Can the Punjab and Haryana High Court quash a special anti corruption tribunal order when a member resigns and no reconstitution notice was issued?

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Suppose a situation where the accused is charged under a special anti‑corruption ordinance that mandates the trial of certain offences before a three‑member special tribunal, but the tribunal loses one of its members before the trial commences and no fresh notification is issued to reconstitute it.

In this hypothetical, the investigating agency files an FIR alleging that the accused, a senior public servant, accepted bribes in connection with the award of a government contract. The case is initially assigned to the Special Tribunal, which, under the ordinance, must consist of three members. After the first hearing, one member resigns, and the remaining two continue without a formal re‑constitution order. The prosecution proceeds, and the tribunal delivers a conviction and sentence.

The accused files a factual defence, denying the allegations and challenging the evidence, but the conviction stands. The legal problem emerges because the statutory framework contains a provision stating that “nothing in this Act shall apply to any proceedings pending on the date of commencement of the Special Courts Amendment Ordinance in any court other than a special court.” The amendment ordinance came into force after the tribunal’s composition became defective, and the accused argues that the trial is now being conducted in a “court other than a special court” since the tribunal no longer meets the statutory requirement of three members.

At the same time, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana had earlier set aside a prior order of retrial issued by a regular district court, directing that the matter be tried before a special court. The accused contends that the High Court’s direction cannot be implemented because the special tribunal, as currently constituted, is invalid, and the statutory bar should prevent the continuation of the proceedings in the defective tribunal.

Ordinary factual defence is insufficient here because the core issue is not the merits of the bribery allegations but the jurisdictional validity of the forum. The accused must demonstrate that the tribunal, lacking the requisite three members, does not qualify as a “special court” under the ordinance, and therefore the statutory bar on “proceedings in a court other than a special court” should apply, rendering the ongoing trial ultra vires.

To resolve this jurisdictional impasse, the accused seeks a writ of certiorari and a petition for quashing of the tribunal’s order under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appropriate forum for such a remedy is the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which possesses the constitutional authority under Article 226 to examine the legality of the tribunal’s composition and the applicability of the statutory bar.

The petition argues that the amendment ordinance’s protective clause was intended to safeguard the rights of accused persons when a non‑special court is improperly exercising special‑court jurisdiction. Since the tribunal’s composition fell short of the statutory requirement at the time the amendment came into force, the proceedings should be deemed “pending in a court other than a special court,” triggering the bar and necessitating dismissal of the trial.

In support of the petition, the accused engages a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court who prepares a detailed affidavit outlining the procedural irregularities, the statutory language, and relevant precedents where courts have interpreted “court other than a special court” to refer to the nature of the forum rather than the stage of the proceeding. The counsel also cites case law establishing that a defective tribunal cannot be cured by continuation of the same members without a fresh re‑constitution order.

The petition further contends that the High Court’s earlier direction for a retrial before a special court cannot be executed because the special court, as currently constituted, is void. Consequently, the only lawful remedy is to either re‑constitute a proper three‑member tribunal or to transfer the case back to a regular court, but the latter would contravene the statutory bar, leaving the Punjab and Haryana High Court as the sole authority to determine the correct procedural route.

Because the issue revolves around the interpretation of a statutory provision and the jurisdiction of a special tribunal, the remedy does not lie in an ordinary appeal against conviction but in a higher‑court writ petition. The accused therefore files a petition for quashing of the tribunal’s order and a prayer for a declaration that the proceedings are barred under the amendment ordinance, seeking that the Punjab and Haryana High Court either order a fresh constitution of a valid special tribunal or direct that the matter be tried in a regular court with appropriate safeguards.

The petition also requests interim relief of bail, arguing that continued detention while the jurisdictional question is pending would be unjust, especially given the procedural infirmities. The petition cites the principle that bail may be granted when the trial is likely to be stayed on jurisdictional grounds, and it asks the High Court to exercise its powers under Section 439 of the CrPC to grant bail pending the final decision.

In the course of the proceedings, the prosecution opposes the petition, asserting that the tribunal’s two‑member composition is permissible under an earlier amendment and that the statutory bar applies only to original trials, not to ongoing proceedings. The prosecution further argues that the High Court’s earlier order for retrial validates the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

The High Court, after hearing both sides, must interpret whether the phrase “court other than a special court” encompasses a tribunal that has become defective after the amendment’s commencement. If the court holds that the defective tribunal is indeed a “court other than a special court,” the statutory bar will apply, and the petition for quashing will succeed, leading to the dismissal of the ongoing trial. Conversely, if the court finds that the phrase applies only to non‑special courts and not to a special tribunal that continues despite a vacancy, the petition will be dismissed, and the trial will proceed before the existing tribunal.

