Can the magistrate’s order designating the accused as an approver be challenged when the earlier pardon covered only certain categories of offences?

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Suppose a senior official of a central public sector undertaking, who is also a married complainant, files an FIR alleging that a senior clerk of the same undertaking disclosed confidential procurement plans to a private contractor in exchange for a sum of money, thereby violating the Official Secrets Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act; the investigating agency then obtains a written statement from the clerk, who had earlier been granted a pardon by the magistrate under Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a separate offence of embezzlement, and the magistrate treats the clerk as an approver for the present case, allowing the prosecution to rely on his testimony as a co‑accused turned witness.

The clerk, now the accused in the present proceeding, contends that the pardon was limited to the embezzlement offence, which fell within the three categories enumerated in Section 337, and that the Official Secrets offence does not belong to any of those categories; consequently, the magistrate’s order treating him as an approver is legally untenable. The prosecution argues that the clerk’s full disclosure, coupled with the conditions of the pardon, should permit his examination as an approver for all related offences, including the alleged breach of official secrets.

At the trial stage before the magistrate, the accused files a petition seeking to quash the order that designates him as an approver, asserting that the statutory scope of Section 337 is exclusive and that the clerk cannot be compelled to testify as an approver for an offence outside its ambit. The petition raises a procedural problem: the accused’s defence on the merits – denial of participation in the disclosure – does not address the fundamental flaw in the procedural posture, namely the improper classification of his status under the pardon provision.

Because the magistrate’s order is interlocutory and determines the mode of trial, the appropriate remedy is not a regular appeal under the ordinary criminal appellate route but a revision petition under the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The revision seeks a writ of certiorari to set aside the magistrate’s order, on the ground that it is perverse, illegal, and contrary to the clear language of Section 337.

In preparing the revision, the accused engages a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who drafts a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, emphasizing that the magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction by extending the pardon to an offence not listed in the statutory categories. The petition also highlights that the accused’s right to a fair trial is jeopardised if he is forced to testify as an approver for a crime for which the pardon does not apply.

The petition before the High Court sets out the factual matrix: the FIR, the nature of the allegations, the prior pardon, and the magistrate’s order. It then articulates the legal issue – the interpretation of Section 337 – and relies on precedent that a literal‑textual approach must be adopted, limiting the pardon to offences expressly enumerated. The petition further argues that the prosecution’s reliance on the clerk’s testimony as an approver violates the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Constitution.

During the hearing, the counsel for the accused, a seasoned lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, points out that the High Court has the power to issue a writ of certiorari to quash an illegal order of a subordinate court. The counsel also notes that the accused is not seeking to overturn the substantive charges but merely to correct the procedural classification that impedes his right to a fair defence.

The prosecution, represented by a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, counters that the clerk’s cooperation and the conditions of the pardon should be given a liberal construction, allowing the magistrate’s discretion to treat him as an approver. However, the prosecution’s argument is rebuffed by the bench, which finds that the statutory language of Section 337 is unambiguous and that the clerk’s pardon cannot be stretched to cover the Official Secrets offence.

The High Court, after considering the submissions of the lawyers in Chandigarh High Court and the lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court, issues a direction to the magistrate to withdraw the order treating the accused as an approver and to conduct the trial on the basis of the standard evidentiary rules applicable to a regular accused. The court also grants interim relief, staying any further use of the clerk’s testimony as an approver pending a final determination on the admissibility of his statement.

This procedural remedy – a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court – is the appropriate route because the issue arises at the pre‑trial stage, where the lower court’s order determines the very nature of the trial. An ordinary criminal appeal would be premature, as the trial on the merits has not yet commenced. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine the legality of subordinate court orders provides the necessary avenue to correct the procedural defect.

Consequently, the accused’s petition succeeds, and the magistrate’s order is set aside. The case proceeds as a regular trial, with the prosecution required to prove the allegations of breach of official secrets without relying on the accused’s testimony as an approver. The revision not only safeguards the accused’s right to a fair trial but also reinforces the principle that a pardon under Section 337 cannot be extended beyond its statutory limits.

