Can the Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside a conviction based on a joint trial where the approver’s pardon was never accepted?

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Suppose a small textile shop in a bustling market is robbed and its owner is brutally murdered while counting the day’s earnings, and three individuals are arrested in connection with the crime. The investigating agency files an FIR describing the alleged theft, homicide, and the presence of the three suspects at the scene. One of the three, who was apprehended first, is offered a pardon by the prosecution under the provisions that allow an approver to obtain immunity in exchange for full disclosure of the conspiracy. The accused, however, never signs the pardon document nor appears before the court as a witness, and the prosecution proceeds to try all three together on the basis of a joint trial.

The complainant, a grieving family member of the deceased, files a petition for criminal trial, and the prosecution moves forward with the trial of all three accused in a single proceeding. The accused maintain that the joint trial is procedurally infirm because the approver’s pardon was never accepted, and therefore the statutory bar that would permit a separate trial of the remaining accused does not arise. They argue that the trial court erred in treating the unaccepted pardon as effective, thereby violating the provisions that safeguard the rights of co‑accused when an approver’s status is uncertain.

At the trial stage, the defence presents an ordinary factual defence, contending that the injuries on the accused’s hands could be explained by routine work in the shop and that the blood‑stained cloth found in one of their possession might have been transferred inadvertently. While these explanations address the evidentiary aspects, they do not resolve the procedural defect concerning the validity of the joint trial. The accused therefore seek a higher‑order remedy that can address the flaw in the trial court’s jurisdiction to convict them together.

The procedural problem crystallises when the trial court, after hearing the prosecution’s case, delivers a conviction under the murder provision of the Indian Penal Code read with the common‑intention clause, imposing severe sentences on all three accused. The accused, now petitioners, file a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, invoking the power of the High Court to examine whether the lower court exercised jurisdiction correctly. The revision seeks quashing of the conviction on the ground that the approver’s pardon was never accepted, rendering the joint trial illegal under the relevant criminal procedure provisions.

Why does the remedy lie before the Punjab and Haryana High Court? The High Court possesses the authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure to entertain revision applications challenging orders passed by subordinate courts when a substantial question of law or jurisdiction is involved. In this scenario, the question is whether the trial court could lawfully try the accused together when the statutory conditions for a joint trial—specifically, the acceptance of a pardon by the approver—were not satisfied. Only the High Court can interpret the interplay of the pardon provision and the rule against joint trial, and can direct a fresh trial or set aside the conviction.

The specific type of proceeding is a criminal revision petition under the provisions that empower the High Court to review orders of subordinate courts. The petition frames the legal issue as a jurisdictional defect: the trial court’s reliance on an unaccepted pardon to justify a joint trial contravenes the statutory scheme that protects the rights of co‑accused. By filing a revision, the accused aim to obtain a declaration that the conviction is void and to secure an order for a separate trial, thereby preserving their right to a fair hearing.

In preparing the revision, the accused retain a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who drafts the petition, highlighting the statutory requirement that a pardon under the relevant section becomes operative only upon acceptance and examination of the approver as a witness. The petition cites precedents where courts have quashed convictions on similar procedural grounds, emphasizing that the failure to secure the approver’s acceptance defeats the legal basis for a joint trial.

The prosecution, represented by a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, counters that the approver’s cooperation, albeit informal, was sufficient to satisfy the spirit of the law. However, the defence stresses that the procedural safeguard is not a matter of legislative intent but of strict statutory construction, and that any deviation undermines the fairness of the criminal justice process.

The revision petition also raises ancillary relief, seeking bail for the accused pending the outcome of the High Court’s determination. The petition argues that continued custody is unwarranted in light of the procedural irregularity, and that the accused are entitled to liberty until a proper trial can be conducted in accordance with law.

Legal scholars note that a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court often advises clients in such matters to focus on the procedural defect rather than the evidentiary disputes, because the High Court’s jurisdiction to set aside a conviction hinges on the existence of a jurisdictional error. The revision therefore concentrates on the statutory interpretation of the pardon provision and its impact on the validity of the joint trial.

