Criminal Lawyer Chandigarh High Court

Can the customs penalty and seizure of foreign exchange and a prohibited firearm be argued as punishment before the Punjab and Haryana High Court to bar subsequent criminal prosecutions?

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Suppose a person who had been travelling from a neighboring country with a vehicle loaded with foreign currency, a small amount of gold jewellery and a licensed hunting rifle is stopped at a land customs checkpoint in a northern district, where the customs officials discover an undeclared compartment in the vehicle containing additional foreign exchange and a prohibited firearm, seize the items and, under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, impose a confiscation order together with a monetary penalty on the accused.

Following the seizure, the investigating agency files a First Information Report (FIR) alleging violations of the Sea Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act. The accused is placed in judicial custody because the penalty amount is beyond his capacity to furnish security, and the customs authority also issues a notice of personal liability, demanding a substantial fine. While the accused remains in custody, the prosecution later initiates a separate criminal case under the Indian Arms Act for unlawful possession of the hunting rifle and a distinct case under the Indian Penal Code for conspiracy to smuggle foreign exchange, arguing that these offences are unrelated to the customs penalty.

The accused contends that the customs penalty, although framed as an administrative sanction, effectively operates as a punishment for the same conduct that is now the subject of the criminal prosecution. He argues that the subsequent criminal proceedings amount to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence, thereby violating the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by Article 20(2) of the Constitution. The accused’s legal team submits that the customs penalty should be treated as a conviction and that the criminal charges are barred.

However, the prosecution maintains that the customs penalty is a civil consequence of the customs violation and does not constitute a criminal conviction. It points to the statutory provision in the Sea Customs Act that expressly states that a penalty imposed under the Act does not preclude punishment under any other law. Accordingly, the prosecution argues that the offences under the Arms Act and the Indian Penal Code are distinct in nature and elements, and therefore the double‑jeopardy bar does not arise.

At this procedural stage, the accused’s ordinary factual defence—such as challenging the admissibility of the seized items or disputing the quantum of the penalty—does not address the core constitutional issue of whether the customs sanction amounts to “punishment” within the meaning of Article 20(2). The accused therefore requires a remedy that can directly test the constitutional validity of the detention and the continuation of the criminal proceedings.

The appropriate procedural route is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By invoking the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction, the accused seeks a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from custody, a writ of certiorari to quash the customs penalty order, and a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower courts from entertaining the subsequent criminal cases on the ground of double jeopardy.

In drafting the petition, the accused’s counsel emphasizes that the customs penalty, although labeled as “administrative,” carries the hallmarks of punishment: it imposes a monetary burden, is adjudicated by an authority exercising quasi‑judicial powers, and results in the deprivation of liberty when security cannot be furnished. The petition further relies on precedent that distinguishes between civil penalties and criminal punishments, arguing that the statutory language of the Sea Customs Act does not transform the penalty into a criminal conviction, yet the effect on the accused’s liberty is indistinguishable from a criminal sentence.

The petition also requests that the Punjab and Haryana High Court stay the criminal proceedings pending a determination of the constitutional issue, thereby preventing the accused from being subjected to successive prosecutions for the same conduct. The relief sought includes an order directing the investigating agency to release the accused on bail, to refund any amount collected under the customs penalty, and to set aside the FIR insofar as it overlaps with the customs sanction.

Because the matter involves a fundamental right and the accused is already in custody, the High Court is the proper forum to entertain the writ petition. The remedy cannot be pursued through an ordinary appeal or revision, as those routes would not allow the accused to challenge the legality of his detention and the underlying penalty in a single, comprehensive proceeding.

Legal practitioners familiar with the procedural nuances of the Punjab and Haryana High Court often advise that a well‑crafted writ petition, supported by a detailed comparative analysis of the statutory provisions, is essential to persuade the bench that the double‑jeopardy principle is engaged. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court with experience in constitutional criminal law would typically structure the arguments to highlight the incompatibility of the customs penalty with the constitutional guarantee, while a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court might focus on procedural safeguards and the necessity of immediate relief.