Question: Did the magistrate possess the legal authority to designate the accused as an approver when the pardon he received was expressly limited to offences that fall within the narrowly defined categories of the pardon provision?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the senior clerk, now the accused, obtained a pardon from a magistrate for a prior embezzlement case. The pardon provision expressly enumerates three classes of offences for which relief may be granted, and the official‑secrets breach alleged in the present FIR does not belong to any of those classes. The magistrate’s order treating the clerk as an approver therefore hinges on an expansive reading of the pardon provision, extending its effect to a crime outside the statutory ambit. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that statutory construction must begin with the plain meaning of the provision; the language is exclusive, not permissive, and limits the pardon to the enumerated offences. The legal problem thus centers on whether the magistrate can lawfully broaden the scope of a pardon to cover a distinct offence. Procedurally, the magistrate’s order is interlocutory, determining the mode of trial and the status of the accused before any substantive hearing. If the order is ultra vires, it must be set aside, otherwise the accused is compelled to testify under a status that the law does not support, infringing his right to a fair trial. The practical implication for the accused is that, unless the order is quashed, he faces the risk of self‑incrimination and the loss of procedural safeguards that apply to a regular accused. For the complainant and the prosecution, an unlawful approver designation could render the clerk’s testimony inadmissible, jeopardising their case. The High Court, therefore, must scrutinise the magistrate’s jurisdiction and the textual limits of the pardon provision before allowing the trial to proceed on the basis of an approver status that may be legally untenable.

Question: What procedural remedy is available to the accused for challenging the magistrate’s interlocutory order that classifies him as an approver, given that the trial has not yet commenced?

Answer: The appropriate procedural avenue is a revision petition filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court under the constitutional power to issue writs of certiorari. Because the magistrate’s order is interlocutory and determines the mode of trial, an ordinary appeal would be premature; the appellate jurisdiction under the ordinary criminal appellate route is triggered only after a final judgment on the merits. A revision petition, on the other hand, allows a higher court to examine the legality of a subordinate court’s order at any stage, particularly when the order is alleged to be perverse, illegal, or beyond jurisdiction. The legal issue before the High Court will be whether the magistrate exceeded his authority by extending the pardon to an offence not covered by the statutory categories. The petition must demonstrate that the order adversely affects the accused’s right to a fair trial, as it forces him to testify as an approver for a crime outside the pardon’s scope. The procedural consequence of a successful revision is the issuance of a writ of certiorari directing the magistrate to withdraw the approver designation and to conduct the trial under ordinary evidentiary rules. For the prosecution, the removal of the approver status means they must rely on independent evidence rather than the clerk’s privileged testimony. The complainant may need to strengthen the investigative file to compensate for the loss of that evidence. The accused, once the order is set aside, regains the procedural protections accorded to a regular accused, including the right against self‑incrimination and the opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s case on its merits. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court often advise that timely filing of a revision is crucial to prevent irreversible prejudice that may arise from an unlawful interlocutory order.

Question: How does the classification of the accused as an approver influence the evidentiary burden and the accused’s right to a fair defence in the context of the alleged breach of official secrets?

Answer: When an accused is treated as an approver, the prosecution is permitted to rely on his testimony as a co‑accused who has turned state‑witness, often granting the testimony a degree of credibility that would not be available from an ordinary witness. This shifts the evidentiary dynamics because the prosecution can present the approver’s statements as substantive evidence of the commission of the offence, potentially reducing the burden on the prosecution to prove each element beyond reasonable doubt through independent material. However, the accused’s constitutional right to a fair defence includes protection against compelled self‑incrimination and the guarantee of a fair trial. If the magistrate’s order is unlawful, the accused is forced to testify under a status that the law does not support, compromising his ability to challenge the credibility of the testimony and to cross‑examine without the safeguards applicable to a regular witness. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would argue that the accused should be afforded the same evidentiary protections as any other defendant, meaning the prosecution must meet the full burden of proof without reliance on privileged approver testimony. Procedurally, an unlawful approver designation could render any evidence derived from the clerk’s statements inadmissible, compelling the prosecution to revisit its case strategy. Practically, for the accused, the removal of the approver label restores his right to contest the evidence on its own merits, to invoke the privilege against self‑incrimination, and to demand that the prosecution prove the alleged breach of official secrets through independent corroboration. For the complainant, the loss of the approver’s testimony may weaken the case, necessitating additional investigative work to secure admissible evidence. The High Court’s decision on this issue will therefore have direct implications for the balance of evidentiary burdens and the preservation of fair‑trial rights.

