Can a customs officer’s arrest and interrogation powers cause his statement to be excluded as a confession in a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

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Suppose a railway employee who works as a senior fire‑man on long‑distance freight trains is intercepted by a revenue officer of the customs department during a routine inspection at a border checkpoint, and the officer obtains a written statement in which the employee admits to having concealed a parcel of contraband currency and gold in the coal bunker of the locomotive, allegedly at the direction of a smuggling syndicate.

The customs officer, who is empowered under the Customs Act to search, seize and interrogate persons suspected of smuggling, records the admission in the presence of a senior official of the customs department. The employee is subsequently arrested by the local police, produced before a magistrate, and charged under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Customs Act for possession of prohibited foreign exchange and smuggling of gold.

During the trial, the prosecution relies heavily on the written admission, arguing that the statement was made voluntarily to a revenue officer and therefore falls outside the protection of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, which excludes confessions made to a police officer. The magistrate accepts the admission as admissible, convicts the employee, and imposes a term of imprisonment along with a fine.

The employee files an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, contending that the customs officer, by virtue of the powers of arrest and interrogation vested in him, must be treated as a “police officer” within the meaning of section 25. The High Court, after examining the statutory definition of “police” in the Police Act, holds that the primary function of customs officers is revenue protection rather than general crime prevention, and consequently rules that the officer is not a police officer. The court therefore declares the confession inadmissible, sets aside the conviction, and orders the employee’s release.

The legal problem that emerges is whether a customs officer, who exercises statutory powers of arrest and interrogation, can be classified as a police officer for the purposes of the exclusionary rule in section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The answer to this question determines the admissibility of the confession and, by extension, the viability of the conviction.

While the employee’s factual defence—that the confession was involuntary—remains relevant, it does not address the core procedural issue: the proper classification of the officer who obtained the statement. Because the High Court’s decision rests on a statutory interpretation rather than on the merits of the evidence, the prosecution cannot simply rely on a fresh factual defence at the trial level; it must challenge the High Court’s interpretation through a higher procedural remedy.

Consequently, the State decides to file a criminal revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking restoration of the conviction on the ground that the High Court erred in holding that the customs officer was not a police officer within the meaning of section 25. The revision petition is the appropriate remedy because it permits a superior court to examine the legality of a subordinate court’s order when there is a substantial question of law, without re‑litigating the entire factual matrix.

In the revision petition, the State specifically asks the High Court to declare that the customs officer, by virtue of his statutory powers of arrest, search and interrogation, falls within the ambit of “police officer” as intended by the Indian Evidence Act, and therefore the confession should be deemed inadmissible. The petition also seeks a direction that the conviction be reinstated and that the employee be ordered to serve the sentence originally imposed.

A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court prepares the revision petition, meticulously citing precedents that interpret the term “police officer” in the context of statutory officers exercising coercive powers. The counsel argues that extending the protection of section 25 to revenue officers would undermine the legislative intent of the Evidence Act, which aims to curb the risk of forced confessions by officers traditionally associated with law‑enforcement functions.

Because the revision petition challenges a legal interpretation rather than the factual findings of the trial, the High Court’s jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Code to entertain revisions is invoked. The petition demonstrates that the order of the High Court is not merely an appellate decision on the merits but a determination of a point of law that has a direct bearing on the admissibility of evidence and the validity of the conviction.

Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court have observed similar disputes where customs or excise officers were deemed “police officers” for evidentiary purposes, and their analyses reinforce the argument that the High Court’s earlier ruling deviated from established jurisprudence. By referencing these comparative decisions, the revision petition seeks to persuade the Punjab and Haryana High Court to align its interpretation with the broader judicial consensus.

The procedural route of filing a criminal revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court is thus the natural and necessary step to obtain the relief sought. It allows the State to directly address the legal error, request a reversal of the High Court’s order, and secure the reinstatement of the conviction without the need for a fresh trial.

In summary, the fictional scenario mirrors the essential legal contours of the analyzed judgment: a dispute over the classification of a revenue officer for the purposes of section 25, the inadmissibility of a confession, and the strategic use of a criminal revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court to correct the legal misinterpretation and restore the conviction.