Consequently, the specific type of proceeding that naturally follows from the factual matrix is a writ petition under Article 226 filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking quashing of the customs penalty, release from custody, and a stay of the subsequent criminal prosecutions on the ground of double jeopardy. This remedy directly addresses the constitutional issue that ordinary factual defences cannot resolve, and it leverages the High Court’s power to protect fundamental rights at the earliest stage of the proceedings.

Question: Does the penalty imposed by the customs authority qualify as a “punishment” within the meaning of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, and how should the court assess this characterization?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the accused was stopped at a land customs checkpoint where officials discovered an undeclared compartment containing foreign exchange and a prohibited firearm. The customs authority seized the items, issued a confiscation order and levied a substantial monetary penalty. The accused argues that this sanction operates as a punishment because it imposes a heavy financial burden, is adjudicated by a quasi‑judicial officer, and resulted in his detention when he could not furnish security. The constitutional test for double jeopardy requires the court to determine whether the person has already been “prosecuted and punished” for the same conduct. In assessing whether the customs sanction is a punishment, the court looks at the nature of the proceeding, the statutory language, and the consequences for the individual. If the sanction is merely a civil or administrative penalty, it does not trigger the protection. However, where the penalty has punitive attributes—such as deprivation of liberty, a stigma of conviction, or a punitive fine—the court may treat it as punishment. The accused’s counsel, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, will likely emphasize that the penalty was imposed without a criminal trial, that the customs provision expressly describes it as a “penalty” rather than a “conviction,” and that the accused remains in judicial custody solely because he could not meet the security requirement. The prosecution, on the other hand, will argue that the customs provision expressly states that the penalty does not preclude punishment under any other law, indicating a legislative intent to treat it as a civil consequence. The court must balance these positions, examine precedent on the distinction between civil penalties and criminal punishments, and decide whether the effect of the customs order is sufficiently punitive to invoke Article 20(2). If the court concludes that the sanction is not a punishment, the double‑jeopardy bar does not arise, allowing subsequent criminal prosecutions to proceed.

Question: What specific writs can be sought in a petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and what procedural consequences would each writ have on the ongoing criminal cases and the accused’s detention?

Answer: The accused can file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The petition may pray for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his continued judicial custody, a writ of certiorari to quash the customs penalty order, and a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower courts from entertaining the subsequent criminal prosecutions on the ground of double jeopardy. A writ of habeas corpus, if granted, would compel the detaining authority to produce the accused before the court and justify the detention; the court could order his release on personal bond or bail, thereby removing the immediate liberty constraint. A writ of certiorari would set aside the customs penalty, treating it as ultra vires or violative of constitutional rights, and would nullify the financial liability attached to the penalty. A writ of prohibition would direct the trial courts handling the Arms Act and the conspiracy charge to refrain from proceeding until the constitutional issue is resolved. The combined effect would be a stay of the criminal proceedings, preventing the accused from facing successive prosecutions while the High Court determines whether the customs sanction amounts to punishment. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would stress that the writ of prohibition is essential to prevent irreversible prejudice, as the accused could otherwise be convicted and sentenced before the constitutional question is finally decided. The procedural consequence of granting these writs is that the prosecution would be barred from moving forward with the criminal cases until the High Court either dismisses the petition or issues a detailed order clarifying the scope of the double‑jeopardy protection. If the writs are denied, the accused remains in custody, the customs penalty stands, and the criminal prosecutions continue unabated.

Question: How does the prosecution’s contention that the offences under the Arms Act and the conspiracy charge are distinct from the customs violation influence the double‑jeopardy analysis?