Question: What are the consequences for the prosecution if the High Court sets aside the magistrate’s order and disallows the clerk’s testimony as an approver in the trial of the official‑secrets offence?

Answer: Should the High Court quash the approver order, the prosecution will be barred from using the clerk’s statements as privileged evidence. This outcome forces the prosecution to rely exclusively on other admissible material, such as documentary evidence, independent witness testimony, or forensic analysis, to establish the elements of the alleged breach of official secrets. The legal problem for the prosecution becomes one of evidentiary sufficiency; without the clerk’s insider account, the case may lack the direct link between the accused and the alleged disclosure to the private contractor. Procedurally, the prosecution may seek to introduce the clerk’s statement as an ordinary witness, but the credibility and weight of such testimony will be subject to rigorous cross‑examination, and the defence can challenge its admissibility on grounds of relevance and reliability. Practically, the prosecution may need to file a supplementary application to the trial court seeking permission to call the clerk as a regular witness, which could delay proceedings and increase litigation costs. For the complainant, the loss of the approver’s testimony may weaken the narrative of a quid pro quo arrangement, potentially affecting the prospects of conviction. Conversely, the removal of the approver status safeguards the accused’s right to a fair trial and upholds procedural integrity, reinforcing the principle that a pardon cannot be stretched beyond its statutory limits. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise the prosecution to reassess its evidentiary strategy promptly, to preserve any remaining admissible evidence, and to anticipate possible challenges to the credibility of alternative witnesses. The High Court’s intervention thus rebalances the procedural playing field, ensuring that the trial proceeds on a legally sound evidentiary foundation.

Question: In what way might the High Court’s decision on the revision petition shape future applications of the pardon provision in cases involving corruption and breaches of official secrets?

Answer: The High Court’s ruling will establish a precedent on the interpretative limits of the pardon provision, clarifying that a pardon cannot be extended to offences that fall outside the expressly enumerated categories. This legal principle will guide magistrates, investigators, and prosecutors in future cases where a co‑accused seeks to benefit from a prior pardon. The decision will reinforce a literal‑textual approach, compelling courts to scrutinise the statutory language before granting approver status, thereby preventing a liberal construction that could dilute the scope of the pardon provision. Procedurally, future magistrates will be more cautious in treating individuals as approvers when the underlying offence is not covered by the pardon, reducing the risk of interlocutory orders being quashed on appeal. For the prosecution, the ruling will necessitate a more rigorous evidentiary foundation when relying on approvers, ensuring that any plea bargain or cooperation agreement aligns strictly with the statutory categories. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court will likely cite this decision in arguments to resist attempts to broaden the pardon’s reach in corruption or official‑secrets cases. Practically, the decision will protect accused persons from being compelled to testify under an unlawful approver label, thereby safeguarding their constitutional right to a fair defence. It will also signal to the investigating agency that any offer of pardon must be carefully calibrated to the specific offences involved, and that any deviation may be subject to judicial reversal. Ultimately, the High Court’s judgment will serve as a doctrinal anchor, shaping the jurisprudence on pardon‑related approver status and ensuring consistency in the application of the law across similar criminal matters.

Question: Why does the procedural defect created by the magistrate’s order treating the accused as an approver give rise to a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than an ordinary appeal?

