constitution is invoked. The Punjab and Haryana High Court possesses the authority to entertain such a petition because the conviction was rendered by a tribunal exercising powers delegated by the state, and the High Court can issue a writ of certiorari to quash an order that exceeds jurisdiction. The accused therefore files a revision rather than a fresh trial to obtain a declaration that the appellate body misinterpreted the regulatory framework, which cannot be remedied by re‑presenting laboratory reports. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court ensures that the petition is framed with precise reference to the jurisdictional defect, the lack of a prescribed standard, and the need for a supervisory writ. Simultaneously, the accused may consult lawyers in Chandigarh High Court for ancillary relief such as bail, because the High Court’s jurisdiction over the revision does not automatically stay the detention of the accused. By separating the substantive challenge (revision) from the procedural relief (bail), the accused can preserve liberty while the higher court scrutinises the legal error. Thus, the procedural route follows directly from the facts: the conviction is legally untenable, the appropriate High Court remedy is a revision petition, and the involvement of counsel in both courts reflects the dual strategy of attacking the conviction and securing immediate personal liberty.

Question: How does the absence of a prescribed standard in the Food Safety Rules affect the jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal and justify intervention by the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The Food Safety Rules enumerate quantitative standards for several dairy products but remain silent on “skimmed curd‑milk”. Under the statutory scheme, liability for adulteration requires that the article fall below a prescribed standard; without such a standard, the essential element of the offence is missing. The appellate tribunal’s decision to import the curd standard into the definition of skimmed curd‑milk therefore creates a jurisdictional overreach, because the tribunal is effectively legislating a standard that the rule‑making authority deliberately omitted. This mis‑step triggers the supervisory jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which can examine whether the lower forum acted within the limits of its conferred powers. A revision petition can highlight that the tribunal’s reasoning contravenes the principle that a criminal conviction cannot be predicated on a statutory element that the legislature has not prescribed. The High Court, through a writ of certiorari, can set aside the order for exceeding jurisdiction, thereby restoring the legal position that the accused cannot be convicted on an undefined standard. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court may be consulted to advise on the procedural nuances of filing the revision, ensuring that the petition correctly cites the lack of a rule‑made standard as a jurisdictional defect. Meanwhile, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court will draft the petition to emphasise the constitutional and statutory basis for High Court intervention, arguing that the appellate tribunal’s implied standard amounts to an unlawful amendment of the Rules. The procedural consequence is that the High Court, upon finding the jurisdictional error, will quash the conviction, reaffirm the principle that criminal liability must rest on a clear legislative prescription, and thereby correct the legal error that arose from the factual context of the dairy case.

Question: Why might the accused seek a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court for bail and related relief even though the revision petition is filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The revision petition challenges the legal basis of the conviction, but it does not automatically stay the execution of the sentence or the continued detention of the accused. While the Punjab and Haryana High Court examines the jurisdictional defect, the accused remains in custody, and the immediate concern is personal liberty. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can file a bail application under the appropriate criminal procedure provisions, arguing that the accused’s continued detention is unwarranted where the conviction itself is legally vulnerable. The bail application must demonstrate that the accused is not a flight risk, that the alleged offence does not involve a serious threat to public health beyond the contested standard, and that the pending revision provides a strong prospect of relief. By engaging lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, the accused ensures that the bail petition is presented before the same bench that will hear ancillary matters, facilitating coordinated advocacy. Simultaneously, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court prepares the revision petition, focusing on the jurisdictional error and the absence of a statutory standard. This dual representation allows the accused to pursue two parallel tracks: one to secure immediate release and another to overturn the conviction. The practical implication is that if the bail is granted, the accused can participate more effectively in the High Court proceedings, attend hearings, and cooperate with counsel. Moreover, the bail application underscores the principle that factual defence alone—such as laboratory reports showing low solids‑not‑fat content—cannot substitute for a legal basis for detention when the conviction itself is predicated on an undefined standard. Thus, the involvement of a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court for bail complements the revision strategy before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, ensuring both procedural correctness and protection of personal liberty.