Answer: The prosecution maintains that the customs penalty addresses a regulatory breach concerning undeclared foreign exchange and prohibited goods, whereas the Arms Act offence concerns unlawful possession of a hunting rifle and the conspiracy charge pertains to an agreement to smuggle foreign exchange. Under the constitutional double‑jeopardy doctrine, the key inquiry is whether the two sets of proceedings constitute prosecution for the “same offence.” The test involves comparing the statutory elements of each offence, the nature of the conduct, and the legislative intent. The accused’s counsel will argue that the underlying conduct—smuggling foreign exchange and importing a prohibited firearm—remains the same, merely framed under different statutes, and that the customs penalty already punished that conduct. The prosecution, however, will point out that the Arms Act offence requires proof of possession of a prohibited weapon, an element absent in the customs proceeding, while the conspiracy offence requires proof of an agreement to commit an unlawful act, which is a distinct mental element. By emphasizing these divergent elements, the prosecution seeks to demonstrate that each charge targets a separate legal wrong, thereby avoiding the double‑jeopardy bar. The court will examine whether the offences have a “common core” of facts that would make successive prosecutions oppressive. If the court finds that the offences are indeed distinct—each requiring proof of different facts and punishable under separate legislative schemes—the double‑jeopardy protection does not apply, and the criminal cases may proceed. Conversely, if the court determines that the offences are merely different labels for the same prohibited conduct, the protection would be engaged, potentially invalidating the subsequent prosecutions. The analysis will hinge on the factual distinctions, the legislative purpose of each statute, and precedent on what constitutes the “same offence” for constitutional purposes.

Question: What are the practical ramifications for the accused if the High Court grants the writs sought, and how would the legal landscape change if the petition is dismissed?

Answer: Should the Punjab and Haryana High Court grant the writs, the immediate practical effect would be the release of the accused from judicial custody, either on personal bond or bail, because the writ of habeas corpus would compel the detaining authority to justify the continued imprisonment. The writ of certiorari would annul the customs penalty, removing the financial liability and the basis for the personal liability notice. The writ of prohibition would stay the criminal proceedings under the Arms Act and the conspiracy charge, preventing the trial courts from moving forward until the constitutional issue is finally resolved. This would give the accused a respite from prosecution, preserve his liberty, and allow him to prepare a robust defence without the pressure of concurrent trials. Moreover, the quashing of the customs order would eliminate the stigma of a civil conviction, potentially influencing future investigations. If, on the other hand, the High Court dismisses the petition, the status quo remains: the accused stays in custody, the customs penalty continues to loom, and the criminal prosecutions proceed unabated. The prosecution would be free to file charge sheets, summon witnesses, and seek conviction on the arms possession and conspiracy charges. The accused would have to confront multiple trials, each carrying its own potential sentence, and would face the cumulative financial burden of the customs penalty. The denial of relief would also signal to law‑enforcement agencies that the customs sanction does not trigger double‑jeopardy protection, encouraging similar parallel prosecutions in future cases. In either scenario, the outcome will shape the strategic posture of both the defence and the prosecution, influencing plea negotiations, bail applications, and the broader jurisprudence on the interplay between administrative penalties and criminal prosecutions.

Question: Why does the constitutional remedy of a writ petition under Article 226 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court constitute the proper forum for challenging both the customs penalty and the subsequent criminal prosecutions, given the facts of the case?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the accused was seized at a customs checkpoint, faced an administrative confiscation order and a monetary penalty, and was subsequently placed in judicial custody because he could not furnish the security demanded. While the penalty is framed as a civil sanction, its effect is indistinguishable from a criminal punishment: it imposes a heavy monetary burden, is adjudicated by a quasi‑judicial authority, and results in deprivation of liberty. The accused therefore contends that the customs sanction operates as a “punishment” within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution, invoking the double‑jeopardy bar against the later Arms Act and Indian Penal Code prosecutions. An ordinary bail application or a revision under the criminal procedure code would only address procedural defects in the trial courts and would not permit the accused to raise the constitutional question of whether the earlier sanction already constitutes punishment. Only a writ petition under Article 226 empowers the High Court to examine the legality of the detention itself (through habeas corpus), to set aside an order that is alleged to be ultra vires (through certiorari), and to restrain lower courts from entertaining proceedings that would violate a fundamental right (through prohibition). The Punjab and Haryana High Court has territorial jurisdiction over the district where the customs seizure occurred and over the investigating agency, and it possesses the extraordinary jurisdiction to grant relief at the earliest stage of the proceedings. Moreover, the High Court can issue a stay of the criminal cases pending determination of the constitutional issue, thereby preventing the risk of successive punishments. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who is versed in constitutional criminal law ensures that the petition is framed to highlight the punitive character of the customs order, the infringement of liberty, and the necessity of immediate judicial intervention, which ordinary criminal appeals cannot provide.