Answer: The magistrate’s order is interlocutory; it determines the mode of trial by classifying the accused as an approver, which directly affects the evidentiary regime and the accused’s right to a fair defence. At this stage the substantive trial has not commenced, and the accused is not yet convicted of any offence. An ordinary appeal under the criminal appellate hierarchy is premised on a final judgment or a decree that resolves the merits of the case. Because the order in question merely directs the conduct of the trial, the appropriate statutory remedy is a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is exercisable before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226, can issue a writ of certiorari to quash an illegal or perverse order of a subordinate court. The factual matrix shows that the magistrate extended a pardon granted under a specific provision to an offence that falls outside the statutory categories, thereby exceeding his jurisdiction. The accused therefore files a revision to correct this jurisdictional overreach before the High Court, seeking a declaration that the order is void. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court is essential because the practitioner must be familiar with the High Court’s procedural rules for filing revision petitions, drafting the writ petition, and presenting oral arguments before a bench that has the power to set aside the magistrate’s direction. The lawyer will also advise on the necessity of attaching the original order, the FIR, and the pardon document as annexures, and on framing the grounds of illegality, violation of the principle of natural justice, and infringement of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. By invoking the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, the accused aims to restore the proper procedural posture, ensuring that the trial proceeds on the basis of ordinary evidentiary rules rather than an improper approver classification.

Question: In what circumstances would the accused look for lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, and how does that choice affect the strategy for challenging the magistrate’s order?

Answer: Although the revision petition is filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused may also need representation in the trial court where the case will ultimately be heard, which is the district court located in Chandigarh. The trial court’s jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings means that any interlocutory applications, such as a stay of the magistrate’s order or a request for a fresh charge sheet, must be made before the court sitting in Chandigarh. Consequently, the accused may search for lawyers in Chandigarh High Court who are also authorised to practice before the subordinate courts in the same jurisdiction. These lawyers bring the advantage of local familiarity with the district magistrate’s practices, the procedural nuances of filing applications for bail, and the ability to coordinate with counsel appearing before the High Court. By retaining lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, the accused can simultaneously pursue the revision before the higher bench and ensure that any interim relief, such as a stay of the approver designation, is effectively implemented at the trial level. This dual representation helps prevent a situation where the High Court grants a writ but the trial court continues to rely on the now‑void order, thereby causing procedural chaos. Moreover, lawyers in Chandigarh High Court can advise on the timing of filing a petition for bail, arguing that the accused’s continued custody is unjustified in light of the pending revision. They can also prepare a detailed affidavit contesting the magistrate’s factual findings, emphasizing that the accused’s denial of participation in the disclosure is a substantive defence that cannot be subsumed under the approver regime. The coordinated strategy ensures that the High Court’s intervention is mirrored by appropriate actions in the trial court, preserving the accused’s liberty and safeguarding the integrity of the criminal process.

Question: How does the procedural route from the magistrate’s interlocutory order to the High Court’s writ of certiorari operate, and why is a purely factual defence insufficient at this juncture?

Answer: The procedural trajectory begins with the magistrate’s order classifying the accused as an approver, an act that determines the evidentiary framework for the forthcoming trial. Because this classification is a question of law—whether the pardon under the specific provision can be extended to the offence alleged—it is not a matter that can be settled by merely denying the factual allegations of disclosure. The accused’s factual defence, which asserts non‑participation in the breach of official secrets, does not address the core legal error: the magistrate’s overreach in applying the pardon to an offence outside its statutory ambit. To rectify this, the accused files a revision petition invoking the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226. The petition must articulate the legal grounds for quashing the order, attach the original order, the FIR, and the pardon document, and request a writ of certiorari. The High Court then examines whether the magistrate acted within his jurisdiction, whether the order is perverse, and whether it violates constitutional safeguards. If the High Court finds merit, it may issue a certiorari to set aside the order and may also grant a stay of its operation pending final determination. The procedural focus is on the legality of the order, not on the truth of the allegations. Consequently, a factual defence alone cannot compel the High Court to intervene, because the High Court does not re‑try the case at this stage. Instead, it ensures that the trial proceeds under the correct procedural regime. Engaging a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court to draft the revision petition is crucial, as the counsel must frame the legal arguments precisely, cite relevant precedents on the limits of the pardon provision, and demonstrate how the magistrate’s order infringes upon the accused’s right to a fair trial. This legal‑centric approach is indispensable for obtaining the necessary judicial correction before the substantive trial commences.