Question: In what way does a purely factual defence based on laboratory reports fail to address the core legal issue, necessitating a writ of certiorari from the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The laboratory reports indicating that the skimmed curd‑milk contained a solids‑not‑fat percentage of 5.8 per cent are indeed relevant to the factual allegation of adulteration. However, the core legal issue is whether the Food Safety Rules prescribe a quantitative benchmark for “skimmed curd‑milk” against which such a measurement can be judged. Criminal liability under the Food Safety Act requires that the article fall below a prescribed standard; without a statutory benchmark, the factual finding of low solids‑not‑fat cannot be transformed into a criminal offence. Consequently, a factual defence that merely disputes the measurement does not cure the deficiency that the essential element of the offence is absent. The appropriate remedy is a writ of certiorari, which a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court can seek to quash the appellate order on the ground of jurisdictional error. The writ challenges the legal reasoning that created a de facto standard where none exists, rather than contesting the laboratory numbers. By filing a revision petition, the accused asks the High Court to examine whether the tribunal exceeded its authority by reading an implied standard into the Rules, a question of law that cannot be resolved by presenting additional scientific evidence. Meanwhile, a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court may advise on the strategic timing of the writ, ensuring that the petition is filed before any further execution of the sentence. The practical implication is that the High Court, upon recognizing the lack of a prescribed standard, will likely set aside the conviction, rendering the factual defence moot. This underscores why factual arguments alone are insufficient at this stage; the decisive factor is the statutory framework, and only a High Court writ can correct the legal misinterpretation that gave rise to the conviction.

Question: Does the appellate tribunal’s reading of an implied quality standard for “skimmed curd‑milk” constitute a jurisdictional error that a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court can exploit in a revision petition?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the investigating agency measured a solids‑not‑fat content of 5.8 per cent in the product, while the Food Safety Rules enumerate explicit standards for milk, skimmed milk, butter and curd but remain silent on “skimmed curd‑milk”. The legal problem, therefore, is whether the tribunal may legally import the curd standard into the definition of the product in order to sustain a conviction. Procedurally, a criminal court must confine its judgment to the elements prescribed by the statute and its subordinate rules; any expansion of those elements amounts to a jurisdictional overreach. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would begin the revision by highlighting that the tribunal’s decision rests on a question of law—specifically the interpretation of the Rules—not on factual disputes. The High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 permits it to quash orders that exceed the adjudicating authority’s jurisdiction. The revision petition must therefore allege that the tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction by reading an implied standard that the legislature deliberately omitted. The practical implication for the accused is that, if the High Court accepts this argument, the conviction will be set aside and the original acquittal restored, eliminating the fine and imprisonment. For the prosecution, the consequence is a loss of the conviction and a potential requirement to re‑file the case, but only if a clear standard can be promulgated. The petition should also attach the relevant excerpts of the Rules, the laboratory report, and the tribunal’s reasoning to demonstrate the legal gap. By focusing on the jurisdictional defect rather than merely disputing the expert analysis, the lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court maximizes the chance of a successful quashing of the appellate order.

Question: How can the accused challenge the reliability of the solids‑not‑fat laboratory reports when the statutory framework lacks a prescribed benchmark, and what evidentiary tactics should a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court employ?