Question: How does the accused’s status in judicial custody shape the choice of remedy, and why would a simple bail application fail to address the core constitutional challenge presented by the double‑jeopardy argument?

Answer: The accused’s detention stems not from a conviction in a criminal trial but from the inability to meet the security demanded under the customs penalty. This creates a unique procedural predicament: the custody is predicated on an administrative order that the accused claims is punitive. A bail application under the criminal procedure code presupposes that the underlying charge is a criminal offence already framed in a trial court; it merely seeks a temporary release pending trial. It does not permit the petitioner to question whether the order that placed him in custody is itself unconstitutional. In the present facts, the core dispute is whether the customs penalty amounts to “punishment” for the same conduct that is now the subject of separate criminal charges. This is a question of constitutional law, not of procedural bail eligibility. Consequently, the appropriate remedy must be one that can directly test the legality of the detention and the character of the penalty. A writ of habeas corpus can compel the detaining authority to justify the custody before a constitutional bench, while a writ of certiorari can annul the penalty order if it is found to be ultra vires. Additionally, a writ of prohibition can pre‑empt the lower courts from proceeding with the subsequent criminal trials that would contravene Article 20(2). The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 is expressly designed for such situations where a fundamental right is at stake and immediate relief is required. By filing the petition, the accused also creates a record that the detention is not merely a procedural matter but a constitutional violation, thereby compelling the court to consider the broader implications for the investigating agency’s power to impose punitive sanctions without a criminal conviction. Engaging lawyers in Chandigarh High Court who understand the interplay between custody, bail, and constitutional writs ensures that the petition is not reduced to a routine bail plea but is positioned as a comprehensive challenge to the legality of the detention itself.

Question: What procedural steps must a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court follow to obtain a writ of certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and what are the likely hurdles at the initial hearing of such a petition?

Answer: The first step is the preparation of a detailed petition that sets out the factual chronology, the constitutional question, and the relief sought. The petition must be filed in the appropriate registry of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, accompanied by a certified copy of the customs penalty order, the FIR, and the custody order. The petitioner must also attach an affidavit affirming the truth of the facts and a supporting affidavit from any witness who can attest to the punitive nature of the penalty. Once the petition is admitted, the court issues a notice to the respondents – the customs authority, the investigating agency, and the trial court handling the criminal cases – directing them to file their written responses within the stipulated time. At the initial hearing, the court will scrutinise whether the petition discloses a clear violation of a fundamental right and whether the writ jurisdiction is appropriate. A common hurdle is the argument by the respondents that the penalty is merely civil and therefore does not attract Article 20(2); the petitioner must counter this by demonstrating the punitive effects, such as deprivation of liberty and the imposition of a heavy monetary burden. Another obstacle is the court’s discretion to dismiss the petition on the ground of alternative remedies; the petitioner must convincingly argue that no other efficacious remedy exists, as ordinary appeals cannot address the constitutional issue. The court may also raise the question of jurisdiction, especially if the customs order was passed by an authority located outside the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction; the petitioner must establish that the High Court’s jurisdiction is invoked by the detention of the accused within its territorial limits. If the court is satisfied, it may grant interim relief, such as a stay of the criminal proceedings and release on bail, pending a full hearing. Throughout, the lawyer in Chandigarh High Court must be adept at framing the arguments in constitutional terms, citing precedent on the distinction between civil penalties and criminal punishments, and demonstrating the immediate threat to liberty, thereby overcoming the procedural and substantive hurdles at the initial stage.

Question: Under what circumstances can the Punjab and Haryana High Court issue a stay of the subsequent criminal proceedings, and how does that stay interact with the investigating agency’s powers to continue the trial?