Question: What practical steps should the accused undertake to file the writ of certiorari, and what type of interim relief can realistically be expected from the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

Answer: The first practical step is to engage lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court who are experienced in constitutional writ practice. These counsel will prepare a petition under Article 226, clearly stating the parties, the nature of the interlocutory order, and the specific grounds for relief, such as jurisdictional error, violation of the principle of legality, and infringement of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The petition must be accompanied by certified copies of the magistrate’s order, the FIR, the pardon document, and any affidavit filed by the accused denying participation in the alleged disclosure. Once the petition is filed, the court may issue a notice to the prosecution and the magistrate, inviting them to respond. Simultaneously, the counsel can move for an interim stay of the magistrate’s order, arguing that continued enforcement of the approver designation would cause irreparable harm by compromising the accused’s defence and potentially leading to wrongful conviction. The High Court, recognizing the gravity of the procedural defect and the risk to liberty, may grant a temporary stay, thereby preventing the trial court from using the approver testimony until the revision is finally decided. Additionally, the court may direct the investigating agency to refrain from relying on the approver’s statement in any further investigation, preserving the integrity of the evidence. While the High Court cannot grant substantive relief such as dismissal of charges at this stage, it can ensure that the accused remains out of custody if bail is sought, on the ground that the pending revision casts doubt on the legality of the proceedings. The counsel will also advise the accused to file a bail application in the trial court, citing the High Court’s interim stay as a supporting factor. By following these steps, the accused secures both procedural correction of the magistrate’s order and practical protection of liberty while the substantive trial awaits a proper legal framework.

Question: How should the accused and his counsel evaluate the procedural defect in the magistrate’s order treating him as an approver, and what specific documents and statutory interpretation must be examined before filing a revision petition?

Answer: The first step for the accused is to obtain a certified copy of the magistrate’s order that designated him as an approver, together with the original pardon order issued under the pardon provision and the written statement recorded from the clerk. These documents reveal the factual basis on which the magistrate extended the pardon to the Official Secrets offence, an extension that the accused contends is beyond the statutory language. A careful reading of the pardon provision’s text, which enumerates only three categories of offences, is essential; the accused must demonstrate that the breach of official secrets does not fall within any of those categories. The counsel should also secure the FIR, the charge sheet, and any annexures that list the offences for which the pardon was granted, because any discrepancy between the listed offences and the charge in the present case will underscore the procedural irregularity. In addition, the accused must review prior case law where courts have applied a literal‑textual approach to the pardon provision, as these precedents will support the argument that the magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court will typically prepare a revision petition under Article 226, framing the issue as a perverse exercise of jurisdiction that violates the accused’s right to a fair trial. The petition must attach the magistrate’s order, the pardon order, and the clerk’s statement as annexures, and it should articulate that the order is interlocutory, determining the mode of trial, and therefore amenable to judicial review. By assembling this documentary record and grounding the argument in statutory construction, the accused can present a compelling case that the magistrate’s order is illegal, setting the stage for the High Court to quash the approver designation and restore the regular procedural posture.

Question: What evidentiary risks arise from relying on the clerk’s testimony as an approver, and how can the prosecution and defence strategically manage the collection and presentation of documentary and electronic evidence to strengthen or undermine the allegations?