Question: Does the statutory power of arrest and interrogation vested in a customs officer automatically render that officer a “police officer” for the purposes of the exclusionary rule on confessions, and how does this classification affect the admissibility of the employee’s written admission?

Answer: The factual matrix presents a senior fire‑man of the railways who, during a routine customs inspection at a border checkpoint, provided a written admission to a customs officer that he had concealed contraband currency and gold in the locomotive’s coal bunker. The crux of the legal dispute is whether the customs officer, by virtue of his arrest and interrogation powers, falls within the definition of “police officer” under the Indian Evidence Act, which would bar the confession from evidence. The High Court’s earlier ruling held that the primary function of customs officers is revenue protection, not general crime prevention, and therefore they are not police officers for the purpose of the exclusionary rule. This interpretation aligns with the purposive approach that looks at the officer’s principal role rather than the mere existence of coercive powers. If the officer is deemed a police officer, the confession would be excluded under the rule that confessions made to police are inadmissible, leading to the collapse of the prosecution’s case, as the admission was the centerpiece of the evidence. Conversely, if the officer is classified as a non‑police revenue official, the confession remains admissible, sustaining the conviction. The classification thus directly determines whether the State can rely on the admission to prove possession of prohibited foreign exchange and smuggled gold. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that extending the protection to customs officers would dilute the legislative intent of the Evidence Act, which targets the risk of coercion by law‑enforcement officials traditionally associated with police functions. The court must balance the statutory purpose against the practical reality of customs officers exercising coercive powers, and its decision will set a precedent for future evidentiary disputes involving revenue officers.

Question: What procedural remedy is available to the State to challenge the High Court’s interpretation of “police officer,” and why is a criminal revision petition the appropriate mechanism rather than an appeal or fresh trial?

Answer: The State’s objective is to overturn the High Court’s order that declared the confession inadmissible and set aside the conviction of the railway employee. The appropriate procedural avenue is a criminal revision petition filed under the Criminal Procedure Code, which permits a superior court to examine the legality of a subordinate court’s order when a substantial question of law arises. An appeal is unavailable because the High Court’s decision was not a final appellate judgment on the merits but a judicial determination of a legal question—namely, the classification of the customs officer. A fresh trial would be unnecessary and inefficient, as the factual findings concerning the contraband and the employee’s conduct remain undisputed; the dispute centers on the legal interpretation of the term “police officer.” By filing a revision petition, the State can directly seek a correction of the legal error without re‑litigating the entire factual matrix. The petition will argue that the High Court misapplied the purposive test and ignored established jurisprudence that treats officers exercising coercive powers akin to police for evidentiary purposes. The revision mechanism also allows the State to request that the conviction be reinstated and the employee be ordered to serve the original sentence, thereby achieving the relief sought. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court have observed analogous revisions where higher courts corrected misinterpretations of evidentiary provisions, reinforcing the suitability of this remedy. The revision petition thus streamlines the process, focusing the court’s attention on the statutory construction and ensuring that the State’s grievance is addressed through the correct procedural channel.

Question: How does the principle of voluntariness intersect with the classification issue, and what evidential burden does the prosecution bear to prove that the confession was made voluntarily to a non‑police officer?

Answer: While the primary contention revolves around the officer’s classification, the principle of voluntariness remains a parallel ground for assessing admissibility. Even if the customs officer is deemed a non‑police officer, the confession must still be shown to have been made voluntarily, without coercion, threat, or inducement. The prosecution therefore bears the evidential burden of establishing the voluntariness of the written admission. This burden is satisfied by demonstrating that the statement was recorded in the presence of a senior customs official, that the employee was not subjected to physical force, and that the circumstances of the interrogation adhered to procedural safeguards. The prosecution may also rely on the employee’s own written acknowledgment, which can be interpreted as an affirmation of its voluntariness. However, the defense can challenge this by alleging that the customs officer’s arrest powers created an atmosphere of compulsion, thereby rendering the confession involuntary despite the officer’s non‑police status. The court will assess factors such as the duration of the interrogation, the presence of legal counsel, and any threats of harsher penalties. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court will emphasize that the statutory definition of “police officer” is the decisive factor for exclusion under the Evidence Act, but will also be prepared to rebut any voluntariness claims by the defense. If the court finds the confession voluntary, it will be admissible regardless of the officer’s classification; if not, the confession will be excluded, and the State’s case may collapse. Thus, the prosecution must meticulously document the circumstances of the statement to satisfy both the classification and voluntariness requirements, ensuring that the evidence can withstand judicial scrutiny.