Thus, the procedural solution lies in filing a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking a declaration on the jurisdictional validity of the special tribunal and a quashing of its order. This remedy directly addresses the statutory interpretation issue that cannot be resolved through a simple factual defence or an ordinary appeal, making the High Court the proper forum for adjudicating the matter.

Question: Does the loss of one member from the three‑member special tribunal automatically render the tribunal no longer a “special court” within the meaning of the anti‑corruption ordinance, thereby stripping it of jurisdiction to continue the trial?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the ordinance expressly mandates a three‑member composition for a tribunal to qualify as a “special court.” When one member resigned after the first hearing, the remaining two continued without a fresh re‑constitution order. The legal problem therefore hinges on whether the statutory requirement is a condition precedent to jurisdiction or merely a procedural preference. In interpreting such language, courts look to the purpose of the special tribunal scheme, which is to ensure a balanced adjudicatory panel for sensitive corruption matters. A vacancy that is not filled defeats that purpose, and the tribunal cannot be deemed a “special court” once it no longer meets the statutory composition. The accused, through his counsel, a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, argues that the tribunal’s continued existence violates the ordinance’s core requirement, making any subsequent proceedings ultra vires. The prosecution counters that the ordinance allows the tribunal to proceed until a formal re‑constitution is effected, citing an earlier amendment that tolerated temporary vacancies. However, precedent in similar special‑court contexts holds that a defect in the forum’s constitution cannot be cured by mere continuation; a fresh notification is indispensable. If the High Court accepts that the tribunal has lost its “special court” status, the trial would be void ab initio, and any conviction would be set aside. Practically, this would compel the investigating agency to either re‑constitute a proper three‑member tribunal or transfer the case to a regular court, subject to the statutory bar. The decision will affect the accused’s liberty, the prosecution’s evidentiary strategy, and the integrity of the anti‑corruption framework, making the jurisdictional question decisive for the continuation of the proceedings.

Question: Does the amendment ordinance’s protective clause, which bars “proceedings pending … in any court other than a special court,” extend to a tribunal that became defective after the amendment’s commencement, thereby invalidating the ongoing trial?

Answer: The amendment ordinance introduced a safeguard that any case pending in a non‑special forum at the moment of its commencement must be stayed. The crux is whether a tribunal that was originally a “special court” but later lost a member falls within the phrase “court other than a special court.” The accused’s lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court maintain that the statutory language is dynamic; once the tribunal ceases to satisfy the composition requirement, it ceases to be a “special court,” and the protective clause instantly applies. This interpretation aligns with the purposive approach, which seeks to prevent a defective tribunal from exercising special jurisdiction. The prosecution argues that the clause is retrospective only to the date of commencement and does not affect proceedings already underway, especially where the defect arose later. They rely on the principle that procedural irregularities do not automatically invoke statutory bars unless expressly provided. Judicial precedents on similar statutory language have held that “court other than a special court” refers to the nature of the forum at the time the proceedings are considered, not merely at the commencement of the amendment. Accordingly, if the High Court finds that the tribunal’s vacancy transforms its character, the protective clause would render the trial ultra vires, obliging the court to quash the proceedings. The practical implication is that the case would either be re‑started before a properly constituted tribunal or, if that is not feasible, the statutory bar may force a transfer to a regular court, subject to constitutional safeguards. The outcome will determine whether the accused can obtain relief through a writ petition and whether the prosecution must restart its case under a valid forum.

Question: Can the Punjab and Haryana High Court enforce the earlier High Court order directing a retrial before a special court when the currently constituted tribunal is arguably invalid, or must the court set aside that direction?