Answer: Relying on the clerk’s testimony as an approver carries the inherent risk that the testimony may be deemed inadmissible if the approver status is later invalidated, leaving the prosecution without its principal piece of evidence. The defence can exploit this vulnerability by challenging the legality of the approver designation, thereby rendering any statements made under that guise vulnerable to exclusion. Consequently, the prosecution must anticipate the need to substantiate the breach of official secrets through independent documentary evidence, such as the confidential procurement plans, email trails, meeting minutes, and any financial records indicating receipt of consideration by the private contractor. The defence, on the other hand, should seek to obtain copies of these documents through discovery, scrutinize their authenticity, and look for gaps or inconsistencies that could cast doubt on the prosecution’s narrative. Electronic metadata, timestamps, and access logs from the undertaking’s internal systems are particularly valuable; they can either corroborate the alleged disclosure or demonstrate that the clerk did not have the opportunity to share the information. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would advise the defence to file applications for production of these records and to request forensic examination, thereby creating a factual matrix that may offset the loss of the approver’s testimony. Simultaneously, the prosecution should prepare a parallel evidentiary trail that does not depend on the clerk, perhaps by securing statements from the private contractor or other witnesses who can attest to the receipt of the confidential plans. By diversifying the evidentiary base, both sides mitigate the risk that the approver issue will derail the trial, and they position themselves to argue either the existence or the absence of a quid pro quo arrangement with greater credibility.

Question: Considering the accused is currently in custody pending the revision petition, what factors should be weighed in assessing bail prospects, and how can the defence craft a bail application that addresses the seriousness of the Official Secrets allegation while highlighting procedural flaws?

Answer: The bail assessment hinges on three principal considerations: the nature and gravity of the offence, the risk of the accused fleeing or tampering with evidence, and the existence of any procedural infirmities that may prejudice the case. Although the breach of official secrets is a serious charge, the accused can argue that the pending revision petition creates a substantial doubt about the procedural foundation of the trial, specifically the illegality of treating him as an approver. This doubt can be presented as a mitigating factor that reduces the likelihood of the accused influencing the investigation. The defence should also gather evidence of the accused’s stable family ties, lack of prior criminal record, and willingness to cooperate with the investigating agency, thereby lowering the perceived flight risk. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would typically emphasize that the accused has already been subjected to a pardon for a separate offence, indicating a history of compliance with judicial orders. Moreover, the bail application should request that the court impose conditions such as surrender of passport, regular reporting to the police station, and a prohibition on contacting the private contractor or any witnesses, to assuage concerns about interference. Highlighting the procedural defect—namely, the magistrate’s overreach in extending the pardon—serves a dual purpose: it underscores that the trial’s foundation is unsettled and that the accused’s continued detention may amount to punitive pre‑trial confinement. By weaving together these factual and legal strands, the defence can present a balanced argument that respects the seriousness of the allegations while demonstrating that the accused does not pose a danger to the administration of justice, thereby enhancing the likelihood of bail being granted.

Question: What strategic steps should lawyers in Chandigarh High Court and lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court take when drafting the revision petition, and how can they anticipate and counter the prosecution’s arguments to secure a certiorari that quashes the approver order?

Answer: The drafting strategy must begin with a concise statement of facts that sets out the FIR, the pardon order, the magistrate’s interlocutory order, and the specific statutory language limiting the pardon’s scope. The petition should attach certified copies of all relevant documents as annexures, ensuring that the High Court can verify the procedural defect without further referrals. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court will frame the relief sought as a writ of certiorari under Article 226, arguing that the magistrate acted beyond his jurisdiction by extending the pardon to an offence not enumerated in the pardon provision, thereby violating the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The petition must also cite authoritative precedents where courts have applied a literal‑textual approach to the pardon provision, reinforcing that the magistrate’s liberal construction is untenable. Anticipating the prosecution’s argument that the pardon should be given a liberal construction to facilitate cooperation, the defence should pre‑emptively address this by highlighting that the statutory language is exclusive and that the prosecution’s reliance on broader interpretative principles conflicts with the clear legislative intent. Additionally, the petition should request an interim stay on the use of the clerk’s testimony as an approver, emphasizing that any such use would be premature and potentially prejudicial pending the High Court’s determination. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court should also be prepared to counter any claim that the revision is premature by underscoring that the order under challenge is interlocutory and directly determines the mode of trial, making it amenable to immediate judicial review. By presenting a well‑structured factual matrix, robust statutory interpretation, and pre‑emptive rebuttal of the prosecution’s contentions, the counsel can persuade the bench to grant certiorari, set aside the approver designation, and restore the regular procedural trajectory of the case.