Answer: A stay may be granted when the court is convinced that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would result in a violation of the accused’s fundamental right against double jeopardy. The petition must show that the customs penalty, although labeled administrative, has the hallmarks of punishment and that the later charges arise from the same factual conduct. If the court is persuaded, it can issue a temporary injunction restraining the trial court from taking any further steps – such as framing charges, issuing summons, or recording evidence – until the constitutional issue is finally decided. The stay does not extinguish the investigating agency’s power to gather evidence; it merely prevents the agency from moving the case to trial or from seeking conviction while the writ petition is pending. The agency may continue investigations, file supplementary documents, or seek further clarification from the customs authority, but any attempt to prosecute the accused in a criminal court would be barred until the High Court lifts the stay. This balance respects the agency’s duty to investigate while safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair process. The court may also condition the stay on the accused furnishing a personal bond or complying with certain procedural safeguards, thereby ensuring that the accused remains available for trial once the constitutional question is resolved. The stay is an equitable remedy, not a permanent dismissal of the charges, and it underscores the High Court’s power to prevent irreparable injury – namely, the risk of successive punishments for the same conduct. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court must therefore craft the petition to emphasize the imminent danger of double jeopardy, the lack of an alternative remedy, and the necessity of preserving the status quo, so that the court can justify the extraordinary step of staying the criminal proceedings while the constitutional challenge is adjudicated.

Question: Does the customs penalty imposed on the accused operate as a punishment that triggers the constitutional protection against double jeopardy and how can a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court structure the argument to persuade the bench?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the customs authority exercised quasi judicial powers to confiscate the vehicle and to levy a monetary penalty after finding an undeclared compartment containing foreign exchange and a prohibited firearm. The penalty was framed as an administrative sanction but it imposed a substantial financial burden and resulted in the denial of bail because the accused could not furnish security. In constitutional analysis the key inquiry is whether the sanction bears the hallmarks of punishment. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would begin by highlighting that punishment is characterised by the imposition of a penalty that is enforceable by law and that curtails personal liberty. The argument would stress that the penalty was not a mere fee for regulatory compliance because it was adjudicated after a hearing, it was recorded in a formal order and it directly affected the accused’s liberty by keeping him in judicial custody. The counsel would then cite precedents that distinguish civil penalties from criminal punishments on the basis of the nature of the sanction, the statutory intent and the effect on personal freedom. By showing that the customs order effectively functioned as a conviction the petition can claim that the subsequent criminal prosecutions for possession of a firearm and conspiracy to smuggle constitute a second punishment for the same conduct. The petition would request a writ of certiorari to set aside the penalty and a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower courts from proceeding with the criminal cases until the constitutional issue is resolved. The strategy would also include a request for immediate release on bail, arguing that continued detention violates the guarantee of liberty unless the penalty is demonstrably civil. By framing the customs sanction as punitive the lawyer aims to trigger the double jeopardy bar and secure relief through the extraordinary jurisdiction of the high court.

Question: What evidentiary avenues are available to challenge the seizure of foreign exchange and the firearm and how should the defence prepare to undermine the prosecution’s case?

Answer: The seizure took place at a land customs checkpoint where officials discovered an undeclared compartment after a routine inspection. The defence can attack the legality of the search by arguing that the officers exceeded their authority because there was no reasonable suspicion at the time of the initial stop. A careful review of the checkpoint procedures and the inspection report will be essential. The defence should obtain the original inventory list, the photographs of the compartment and the chain of custody records. Any gaps in the documentation, such as missing timestamps or unsigned signatures, can be highlighted to cast doubt on the integrity of the evidence. The accused can also raise the argument that the firearm was not functional or that it was a licensed hunting rifle, thereby negating the element of unlawful possession. Expert testimony on the make and model of the rifle can support this claim. Regarding the foreign exchange, the defence can question the valuation method used by the customs authority and whether the amounts were accurately measured. If the seized currency includes denominations that are not legal tender or were already declared in a separate customs form, this can be used to show that the alleged contravention is unfounded. The defence team should also scrutinise the FIR for any inconsistencies between the narrative and the seized items. By preparing a detailed comparative analysis of the seizure records and the statutory requirements for customs declaration, the defence can argue that the prosecution’s case rests on procedural irregularities and unreliable evidence, thereby creating reasonable doubt. This approach also supports the broader strategy of seeking quashing of the proceedings on the ground of procedural infirmities.