Question: What are the potential outcomes of the revision petition for the accused railway employee and the State, and how would each outcome affect the conviction, sentence, and future evidentiary standards?

Answer: The revision petition presents several possible judicial outcomes. If the Punjab and Haryana High Court accepts the State’s argument and holds that the customs officer qualifies as a “police officer” for evidentiary purposes, the confession will be deemed inadmissible, the conviction will be reaffirmed, and the employee will be required to serve the original term of imprisonment and pay the fine. This outcome would reinforce the exclusionary rule, extending its protective scope to revenue officers exercising coercive powers, and would set a precedent that future prosecutions must treat such officers as police for confession admissibility. Conversely, if the court upholds the earlier finding that the customs officer is not a police officer, the confession remains admissible, and the conviction is reinstated, confirming the State’s position. This would maintain the status quo, limiting the exclusionary rule to traditional police officers and preserving the evidentiary framework used in the original trial. A third, less likely, scenario is that the court finds the confession inadmissible on grounds of involuntariness, irrespective of the officer’s classification, leading to the quashing of the conviction and possible acquittal of the employee. In that case, the State would need to consider alternative evidence or initiate fresh proceedings, while the jurisprudence would emphasize the paramount importance of voluntariness over classification. Each outcome carries practical implications: reinstatement of the conviction secures the State’s deterrent objective and recovers the penalty, whereas exclusion of the confession could embolden defendants to challenge custodial statements and compel law‑enforcement agencies to adopt stricter procedural safeguards. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court will closely monitor the court’s reasoning, as it will shape future strategies for both prosecution and defence in cases involving customs or revenue officers.

Question: How might precedent from analogous cases influence the High Court’s decision on the classification issue, and what role do lawyers in Chandigarh High Court play in framing the arguments for the revision petition?

Answer: Judicial precedent is pivotal in resolving the classification dispute. The State’s revision petition will cite earlier decisions where courts have interpreted “police officer” to include officers vested with coercive powers, such as certain excise or narcotics officials, emphasizing the functional test over the nominal title. Conversely, the defence will rely on cases that narrowly confined the term to traditional law‑enforcement bodies, highlighting the revenue‑protective nature of customs duties. The High Court is likely to weigh these competing lines of authority, assessing whether the functional attributes of the customs officer—arrest, search, and interrogation—align more closely with police functions. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, familiar with the regional jurisprudence, will craft persuasive submissions that draw parallels with favorable rulings from neighboring jurisdictions, illustrating a consistent trend toward a broader interpretation of “police officer” for evidentiary purposes. They will also anticipate counter‑arguments by distinguishing the customs context from other revenue‑related statutes, underscoring the unique statutory scheme governing customs enforcement. By integrating comparative analysis and highlighting policy considerations—such as preventing coerced confessions—the lawyers aim to persuade the bench that the exclusionary rule should extend to customs officers. Their advocacy will shape the court’s reasoning, potentially leading to a landmark clarification that either expands or restricts the ambit of the Evidence Act’s protection. The outcome will not only affect the present case but also establish a benchmark for future prosecutions involving revenue officers, thereby influencing the evidentiary landscape across the jurisdiction.