When the revision is filed, the Punjab and Haryana High Court examines the record, including the absence of a signed pardon, the lack of any examination of the approver as a witness, and the trial court’s reliance on the mere offer of pardon as a basis for joint trial. The court’s analysis will determine whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, and whether the conviction must be set aside.

Should the High Court find merit in the revision, it may issue an order quashing the conviction and directing the lower court to conduct separate trials for the remaining accused, or to reopen the proceedings with a proper determination of the approver’s status. This remedy aligns with the procedural route identified in the original analysis, where the appropriate forum for challenging such a jurisdictional flaw is the High Court via a revision petition.

Thus, the fictional scenario mirrors the legal complexities of the analysed judgment: an unaccepted pardon, a contested joint trial, and the necessity of invoking the High Court’s revisionary jurisdiction to rectify a procedural miscarriage. The accused, through their counsel, pursue a remedy that directly addresses the legal defect, rather than merely contesting the factual matrix of the case.

Question: Does the trial court possess the authority to try all three accused together when the approver’s pardon was never accepted, and what legal principles govern the validity of a joint trial in such circumstances?

Answer: The factual matrix presents a robbery‑murder in a textile shop where three individuals were apprehended, and the prosecution offered a pardon to the first suspect on the condition of full disclosure, yet the suspect never signed the pardon nor appeared as a witness. Under the criminal procedure framework, a joint trial is permissible only when the statutory conditions for consolidating the cases of co‑accused are satisfied; one pivotal condition is the acceptance of the approver’s pardon, which triggers the operation of the provision that bars a separate trial of the remaining accused. In the present scenario, the trial court proceeded with a combined proceeding despite the absence of any formal acceptance, thereby ignoring the procedural safeguard designed to protect the rights of co‑accused. The legal principle at stake is that the effectiveness of a pardon is contingent upon the approver’s assent and subsequent examination; without such acceptance, the statutory bar does not arise, and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to merge the cases. This misstep constitutes a jurisdictional defect because the court’s power to convict rests on a valid procedural foundation. The consequence is that any judgment rendered in a trial lacking jurisdiction is vulnerable to being set aside on appeal or revision. For the accused, this defect undermines the fairness of the trial, potentially rendering the conviction void and exposing the prosecution to a requirement to restart proceedings in compliance with the law. The complainant, meanwhile, may experience a delay in obtaining a final verdict, but the integrity of the criminal justice process demands adherence to procedural safeguards. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court representing the accused would argue that the trial court’s reliance on an unaccepted pardon violates the statutory scheme, and that the High Court must scrutinize the jurisdictional basis before entertaining any conviction. The High Court’s assessment will hinge on whether the procedural prerequisite of acceptance was fulfilled, and if not, it must declare the joint trial invalid and order separate trials or a fresh hearing, thereby restoring the accused’s right to a fair trial.

Question: What is the legal effect of an unaccepted pardon on the statutory bar that prevents a joint trial, and how does this impact the rights of the co‑accused under the criminal procedure?

Answer: The unaccepted pardon in this case functions as a nullity because the statutory provision that grants immunity to an approver becomes operative only upon the approver’s acceptance and subsequent examination as a witness. Consequently, the condition that would invoke the bar against a joint trial of the remaining accused never materialises. The legal effect is twofold: first, the procedural shield intended to isolate the approver from the co‑accused is never triggered; second, the co‑accused retain the right to demand separate trials, as the law expressly protects them from being compelled to stand trial alongside an approver whose status remains uncertain. This protection is rooted in the principle that each accused must be tried on the basis of evidence applicable to them individually, and that the presence of an approver who has not formally accepted a pardon cannot be used to justify a consolidated proceeding. In the present facts, the prosecution’s reliance on the mere offer of pardon, without any acceptance, undermines the statutory scheme and infringes upon the co‑accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The practical implication is that any conviction derived from a joint trial under these circumstances is vulnerable to being quashed for lack of jurisdiction. The accused can invoke this defect in a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking a declaration that the trial court exceeded its authority. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would emphasise that the procedural defect is not a mere technicality but a substantive safeguard designed to prevent prejudice against co‑accused who might otherwise be compelled to rely on the unverified testimony of an approver. The High Court, upon recognising the absence of acceptance, would be compelled to set aside the conviction and direct the lower court to conduct separate trials, thereby upholding the procedural rights of the co‑accused and preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Question: Which procedural remedies are available through a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court to challenge a conviction based on an invalid joint trial, and what criteria must the court consider in deciding whether to quash the conviction?