Answer: The evidence consists of two laboratory analyses showing solids‑not‑fat percentages well below the curd benchmark, yet the Rules do not prescribe any quantitative threshold for “skimmed curd‑milk”. The legal problem is that the prosecution’s case hinges on the premise that any deviation from an implied standard constitutes adulteration, a premise that is not anchored in statutory language. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would therefore adopt a two‑pronged evidentiary strategy. First, the defence should file a detailed rebuttal of the expert reports, questioning the calibration of the equipment, the chain of custody of the samples, and the methodology used, thereby creating reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the figures. Second, the defence should introduce independent expert testimony to explain that, in the absence of a legislatively fixed standard, the observed solids‑not‑fat level falls within the normal variability of skimmed curd‑milk production. This expert can also opine that the product’s composition does not pose a health risk, undermining the complainant’s public‑health justification. Procedurally, the defence must move to exclude the prosecution’s reports on the ground that they are irrelevant to a charge that requires a statutory benchmark; without such a benchmark, the reports cannot establish the essential element of the offence. The practical implication for the accused is that a successful evidentiary challenge can strip the prosecution of its core proof, prompting the High Court to view the conviction as unsustainable. For the complainant, the loss of the laboratory evidence weakens the narrative of adulteration, potentially leading to a dismissal of the revision petition. The lawyer in Chandigarh High Court must also ensure that any application to re‑examine the reports complies with the evidentiary rules of the High Court, filing appropriate affidavits and supporting documents within the prescribed timelines.

Question: What are the risks associated with the accused’s continued custody while the revision petition is pending, and how can bail be effectively secured by lawyers in Chandigarh High Court?

Answer: The accused remains in custody after the appellate tribunal imposed a short term of imprisonment, creating a factual situation where liberty is curtailed pending a higher‑court determination. The legal problem is that continued detention may become punitive if the conviction itself is vulnerable to quashing on jurisdictional grounds. Procedurally, the High Court has the power to entertain a bail application under its inherent jurisdiction, especially when the offence is non‑violent and the primary issue is a legal error rather than a factual guilt. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court should file an urgent bail application emphasizing that the conviction rests on an implied standard not found in the Rules, rendering the order ultra vires. The application must highlight that the accused poses no flight risk, has no prior criminal record, and is willing to comply with any reporting conditions. Additionally, the defence can argue that the accused’s continued custody serves no investigative purpose, as the evidentiary material has already been produced and the case is now purely a matter of law. The practical implication for the accused is that successful bail restores personal liberty, allowing the accused to cooperate fully with the revision proceedings and to manage personal affairs, which can be a strategic advantage. For the prosecution, granting bail may be seen as conceding that the conviction is on shaky legal ground, potentially influencing the High Court’s view on the merits of the revision. The lawyers in Chandigarh High Court should also request that the court stay the execution of the fine and imprisonment pending the outcome of the revision, thereby preserving the status quo and preventing irreversible consequences should the High Court later quash the conviction.

Question: How should the defence counter the complainant’s allegations that the product endangers public health, and what strategic arguments can a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court raise to demonstrate legislative silence on “skimmed curd‑milk” standards?

Answer: The complainant, a consumer‑rights group, frames the case as a public‑health emergency, asserting that water addition dilutes nutritional value and poses health risks. The legal problem is that the Food Safety Act requires a breach of a prescribed standard to constitute an offence; the Rules, however, do not prescribe any quantitative standard for “skimmed curd‑milk”. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court can therefore argue that the legislative intent to protect health cannot fill a statutory vacuum. The defence should submit the Rules in their entirety, showing that the legislature deliberately listed standards for milk, skimmed milk, butter and curd, but omitted “skimmed curd‑milk”. This omission signals that the legislature did not consider the product to require a specific solids‑not‑fat threshold, and therefore the offence of adulteration cannot be anchored on an implied standard. Strategically, the defence can cite the principle that criminal liability cannot be imposed on the basis of a non‑existent statutory element, and that any inference of public‑health danger must be grounded in a concrete statutory provision, which is absent here. The practical implication for the accused is that, if the High Court accepts this argument, the conviction will be set aside, and the fine and imprisonment will be vacated. For the complainant, the lack of a prescribed standard undermines the claim that the product is illegal, forcing them to either seek regulatory amendment or pursue civil remedies, which are beyond the scope of the criminal revision. The lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court should also request that the court issue a declaratory order clarifying the legislative gap, thereby preventing future prosecutions on the same basis and providing guidance to the investigating agency on the limits of its enforcement powers.