Question: Why is a criminal revision petition the proper procedural avenue to challenge the High Court’s decision on the admissibility of the customs officer’s statement, rather than filing a fresh appeal or seeking a writ of certiorari?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the employee‑accused was convicted by a magistrate, the conviction was set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on the ground that the customs officer was not a police officer within the meaning of the evidentiary exclusion, and the State now wishes to overturn that legal determination. A criminal revision petition is the statutory mechanism that allows a superior court to examine the legality of an order passed by a subordinate court when a substantial question of law arises, without re‑litigating the entire factual matrix. The High Court’s judgment did not merely assess the credibility of the confession; it interpreted the statutory definition of “police officer” and applied it to the customs officer’s statutory powers. This interpretation is a pure question of law, making it amenable to revision. A fresh appeal would be procedurally barred because the appeal route has already been exhausted; the State cannot appeal a judgment of the same High Court in the same cause of action. A writ of certiorari, on the other hand, is limited to jurisdictional errors or excess of jurisdiction, not to errors of law made in the exercise of discretionary powers. Since the High Court correctly exercised jurisdiction but possibly erred in its legal construction, revision is the appropriate remedy. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court ensures that the petition is drafted with precise reference to precedent, statutory interpretation, and the procedural requisites of the Criminal Procedure Code, such as the necessity of a certified copy of the impugned order and a concise statement of the substantial question of law. The lawyer will also advise on the timing of filing, service on the State, and the preparation of annexures, thereby enhancing the prospects that the revision petition will be entertained and that the High Court may reconsider its legal view, potentially restoring the conviction and ordering the accused’s custody pending execution of the sentence.

Question: How does the classification of the customs officer as a non‑police officer affect the admissibility of the confession, and why can the accused not rely solely on a factual defence at the revision stage?

Answer: The core issue is the evidentiary rule that excludes confessions made to a police officer. In the present facts, the customs officer exercised statutory powers of arrest, search and interrogation, yet the High Court concluded that his primary function is revenue protection, not general crime prevention, and therefore he does not fall within the definition of a police officer. This classification renders the written admission admissible, forming the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case. At the revision stage, the accused cannot simply argue that the confession was involuntary or that the factual circumstances were misinterpreted because the revision jurisdiction is confined to questions of law, not to re‑examining the truth of the allegations. The factual defence—such as claiming coercion or mistaken identity—was already considered, if at all, by the trial court and the appellate High Court. The revision petition must therefore focus on whether the High Court erred in its legal construction of “police officer.” Relying on a factual defence would be procedurally futile and likely to be dismissed as an attempt to re‑litigate the merits. Moreover, the admissibility of the confession determines whether the prosecution’s evidence can be admitted at all; if the confession is deemed admissible, the factual defence must confront a stronger evidentiary foundation. Consequently, the accused must seek relief through a legal challenge to the classification, not by reiterating factual disputes. This strategic shift underscores the importance of consulting lawyers in Chandigarh High Court who are adept at framing revision arguments, identifying precedent on the scope of evidentiary exclusions, and preparing a concise legal brief that isolates the statutory interpretation issue, thereby maximizing the chance of a favorable judicial reconsideration.

Question: What procedural steps must the State follow in drafting and filing the criminal revision petition, and why might the accused consider obtaining advice from a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court despite the petition being filed in Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The procedural roadmap begins with the preparation of a petition that complies with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code. The State must obtain a certified copy of the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s order, attach a concise statement of the substantial question of law—namely, whether a customs officer exercising arrest and interrogation powers qualifies as a police officer for evidentiary purposes—and set out the grounds of revision, citing relevant precedents and statutory definitions. The petition must be signed by an advocate, supported by an affidavit affirming the correctness of the facts, and accompanied by a list of documents, including the original FIR, the written confession, and the trial court’s judgment. Service of the petition on the accused and the petitioning counsel is mandatory, and a copy must be filed with the court registry within the prescribed time limit, typically 30 days from the receipt of the impugned order. Although the petition is filed in Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused may seek advice from a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court because the latter has extensive experience in handling revision matters that involve nuanced questions of statutory interpretation and evidentiary law. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court are familiar with the procedural intricacies of filing, the drafting of precise relief prayers, and the strategic use of precedent from neighboring jurisdictions. Their counsel can help the accused prepare a robust counter‑submission, argue that the revision petition should be dismissed for lack of a substantial question of law, and possibly raise alternative remedies such as a writ of habeas corpus if custody is at issue. Engaging such expertise ensures that the accused’s response is not merely a factual rebuttal but a legally grounded objection that aligns with the High Court’s procedural posture, thereby safeguarding procedural rights and enhancing the likelihood of a favorable outcome.