Answer: The appropriate procedural avenue for the accused, now petitioners, is a criminal revision petition filed under the provisions that empower the Punjab and Haryana High Court to examine orders of subordinate courts when a substantial question of law or jurisdiction arises. The revision must articulate that the trial court’s reliance on an unaccepted pardon to justify a joint trial constitutes a jurisdictional error, rendering the conviction void. The court will assess several criteria: first, whether the statutory prerequisite of acceptance of the pardon was satisfied; second, whether the trial court correctly applied the rule that bars a joint trial in the absence of such acceptance; third, whether the conviction was predicated on a procedural defect that goes to the root of the court’s jurisdiction rather than a mere irregularity. The High Court will also examine the record for any evidence of the approver’s examination as a witness, which is indispensable for the operation of the statutory bar. If the court finds that the trial court acted without jurisdiction, it possesses the authority to quash the conviction, set aside the sentence, and direct a fresh trial in compliance with the procedural requirements. The practical implication for the accused is the restoration of liberty, especially if bail is granted pending the outcome, and the opportunity to contest the substantive evidence in a proper trial. For the prosecution, the High Court’s decision may necessitate re‑filing charges against each accused separately, ensuring that the evidentiary basis for each is independently established. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court representing the prosecution may argue that the procedural defect is harmless and that the substantive evidence justifies the conviction; however, the High Court’s jurisdictional review focuses on the legality of the trial process, not the merits of the evidence. Accordingly, the court’s decision will hinge on the strict construction of the pardon provision and the necessity of its acceptance, and if the High Court determines that the joint trial was unlawful, it will quash the conviction and order appropriate remedial measures, thereby safeguarding the procedural rights of the accused.

Question: How does the request for bail pending the resolution of the revision petition intersect with the procedural defect identified, and what factors will the High Court evaluate in granting or denying bail?

Answer: The bail application filed alongside the revision petition is intrinsically linked to the procedural defect concerning the unaccepted pardon, because the defect calls into question the legality of the conviction and the continued detention of the accused. The High Court, when considering bail, will weigh the seriousness of the alleged offences, the likelihood of the accused fleeing, the possibility of tampering with evidence, and, crucially, whether the conviction itself is tainted by a jurisdictional error. Since the conviction rests on a joint trial that may be void, the court is inclined to view the detention as potentially unlawful, thereby strengthening the case for bail. The petition will argue that the accused are entitled to liberty until a proper trial can be conducted, emphasizing that the procedural safeguard intended to protect co‑accused was ignored, and that continued custody would amount to punitive detention without legal basis. The prosecution, represented by a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, may counter that the gravity of the murder charge and the risk of interference with witnesses justify denial of bail. However, the High Court’s jurisprudence underscores that bail is the rule and its denial the exception, especially where the conviction is under challenge on jurisdictional grounds. The court will also consider the health, age, and personal circumstances of the accused, as well as any prior criminal record. If the High Court finds that the procedural defect undermines the legitimacy of the conviction, it is likely to grant bail, at least until the revision is decided, thereby preventing an unlawful deprivation of liberty. The practical outcome for the accused would be temporary release pending a full hearing on the revision, while the prosecution would have to proceed with the case under the correct procedural framework, possibly initiating separate trials. This interplay illustrates how procedural safeguards not only affect the validity of convictions but also directly influence custodial decisions, reinforcing the importance of strict adherence to statutory requirements in criminal proceedings.