Answer: The earlier High Court order mandated a retrial before a “special court,” reflecting the legislative intent that corruption cases be tried by a specialized forum. However, the present tribunal’s composition is contested. The accused, represented by a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, argues that the earlier direction cannot be executed because the designated tribunal no longer satisfies the statutory definition of a “special court.” The principle of judicial hierarchy dictates that a higher court may modify or set aside an earlier order if subsequent developments render its performance impossible or illegal. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that the order remains valid until a proper tribunal is constituted, emphasizing that the directive was to ensure a special‑court trial, not to specify the exact members. The High Court must balance the doctrine of vested rights in the order against the doctrine of jurisdictional validity. If the tribunal is deemed void, the earlier direction becomes unenforceable, and the High Court would have to either order the re‑constitution of a valid three‑member tribunal or direct the case to a regular court, subject to the amendment’s protective clause. This decision carries significant procedural consequences: a re‑constitution would require a fresh notification, potentially delaying the trial, while a transfer to a regular court could invoke the statutory bar, leading to dismissal of the case. The practical impact on the accused includes the possibility of prolonged pre‑trial detention or release on bail, while the prosecution faces the prospect of restarting its case. The High Court’s ruling will thus shape the procedural pathway and determine whether the earlier retrial order survives the jurisdictional challenge.

Question: Is a petition for quashing the tribunal’s order under the inherent powers of the High Court the appropriate remedy for the accused, given that the alleged defect is jurisdictional rather than evidentiary?

Answer: The accused’s primary grievance is the alleged lack of jurisdiction due to the tribunal’s defective composition. A petition for quashing under the inherent powers of the High Court is the conventional remedy for jurisdictional defects, as it allows the court to examine the legality of the forum itself. The accused, through lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, argues that the trial cannot proceed in a tribunal that does not meet the statutory definition of a “special court,” and therefore the conviction must be set aside. The prosecution maintains that the defect is merely procedural and does not affect the substantive merits, urging the court to treat the matter as a regular appeal. Jurisprudence holds that when the very authority of the court to try a case is in question, the appropriate recourse is a writ of certiorari or a petition for quashing, not an ordinary appeal, because the appellate jurisdiction presupposes a valid trial court. The High Court’s inherent powers under its constitutional jurisdiction enable it to intervene to prevent miscarriage of justice arising from an ultra vires tribunal. If the petition succeeds, the tribunal’s order will be nullified, and the case will either be re‑started before a properly constituted tribunal or, if that is not feasible, the High Court may direct a transfer to a regular court, subject to the amendment’s protective clause. The practical implication for the accused includes potential release on bail and the avoidance of a criminal conviction, while the prosecution would need to re‑file charges under a valid forum, possibly incurring additional investigative costs and delays. Thus, the petition for quashing is the correct procedural vehicle to address the jurisdictional flaw.

Question: Should the High Court grant bail to the accused while it decides the jurisdictional issue, and what legal standards govern the grant of bail in such circumstances?

Answer: Bail is a discretionary relief aimed at balancing the liberty of the accused against the interests of justice. In the present scenario, the accused is detained pending resolution of a fundamental jurisdictional question. The petition includes a prayer for interim bail, arguing that continued custody is unjust while the trial’s legality is unsettled. The legal standard for bail in non‑bailable offences, as articulated by the courts, requires the court to consider the nature of the offence, the likelihood of the accused fleeing, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. However, when the trial itself is potentially void, the risk of prejudice to the accused’s liberty outweighs the prosecution’s interest, especially since no substantive conviction has been rendered. The accused’s counsel, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, emphasizes that the protective clause of the amendment ordinance creates a presumption of invalidity, strengthening the case for bail. The prosecution argues that the seriousness of the corruption allegations justifies continued detention to prevent interference with the investigation. Nonetheless, jurisprudence holds that bail may be granted when the trial is likely to be stayed on jurisdictional grounds, as the purpose of bail is to avoid punitive detention without a valid trial. The High Court, therefore, must assess whether the jurisdictional defect is substantial enough to render the proceedings ultra vires, and if so, bail should be granted pending a final decision. Practically, granting bail would preserve the accused’s rights and prevent unnecessary hardship, while the prosecution would retain the ability to resume proceedings once the forum issue is resolved. The decision will set a precedent for handling bail applications in cases where the very authority of the trial court is contested.