Question: Under what circumstances can the Punjab and Haryana High Court entertain a revision petition instead of a direct writ, and how does the existence of a prior High Court judgment influence the court’s jurisdictional analysis?

Answer: The High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a criminal revision is triggered when a subordinate court—here the trial magistrate—issues an order that is alleged to be illegal, erroneous, or contrary to law, and the matter involves a substantial question of law. A direct writ such as certiorari is appropriate only when the lower court has acted beyond its jurisdiction or committed a jurisdictional error. In the present scenario, the Punjab and Haryana High Court previously rendered a judgment on the merits, interpreting the statutory definition of “police officer” and consequently setting aside the conviction. The State’s challenge is not that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction, but that its legal interpretation may be flawed. Because the earlier judgment is a final decision on the same cause of action, the High Court retains the power to revisit its own order through revision, provided the question raised is purely legal. The existence of the prior High Court judgment does not bar a revision; rather, it frames the scope of review. The court will examine whether the earlier decision involved a misinterpretation of the statutory scheme governing evidentiary exclusions, and whether such misinterpretation affected the legality of the order. If the court finds that the earlier decision was based on an erroneous legal view, it may set aside or modify its own order. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court will emphasize that the revision petition does not seek to re‑argue factual issues but to correct a legal error, thereby fitting within the statutory ambit of revision. This distinction is crucial because a writ of certiorari would be dismissed for lack of jurisdictional error, while a revision petition aligns with the procedural pathway designed for correcting substantive legal mistakes, ensuring that the High Court can maintain consistency in its jurisprudence while providing a mechanism for the State to seek restoration of the conviction.

Question: How should the accused’s counsel evaluate the risk that the written admission, recorded by the customs officer, may be deemed admissible despite the High Court’s finding, and what documentary and evidentiary safeguards can be pursued to mitigate the danger of a reversal on appeal?

Answer: The first step for the accused’s counsel is to reconstruct the exact circumstances under which the written admission was obtained, focusing on the presence of the senior customs official, the alleged voluntariness of the statement, and any procedural irregularities such as the absence of a caution or denial of legal counsel. The counsel must obtain the original statement, the officer’s report, and any audio‑visual recordings, if existent, to scrutinise whether the customs officer exercised coercive powers that could render the confession involuntary under the broader principles of due process. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise that the prosecution’s reliance on the admission hinges on the classification of the officer; therefore, the defence should pre‑emptively file a petition under the criminal revision provisions challenging the admissibility on the ground of involuntary confession, independent of the officer’s status. Simultaneously, the defence should seek to introduce corroborative evidence that the accused was under duress, such as testimony from fellow crew members, medical reports indicating stress, or any contemporaneous notes contradicting the admission. The counsel must also request the production of the customs officer’s training manual and the statutory framework governing his powers to demonstrate that the officer’s role is distinct from that of a police officer, reinforcing the High Court’s earlier reasoning. In terms of procedural safeguards, filing an application for bail pending the outcome of the revision petition is essential to mitigate custody risks, especially if the accused remains in pre‑trial detention. The defence should also explore the possibility of a writ of habeas corpus if the custody conditions appear unlawful. By assembling a comprehensive documentary record and challenging both the substantive admissibility and the procedural legitimacy of the confession, the accused’s counsel can create a robust barrier against a potential appellate reversal that might otherwise reinstate the conviction.

Question: What strategic considerations should the State’s lawyer weigh when deciding whether to pursue a criminal revision versus a direct appeal on the question of the customs officer’s classification, and how might procedural defects in the original trial be leveraged?