Question: Why does the procedural remedy for the alleged defect in the joint trial lie before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than any other forum?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the trial court convicted all three accused in a single proceeding despite the fact that the approver’s pardon was never accepted or examined. This creates a jurisdictional flaw because the law governing approvers expressly requires acceptance before the benefit of a separate trial can be invoked. When a lower court acts beyond its jurisdiction, the only superior authority empowered to examine such an error is the High Court that supervises the subordinate courts in the state. The Punjab and Haryana High Court possesses the constitutional and statutory power to entertain revision applications that challenge orders of subordinate courts on the ground of jurisdictional defect or substantial question of law. The accused, now petitioners, therefore approach that High Court to seek a declaration that the conviction is void and to obtain an order for a fresh trial. The High Court’s jurisdiction is not limited to appellate review; it also includes the power to revise interlocutory orders, to quash judgments that are illegal, and to direct appropriate remedial measures. Because the alleged defect arose in a criminal trial conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the revision must be filed in the High Court that has supervisory jurisdiction over the district court that rendered the conviction. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court is essential to frame the revision petition correctly, to cite the procedural rule that a pardon becomes operative only upon acceptance, and to argue that the trial court’s reliance on an unaccepted pardon was a jurisdictional error. The High Court, upon finding merit, can set aside the conviction, direct the lower court to conduct separate trials, or remand the matter for fresh proceedings, thereby correcting the procedural miscarriage at the appropriate level of judicial review.

Question: How does the failure to secure an accepted pardon affect the legality of the joint trial and why is a purely factual defence insufficient at this stage?

Answer: The factual defence presented by the accused focuses on explaining injuries and the presence of a blood‑stained cloth as ordinary, but it does not address the core procedural defect. The law on approvers mandates that the benefit of a separate trial is triggered only when the approver formally accepts the pardon and is examined as a witness. In the present case, the approver never signed the pardon document and never appeared before the court, leaving the pardon provision dormant. Consequently, the statutory bar that would have allowed a joint trial to proceed does not arise, rendering the trial court’s decision to try all three together ultra vires. Because the defect is jurisdictional, the accused cannot rely on factual explanations to overturn the conviction; the court’s power to acquit or convict is predicated on the existence of valid jurisdiction. Even if the factual defence were compelling, the conviction would still be vulnerable to being set aside on the ground that the trial was conducted without lawful authority. The procedural route therefore requires the accused to challenge the legality of the joint trial itself, not merely the evidential aspects. A revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court is the appropriate vehicle to raise this jurisdictional issue. The petition must demonstrate that the trial court erred in treating an unaccepted pardon as effective, and that this error vitiated the entire proceeding. Engaging a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court to assist with the factual defence may be useful for bail applications, but the ultimate remedy hinges on correcting the procedural flaw, which cannot be achieved by a factual defence alone.

Question: What steps should the accused take in retaining lawyers in Chandigarh High Court to obtain bail and interim relief while the revision petition is being considered?

Answer: The accused, now in custody, must first approach counsel experienced in criminal matters before the Chandigarh High Court to file an application for bail. The first step is to engage a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court who will examine the revision petition, the trial record, and the grounds for bail, such as the absence of a valid conviction and the pending determination of jurisdiction. The counsel will then draft a bail application that highlights the procedural irregularity, the lack of acceptance of the pardon, and the fact that the accused are petitioners seeking a revision of a judgment that may be set aside. The application must be supported by an affidavit stating the current custodial status, the health condition of the accused, and any other relevant circumstances. Once filed, the court will schedule a hearing, during which the lawyer will argue that continued detention would be oppressive given the pending High Court review and the procedural defect that may render the conviction void. The counsel may also request that the court stay the execution of the sentence pending the outcome of the revision. While the bail application proceeds, the accused should ensure that the revision petition is simultaneously advanced by a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court, so that the two parallel tracks reinforce each other. The bail application, if granted, will provide immediate relief from custody, allowing the accused to cooperate with their legal team, to prepare further submissions, and to attend any hearings related to the revision. It also serves a strategic purpose by demonstrating to the High Court that the accused are not a flight risk and that their liberty should not be curtailed while the substantive jurisdictional issue is being resolved.

Question: If the Punjab and Haryana High Court determines that the joint trial was invalid, what orders can it issue and how will those orders affect the custody and future trial of the remaining accused?