Question: Why does the writ petition seeking quashing of the special tribunal’s order have to be filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than any other court?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the special tribunal was created under a special anti‑corruption ordinance that expressly limits its jurisdiction to a three‑member body. When one member resigned, the tribunal continued with only two members and no fresh re‑constitution notification was issued. This defect makes the tribunal a forum that no longer satisfies the statutory definition of a “special court.” Because the amendment ordinance introduced a protective clause stating that “nothing in this Act shall apply to any proceedings pending… in any court other than a special court,” the question of whether the defective tribunal qualifies as a “special court” is a pure question of law and jurisdiction. Under the Constitution, only a High Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 can entertain a writ of certiorari to examine the legality of a lower forum’s composition. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has territorial jurisdiction over Chandigarh and the surrounding region where the special tribunal was seated, and it possesses the constitutional authority to issue a declaration, quash the tribunal’s order, and direct a proper re‑constitution or transfer. A factual defence that merely contests the bribery allegations cannot cure the jurisdictional flaw; the court must first determine whether the tribunal has any power to try the case at all. Consequently, the accused must approach a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who is versed in writ practice, can draft a petition under the appropriate remedial provisions, and can argue that the tribunal’s continuation violates the protective clause of the amendment ordinance. The High Court’s decision will either validate the tribunal’s authority or render the trial ultra vires, thereby shaping the subsequent procedural path for the accused.

Question: In what circumstances should the accused look for a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court to obtain bail or interim relief while the jurisdictional challenge is being decided?

Answer: Once the writ petition is filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused remains in custody unless bail is granted. The High Court, exercising its inherent powers, can entertain an application for interim bail under its jurisdiction to prevent the accused from suffering undue hardship while the substantive jurisdictional issue is pending. Because the High Court sits in Chandigarh, the practical reality is that the accused will need to engage lawyers in Chandigarh High Court to appear before the bench that hears the bail application. The bail application is distinct from the writ petition; it focuses on the immediate liberty of the accused and requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the allegations are not yet proven, that the jurisdictional defect creates a reasonable doubt about the trial’s validity, and that continued detention would be oppressive. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court will be able to file an affidavit, cite precedents where bail was granted pending a jurisdictional determination, and argue that the accused’s right to liberty outweighs the prosecution’s interest until the High Court resolves the core issue. Moreover, the bail application may invoke the High Court’s power under the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and the counsel must be prepared to address any opposition from the prosecution, which will likely argue that bail would jeopardize the investigation. Engaging lawyers in Chandigarh High Court ensures that the bail plea is presented promptly, that procedural formalities such as service of notice and filing of supporting documents are complied with, and that the accused can secure interim relief even if the final decision on the writ petition takes several weeks or months.

Question: Why does a purely factual defence to the bribery allegations fail to protect the accused when the tribunal’s composition is defective, and how does this affect the choice of legal representation?

Answer: The factual defence centres on disputing the prosecution’s evidence of bribery, such as the alleged receipt of money and the link to the contract award. While a robust factual defence is essential in a regular trial, it does not address the fundamental flaw that the tribunal, after the resignation of a member, no longer meets the statutory requirement of a three‑member special court. The amendment ordinance’s protective clause is triggered by the nature of the forum, not by the stage of the trial or the merits of the evidence. Consequently, even if the accused could prove innocence on the facts, the trial would still be ultra vires because the tribunal lacks jurisdiction. This legal reality forces the accused to shift strategy from a factual defence to a jurisdictional challenge, which can only be pursued through a writ petition. The procedural shift necessitates counsel with expertise in constitutional and administrative law rather than a trial‑court advocate. Therefore, the accused must retain a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who is experienced in drafting and arguing writ petitions, can articulate the statutory interpretation of “court other than a special court,” and can navigate the High Court’s jurisdictional powers. This counsel will also coordinate with any trial‑court lawyers to ensure that the factual defence is preserved for any subsequent trial that may be ordered after the jurisdictional issue is resolved. The dual representation underscores that the immediate priority is to obtain a declaration that the tribunal’s order is void, after which the accused can decide whether to proceed with a factual defence in a properly constituted special tribunal or seek alternative relief.

Question: After the Punjab and Haryana High Court decides on the writ petition, what procedural steps must the accused follow to pursue further relief, and why might the accused still need lawyers in Chandigarh High Court at that stage?

Answer: If the High Court declares the tribunal void and either orders a fresh constitution of a three‑member special tribunal or directs the matter to be tried in a regular court, the accused must act promptly to implement the court’s direction. The first step is to file an application for transfer or re‑allocation of the case in accordance with the High Court’s order, which may involve approaching the administrative authority that assigns cases to special courts. Simultaneously, the accused should file a revision petition, if necessary, to ensure that the procedural compliance of the re‑constitution is observed, especially if the High Court’s order is ambiguous about the timeline. Throughout this process, the accused remains in custody unless bail is granted, so a fresh bail application may be required before the same bench that heard the original bail plea or before a different bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Because the High Court sits in Chandigarh, the practical necessity of appearing before the court for these applications means the accused will again need lawyers in Chandigarh High Court. These lawyers will handle the filing of transfer applications, draft affidavits supporting the need for a proper tribunal, and argue any objections raised by the prosecution or the state. Moreover, if the High Court’s order is appealed to the Supreme Court, the accused will need counsel experienced in appellate practice, but the immediate procedural compliance and bail matters will still be managed by lawyers in Chandigarh High Court. Thus, the procedural roadmap after the writ decision involves implementing the High Court’s directive, securing bail, and possibly pursuing further appellate remedies, all of which require continued engagement of lawyers in Chandigarh High Court to navigate the local procedural rules and ensure the accused’s rights are protected at each stage.