Question: What are the risks associated with the accused remaining in judicial custody and how can a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court devise a bail strategy that addresses both the customs penalty and the pending criminal charges?

Answer: The accused is currently detained because he is unable to furnish the security demanded under the customs penalty. Continued custody heightens the risk of prejudice to the defence, especially if the investigation proceeds while the accused is not present to assist. Moreover, prolonged detention may be viewed as punitive in nature, reinforcing the argument that the customs sanction is a punishment. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would first file an application for bail on the ground that the alleged offence is non‑bailable under the customs regime and that the penalty is essentially civil. The application would emphasise the accused’s cooperation, lack of prior criminal record and the fact that the alleged conduct does not involve violence. To address the criminal charges, the counsel would seek a separate bail order for the arms case and the conspiracy case, highlighting that the offences are bailable and that the accused is not a flight risk. The strategy would also involve requesting the court to stay the enforcement of the customs penalty pending determination of its constitutional validity, thereby removing the immediate financial barrier to bail. If the court is reluctant to grant bail on the customs front, the defence can propose a structured payment plan or the deposit of a modest amount as security, arguing that the punitive effect of continued detention outweighs the modest financial interest of the state. By securing bail, the accused can actively participate in the preparation of his defence, attend interrogations and challenge the evidence, thereby mitigating the risk of an adverse outcome caused by his absence.

Question: Which procedural defects in the FIR and the notice of personal liability can be exploited to seek quashing of the criminal proceedings and what steps should the defence take to substantiate these defects?

Answer: The FIR was lodged after the customs seizure and it incorporates allegations that overlap with the customs penalty. A key defect is the lack of a clear distinction between the administrative sanction and the criminal offences, which creates confusion about the nature of the charge. The defence should obtain the original FIR copy and examine whether the investigating agency recorded the basis for each allegation, the date and time of the alleged offence and the identity of the officer who prepared the report. Any omission of these details can be argued as a violation of the procedural requirements for filing a cognizable complaint. The notice of personal liability also suffers from a procedural flaw because it was issued without providing the accused an opportunity to be heard, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The defence can file a petition for certiorari on the ground that the notice was passed ex parte and that the accused was denied a fair hearing. To substantiate these defects, the counsel must gather affidavits from witnesses present at the checkpoint, obtain the customs inspection report and compare it with the FIR narrative. Discrepancies such as differing descriptions of the seized items or contradictory statements about the accused’s knowledge can be highlighted. By demonstrating that the investigative process was flawed from the outset, the defence can persuade the high court that the criminal proceedings lack a lawful foundation and should be set aside.

Question: How should the writ petition be crafted to maximise the chances of obtaining a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari and prohibition, and what coordination is required between the writ and any parallel criminal appeals?

Answer: The petition must clearly articulate the constitutional violation, the factual background and the relief sought. It should begin with a concise statement of facts describing the customs seizure, the penalty order, the denial of bail and the subsequent criminal cases. The relief clause should request a writ of habeas corpus to secure the release of the accused, a writ of certiorari to quash the customs penalty and a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower courts from entertaining the arms and conspiracy prosecutions until the double jeopardy issue is resolved. The petition should rely on precedent that distinguishes civil penalties from criminal punishments and argue that the penalty in this case bears the hallmarks of punishment. It must also attach the customs order, the FIR, the notice of personal liability and any bail applications as annexures. Coordination with parallel criminal appeals is essential because the writ seeks to stay the criminal proceedings. The defence should file a notice of appeal in the criminal trial and simultaneously move for a stay of the trial pending the outcome of the writ. By aligning the arguments in both forums, the lawyers in Chandigarh High Court and the lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court can present a unified strategy that emphasizes the same constitutional defect. The petition should also request that the court direct the investigating agency to release the seized items on condition of a bond, thereby mitigating any prejudice to the state while protecting the accused’s liberty. This comprehensive approach increases the likelihood that the high court will grant the extraordinary relief sought.