Answer: Upon finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the approver’s pardon was never accepted, the High Court can exercise its revisionary powers to quash the conviction and direct a fresh trial. The court may issue an order setting aside the judgment of the lower court, directing that the case be remanded for separate trials of the co‑accused, or it may order that the matter be reopened with a proper determination of the approver’s status. In addition, the High Court can direct that the accused be released on bail pending the conduct of the new trial, especially if the bail application filed by the lawyers in Chandigarh High Court has been granted. The order may also specify that any sentence already imposed be stayed, preventing its execution. Practically, this means that the accused will no longer be subject to the conviction that was based on an illegal joint trial, and the prosecution will have to re‑file charges in accordance with the correct procedural framework. The court may also require the investigating agency to produce the approver before the trial court, or to withdraw the approver’s testimony if it is deemed inadmissible. For the remaining accused, the new trial will provide an opportunity to contest the evidence afresh, without the prejudice of being tried alongside an approver whose pardon was not validated. The High Court’s order will thus restore the procedural safeguards guaranteed by law, ensure that custody is not continued on an unsound basis, and set the stage for a trial that respects the rights of each accused individually.

Question: Does the failure of the approver to sign the pardon and to be examined as a witness render the joint trial of all three accused void, and what precedent does a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court rely upon to argue that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the investigating agency offered a pardon to the first suspect on the condition of full disclosure, yet the suspect never signed the document nor appeared before the trial court as a witness. Under the statutory scheme governing approvers, the protective effect that bars a joint trial is triggered only when the approver’s pardon becomes operative through acceptance and examination; absent those steps, the law continues to treat the individual as a regular co‑accused. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court must therefore scrutinise the trial record for any indication that the court treated the unaccepted pardon as effective, which would be a misreading of the statutory language. The High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition hinges on whether a substantial question of law or jurisdiction arose, and the core issue is the procedural defect in the trial court’s reliance on a non‑existent approver status. In preparing the argument, counsel will cite earlier decisions where the apex and High Courts emphasized that the operative nature of a pardon is contingent upon acceptance and the approver’s testimony, and that any deviation amounts to a jurisdictional error that cannot be cured by mere factual acquiescence. The strategic focus is to demonstrate that the trial court’s error is not merely an evidentiary oversight but a structural flaw that vitiates the entire conviction, because the joint trial was predicated on a condition that never materialised. By establishing this, the lawyer can persuade the revision bench that the conviction must be set aside and a fresh trial ordered, either separately for each accused or with a proper determination of the approver’s status, thereby safeguarding the accused’s right to a fair trial as guaranteed by constitutional principles.

Question: How should the defence evaluate the evidential explanations offered for the blood‑stained cloth and hand injuries in light of the procedural defect, and what role do lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court play in framing the revision petition to focus on jurisdiction rather than factual guilt?

Answer: The defence’s factual narrative that the injuries on the accused’s hands could arise from routine textile work and that the blood‑stained cloth might have been contaminated inadvertently addresses the material evidence but does not cure the procedural infirmity that underlies the conviction. In a revision proceeding, the primary ground is not the merits of the evidence but whether the lower court possessed the authority to render a judgment on the joint trial. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court therefore craft the petition to foreground the statutory requirement that an approver’s pardon must be accepted and the approver examined before the court, a prerequisite that was never satisfied. By doing so, they argue that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction, rendering any factual findings, however persuasive, legally irrelevant. The defence will still need to anticipate the prosecution’s attempt to argue that the evidential trail establishes common intention, but the revision petition will pre‑empt this by seeking a declaration that the conviction is void ab initio due to the jurisdictional lapse. The strategic advantage of this approach is that it sidesteps the arduous task of disproving the blood evidence, which may be difficult given forensic reports, and instead leverages a procedural shield that, if accepted, compels the High Court to quash the conviction outright. Moreover, the petition can request that the High Court direct the trial court to re‑examine the evidence in a properly constituted proceeding, thereby preserving the accused’s opportunity to contest the incriminating facts without the taint of an illegal joint trial.