Question: How does the defect in the tribunal’s composition affect the jurisdiction of the trial and what are the risks of the conviction being set aside on that ground?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the special tribunal was statutorily required to consist of three members at the time the anti‑corruption ordinance came into force. After the first hearing one member resigned and no fresh re‑constitution order was issued. Because the amendment ordinance expressly bars “proceedings in a court other than a special court” when the statutory composition is not satisfied, the tribunal that continued with only two members arguably ceased to be a “special court.” The legal problem, therefore, is whether the tribunal retained its jurisdiction after the vacancy arose. If the Punjab and Haryana High Court, upon review, determines that the tribunal was no longer a valid special court, the entire trial would be ultra vires and any conviction rendered by it would be void ab initio. The procedural consequence is that the accused could obtain a writ of certiorari and a quashing order under the inherent powers of the High Court, which would nullify the conviction and sentence. Practically, this creates a substantial risk for the prosecution: any appeal against the conviction would be futile if the jurisdictional defect is established, and the case would have to be re‑started either before a properly constituted special tribunal or in a regular court, subject to the statutory bar. For the accused, the advantage is twofold: the possibility of immediate relief from the conviction and an opportunity to argue for bail while the jurisdictional issue is resolved. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would need to scrutinise the exact wording of the ordinance, the date of the amendment’s commencement, and the absence of a re‑constitution notification, because those facts form the core of the jurisdictional challenge. The High Court’s decision on this point will also guide future tribunals on the necessity of strict compliance with statutory composition requirements, thereby influencing broader criminal‑procedure strategy.

Question: Which documentary and evidentiary materials should the defence collect to demonstrate the tribunal’s invalidity and to support an interim bail application?

Answer: The defence must assemble a comprehensive paper‑trail that establishes the statutory framework, the timeline of events, and the procedural lapses. First, the original FIR and the charge sheet filed by the investigating agency are essential to show the nature of the allegations and the procedural history. Second, the appointment order of the special tribunal, the Gazette notification that set out the three‑member requirement, and any subsequent amendment ordinance must be obtained to prove the legal mandate for composition. Third, the resignation letter of the departing member, the minutes of the tribunal’s hearing after the resignation, and any correspondence indicating that the two remaining members continued without a fresh re‑constitution order are critical to demonstrate the defect. Fourth, the High Court’s earlier order directing a retrial before a special court, together with the notification (or lack thereof) of a new tribunal, will illustrate the procedural disconnect. Fifth, the petition for quashing filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, along with annexures such as affidavits, must be prepared to show the basis for relief. For bail, the defence should also gather medical reports, statements of personal circumstances, and any evidence that the accused’s continued detention would prejudice the defence, especially given the jurisdictional uncertainty. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court often rely on such documentary evidence to persuade the bench that the accused is unlikely to flee and that the pending jurisdictional question warrants liberty. The defence should also secure copies of any precedent where courts have quashed proceedings on similar composition defects, as comparative authority strengthens the bail argument. By presenting a well‑organized bundle that links the statutory requirement, the vacancy, and the absence of re‑constitution, the defence can both undermine the tribunal’s legitimacy and demonstrate that bail is a proportionate interim measure while the High Court decides the substantive jurisdictional issue.

Question: What strategic considerations guide the decision to file a writ petition for quashing rather than pursuing an ordinary appeal against the conviction?