Answer: The State’s counsel must first assess the procedural posture of the case: the High Court’s decision was rendered in a revision proceeding, not an appeal, meaning the court examined a point of law without re‑evaluating factual findings. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would note that a direct appeal under the criminal appellate route could allow a broader review, including both legal and factual aspects, but may be barred by the statutory limitation that revisions are the appropriate remedy for interlocutory orders. The counsel should therefore examine whether the High Court’s judgment contains any procedural irregularities, such as failure to consider statutory definitions of “police officer” or neglect of precedent from other jurisdictions, which could be highlighted in a fresh revision petition. Additionally, the State may explore filing a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court’s interpretation conflicts with established Supreme Court jurisprudence on the scope of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Procedural defects in the trial, such as the magistrate’s acceptance of the confession without a proper hearing on voluntariness, can be raised to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, thereby strengthening the argument for a higher court’s intervention. The State must also consider the evidentiary weight of the admission; if the confession is the linchpin of the prosecution’s case, emphasizing its admissibility becomes paramount. Strategically, the counsel might prepare a parallel application for a stay of the acquittal order, citing the risk of the accused re‑offending or the public interest in deterring smuggling. By meticulously mapping the procedural avenues and aligning them with the evidentiary centrality of the customs officer’s statement, the State can choose the most effective path—whether a refined revision petition, a special leave appeal, or a combined approach—to seek reinstatement of the conviction.

Question: In what ways can the accused’s legal team challenge the credibility of the customs officer’s testimony and the authenticity of the written admission, and what evidentiary tools are available to a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court to undermine the prosecution’s case?

Answer: Challenging the customs officer’s credibility begins with a thorough examination of his service record, disciplinary history, and any prior allegations of misconduct, which can be obtained through a Right to Information request or through the department’s internal audit reports. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise that the defence procure the officer’s training syllabus to demonstrate that his powers, while extensive, do not equate to those of a police officer, thereby supporting the argument that the confession should be excluded under section 25. The defence should also scrutinise the written admission for signs of tampering, such as inconsistencies in handwriting, alterations, or lack of contemporaneous signatures, and request forensic document analysis to verify its authenticity. Cross‑examination can focus on the circumstances of the recording, probing whether the officer adhered to procedural safeguards like informing the accused of his right to silence and legal counsel. If the admission was recorded in the presence of a senior official, the defence can question whether that official exerted undue influence or pressure. Additionally, the defence may introduce expert testimony on the psychological state of the accused at the time of the statement, arguing that stress, fatigue, or fear of reprisal compromised voluntariness. The prosecution’s reliance on the admission can be further weakened by presenting independent evidence that contradicts the content of the confession, such as inventory logs of the locomotive’s coal bunker, customs seizure records, or testimonies from other crew members who deny the accused’s participation. By assembling a dossier that attacks both the officer’s credibility and the document’s integrity, the defence can create reasonable doubt about the confession’s reliability, thereby compelling the court to either exclude the evidence or give it minimal weight in the overall assessment of guilt.

Question: How should the accused’s counsel address the potential for custodial prejudice, including the impact of pre‑trial detention on the accused’s ability to mount an effective defence, and what procedural remedies are available to safeguard the accused’s rights?

Answer: Custodial prejudice is a critical concern, particularly where the accused remains incarcerated while the revision petition is pending. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would recommend filing an urgent application for bail on the grounds that the accused is entitled to liberty unless the prosecution can demonstrate that he is a flight risk, likely to tamper with evidence, or poses a danger to public safety. The application should be supported by affidavits attesting to the accused’s family ties, stable employment as a railway employee, and lack of prior criminal record, thereby mitigating the flight risk argument. Additionally, the defence can invoke the principle of “reasonable bail” and argue that continued detention would impair the accused’s ability to consult counsel, gather evidence, and prepare for the revision hearing, violating the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. If the court denies bail, the defence may seek a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the detention is unlawful because the conviction was set aside and no fresh trial order exists. The counsel should also request that the investigating agency disclose all case files, including the FIR, search reports, and forensic analyses, to ensure that the accused can fully challenge the evidence while in custody. Procedurally, the defence can move for a stay of the order of release, arguing that the State’s revision petition raises substantial questions of law that warrant a temporary suspension of the acquittal, but this must be balanced against the accused’s right to liberty. By proactively addressing custodial prejudice through bail applications, habeas corpus petitions, and comprehensive discovery requests, the accused’s counsel can preserve the ability to mount an effective defence and protect the accused’s fundamental rights during the pendency of the higher‑court proceedings.