Question: What are the bail considerations for the accused pending the outcome of the revision petition, and how can a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court argue that continued custody violates the principle of liberty in the presence of a clear procedural irregularity?

Answer: The accused remain in custody after conviction, but the revision petition raises a substantial question of jurisdiction that, if successful, would nullify the conviction. Under the principle that liberty is the default position, continued detention must be justified by a compelling reason, such as a risk of flight, tampering with evidence, or threat to public order. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can contend that the procedural defect—namely, the unaccepted pardon and the consequent illegal joint trial—creates a presumption of innocence that outweighs any residual concerns about the accused’s conduct. The counsel will emphasize that the High Court’s power to quash the conviction is akin to a de‑facto acquittal, and that maintaining the accused in prison would amount to punitive detention without legal basis. The bail application should therefore highlight the lack of any concrete evidence that the accused pose a flight risk, noting that they have cooperated with the investigating agency and have no prior criminal record. Additionally, the lawyer can argue that the procedural irregularity itself undermines the legitimacy of the conviction, rendering any custodial order arbitrary and violative of constitutional guarantees of personal liberty. By presenting affidavits from family members, proof of stable residence, and assurances of surrender, the counsel can persuade the court that bail is appropriate while the revision is pending, thereby mitigating the hardship of prolonged detention and preserving the accused’s right to a fair trial in a properly constituted forum.

Question: In what ways can the prosecution’s reliance on the approver’s informal cooperation be challenged, and how should lawyers in Chandigarh High Court structure their cross‑examination strategy to expose the lack of statutory compliance?

Answer: The prosecution asserts that the first suspect’s informal cooperation satisfies the spirit of the approver provision, yet the statutory framework demands a formal acceptance of the pardon and a court‑ordered examination as a witness. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court must therefore focus on the procedural prerequisites rather than the substantive content of the cooperation. The cross‑examination strategy should begin by establishing that the suspect never signed the pardon document, that no record exists of his appearance before the trial court, and that the prosecution failed to produce any certified copy of an acceptance. By eliciting admissions that the suspect was merely questioned by the police and that no formal oath was taken, the defence can demonstrate that the statutory conditions were not met. Further, the counsel can press the prosecution on why the trial court proceeded with a joint trial despite the absence of a formal approver status, thereby exposing a procedural oversight. The argument should be framed to show that the prosecution’s reliance on informal cooperation is a misinterpretation that cannot override the clear legislative intent to protect co‑accused from joint trial unless the approver’s pardon is operational. This line of attack not only undermines the prosecution’s narrative but also reinforces the revision petition’s claim of jurisdictional error, strengthening the case for quashing the conviction and ordering a fresh trial that respects the statutory safeguards.

Question: What practical steps should the defence take in preparing the revision petition to ensure that the High Court addresses both the jurisdictional defect and the potential for a fresh trial, and how can the counsel balance the need for procedural precision with the overarching goal of securing the accused’s liberty?

Answer: The defence must first collate the complete trial record, highlighting the absence of a signed pardon, the lack of any order for the approver’s examination, and the trial court’s reliance on these missing elements to justify a joint trial. The revision petition should be drafted with meticulous reference to the statutory language governing approvers, emphasizing that the procedural defect is not a mere technicality but a jurisdictional bar that invalidates the entire proceeding. Counsel should request that the High Court issue a direction for the trial court to either set aside the conviction and order separate trials for each accused or to reconvene the case with a proper determination of the approver’s status, thereby preserving the integrity of the process. In addition, the petition can seek interim relief in the form of bail, citing the procedural irregularity and the principle that liberty cannot be curtailed on an unlawful conviction. The lawyer must balance the detailed legal argumentation with a clear narrative that the accused’s continued incarceration is unjustified, ensuring that the petition does not become a purely academic exercise but a vehicle for immediate relief. By attaching affidavits, forensic reports, and the unexecuted pardon document as annexures, the counsel demonstrates procedural precision, while the overarching narrative underscores the fundamental right to a fair trial. This dual approach maximizes the chances that the High Court will both quash the flawed conviction and provide a pathway to a legitimate trial, thereby safeguarding the accused’s liberty and procedural rights.