Answer: The strategic calculus hinges on the nature of the error and the remedies available. An ordinary appeal under the criminal appellate hierarchy addresses errors of law or fact that occurred during trial, but it presumes that the trial court possessed jurisdiction. Here, the core defect is jurisdictional: the tribunal may not have been a “special court” at the time it continued hearing the case. Because jurisdictional defects are jurisdiction‑nullifying, they cannot be cured by a regular appeal; instead, they require a superior court to examine the legality of the forum itself. Consequently, a writ petition under the inherent powers of the High Court, invoking the power to quash proceedings that are ultra vires, is the appropriate vehicle. The defence must also weigh timing: a writ petition can be filed promptly after the conviction, preserving the right to immediate relief, whereas an appeal would entail a longer procedural ladder and could result in the accused remaining incarcerated during the pendency. Moreover, a writ petition allows the defence to seek interim bail under the same application, consolidating relief requests. From a risk perspective, filing a writ avoids the possibility that an appellate court might simply affirm the conviction without addressing the jurisdictional flaw, thereby leaving the defect unremedied. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise that the petition should articulate the statutory requirement for three members, the vacancy, and the lack of re‑constitution, and must attach all relevant documents to demonstrate the defect. The petition can also request a declaration that the tribunal’s orders are void, compelling the prosecution either to re‑constitute a valid tribunal or to transfer the case to a regular court, subject to the statutory bar. This approach maximises the chance of overturning the conviction on a solid legal ground and aligns with the principle that jurisdictional errors are best corrected at the highest appropriate forum.

Question: How should the defence manage the accused’s custody status and bail prospects while the jurisdictional challenge is being adjudicated?

Answer: Custody considerations are pivotal because the accused remains detained pending resolution of the jurisdictional dispute, which may extend for months. The defence must argue that continued incarceration imposes an undue hardship, especially when the trial’s legality is in doubt. The legal problem is to balance the State’s interest in ensuring the accused’s presence against the principle that liberty should not be curtailed where the court’s authority is questionable. Practically, the defence should file a bail application alongside the writ petition, invoking the High Court’s power to grant bail pending final determination of the jurisdictional issue. The application must emphasize that the accused has cooperated with the investigation, has no prior criminal record, and that the alleged offences are non‑violent, thereby reducing flight risk. Additionally, the defence should highlight that the tribunal’s defect undermines the prosecution’s case, making the likelihood of a conviction low, which further justifies bail. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court often stress that bail is a matter of right when the trial is likely to be stayed on jurisdictional grounds. The defence should also prepare to address any prosecution claim that bail would prejudice the investigation; this can be mitigated by offering sureties and surrender of passport. If bail is granted, the accused can more freely assist in gathering documentary evidence, such as the resignation letter and re‑constitution notifications, thereby strengthening the writ petition. Conversely, if bail is denied, the defence must be ready to argue for a stay of the conviction on the basis that the tribunal lacked authority, which would render any punitive measure void. Managing custody thus involves a dual track: securing immediate liberty through bail and simultaneously pursuing the substantive jurisdictional challenge to ensure that any future trial, if required, proceeds before a valid forum.

Question: What counter‑arguments can be advanced against the prosecution’s claim that a two‑member tribunal is permissible and that the statutory bar does not apply to ongoing proceedings?

Answer: The prosecution relies on an earlier amendment that allegedly allowed a two‑member tribunal and contends that the statutory bar in the amendment ordinance only affects original trials, not proceedings already underway. The defence must dismantle both prongs. First, regarding the two‑member composition, the defence should point out that the amendment ordinance expressly required a fresh Gazette notification to re‑constitute the tribunal with a reduced bench; absent such a notification, the original three‑member requirement remains operative. The resignation of a member without re‑constitution therefore rendered the tribunal void, as confirmed by precedent where courts have held that a tribunal cannot continue with a vacancy. Second, the defence must interpret the phrase “proceedings in a court other than a special court” in its natural and ordinary meaning, arguing that it refers to the nature of the forum at any stage of the proceeding, not merely to the stage of trial initiation. The defence can cite analogous judgments where courts have held that a defective special court, even mid‑proceeding, loses its special‑court status, triggering the statutory bar. Moreover, the defence should emphasize that the High Court’s earlier direction for a retrial before a special court does not cure the defect; it merely orders a fresh trial, which cannot be conducted by a tribunal that is no longer a “special court.” A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would stress that the prosecution’s reliance on the amendment’s permissibility is misplaced because the amendment’s operative clause is conditional upon a formal re‑constitution order, which is missing. By highlighting the procedural lapse and the plain language of the statutory bar, the defence can persuade the High Court that the tribunal’s orders are ultra vires and that the prosecution’s arguments lack legal foundation. This counter‑strategy not only supports the quashing petition but also undermines any attempt by the prosecution to proceed on the basis of an allegedly valid two‑member tribunal.