Can a revision petition before Punjab and Haryana High Court succeed when the FIR used as a confession was admitted without proof of constructive custody?
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Suppose a person is arrested after a police officer records a detailed first information report (FIR) in which the accused narrates the sequence of a violent incident, describes the motive, points out the locations of the victims’ bodies and the weapon used, and signs the document with a thumb‑impression; the FIR is then submitted as the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case at trial.
The accused, who had been taken into police custody on the same day, is subsequently tried before a district court for murder under the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution relies heavily on the FIR, arguing that the statements within it constitute admissions that lead to the discovery of the bodies and the murder weapon. The defence contends that the FIR is a confession made to a police officer and therefore falls within the prohibition of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, rendering the entire narrative inadmissible except for any portion that may be rescued under Section 27. Moreover, the defence asserts that the accused was not in “constructive custody” at the time of making the FIR, a prerequisite for invoking the Section 27 exception.
At trial, the trial judge admits the FIR in its entirety, treating the portions describing the discovery of the bodies as admissible under Section 27 and the remaining narrative as admissible admissions. The accused is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction rests primarily on the admitted FIR; the other physical evidence, such as the recovered weapon and forensic reports, is deemed insufficient on its own to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
Following the conviction, the accused seeks relief, but an ordinary factual defence at the appellate stage would not suffice because the core evidentiary foundation—the FIR—remains on the record. The only viable avenue to overturn the conviction is to challenge the admissibility of the FIR itself, arguing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Section 25 and Section 27 and that the accused was not in constructive custody when the FIR was lodged. Such a challenge cannot be pursued through a standard appeal on the merits of the evidence; it requires a higher‑court intervention that can scrutinise the procedural propriety of the trial court’s order.
The appropriate procedural remedy, therefore, is a revision petition filed under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. A revision petition permits the High Court to examine whether the lower court exercised its jurisdiction correctly and whether any legal error—such as the misapplication of evidentiary provisions—has led to a miscarriage of justice. By invoking the inherent powers of the High Court, the petitioner can ask for the quashing of the conviction and the release of the accused, on the ground that the FIR, being a confession to a police officer, should have been excluded in its entirety except for the narrowly saved material under Section 27, which in this case does not satisfy the evidentiary threshold for conviction.
In preparing the revision, the accused engages a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court who meticulously analyses the trial record, highlighting the statutory language of Section 25 that bars any confession made to a police officer, irrespective of whether it directly describes the commission of the offence. The counsel also points out that the trial judge’s finding of constructive custody is unsupported, because the accused was released on bail after the FIR was recorded and only later re‑arrested on unrelated charges, a circumstance that does not meet the legal definition of constructive custody required for Section 27 to apply.
The revision petition, drafted by experienced lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court, sets out three principal grounds: (1) the FIR is a confession within the meaning of Section 25 and therefore inadmissible; (2) the accused was not in constructive custody at the time of making the FIR, rendering Section 27 inapplicable; and (3) the conviction is unsustainable on the remaining evidence, which fails to establish the essential elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The petition also requests that the High Court exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR as an illegal and improperly admitted piece of evidence.
Parallel to the revision, the accused also consults a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court for strategic advice on whether a collateral writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution might be appropriate, should the revision be dismissed. The counsel explains that while a writ petition could address the violation of fundamental rights, the primary and more direct route remains the revision under Section 397, as it directly challenges the trial court’s legal error concerning evidentiary rules.
During the hearing, the Punjab and Haryana High Court examines the statutory framework. It reiterates that Section 25’s bar extends to the entire confession, not merely the portion describing the act, and that Section 27 can rescue only that part of the confession which directly led to the discovery of a fact, provided the accused was in custody at the time. The bench scrutinises the police logbook, the time‑stamped thumb‑impression, and the bail order, concluding that the accused was not in continuous police custody when the FIR was filed; consequently, the Section 27 exception does not apply.
Having established that the FIR should have been excluded, the High Court finds that the remaining evidence—comprising the recovered weapon, a blood‑stained cloth, and medical testimony—does not, on its own, meet the threshold of proof required for a conviction of murder. The court therefore declares that the trial court’s judgment was founded on an inadmissible piece of evidence and that the conviction is unsustainable.
In its order, the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashes the conviction, directs the immediate release of the accused, and orders the investigating agency to expunge the FIR from its records, citing the prohibition under Section 25. The court also directs that no further prosecution be pursued on the same facts, as the evidentiary foundation has been nullified.
The outcome underscores the critical importance of challenging procedural irregularities at the appropriate judicial forum. By filing a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused was able to obtain a remedy that a regular appeal on the merits could not provide. The case also illustrates how a skilled lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can complement the strategy by advising on alternative constitutional remedies, ensuring that the accused’s rights are fully protected throughout the process.
Thus, the fictional scenario mirrors the legal complexities of the original judgment while presenting a distinct factual backdrop. It demonstrates that when an FIR amounts to a confession to a police officer, the correct procedural route to obtain relief is a revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, leveraging the court’s power to scrutinise the admissibility of evidence and to correct judicial errors that could otherwise lead to an unjust conviction.
Question: Does the first information report (FIR) recorded by the police constitute a confession that must be excluded under the evidentiary rule prohibiting confessions to police officers, and if so, what portion, if any, may be rescued as an exception?
Answer: The factual matrix shows that the accused, while in police custody, narrated a detailed account of the murders, identified the locations of the bodies, described the weapon and signed the FIR with a thumb‑impression. Under the evidentiary principle that a confession is any statement acknowledging the commission of an offence, the FIR falls squarely within the definition of a confession made to a police officer. The rule bars the admission of any such confession, irrespective of whether it merely describes the act or includes ancillary details such as motive or procedural steps. Consequently, the entire narrative in the FIR is subject to exclusion. However, the law provides a narrow rescue clause for material that directly leads to the discovery of a fact, provided the accused was in custody at the time of making the statement. In the present case, the portions of the FIR that pointed the police to the victims’ bodies and the murder weapon satisfy the “discovery” requirement. Those specific statements may be admitted under the exception, but only to the extent that they were the immediate cause of the police’s recovery of the bodies and the weapon. All remaining content – the motive, the sequence of killings, the confession of guilt – must be excluded. A seasoned lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that the trial judge’s wholesale admission of the FIR exceeded the permissible scope, and that the conviction rests on inadmissible evidence. The court must therefore excise the inadmissible portions, and assess whether the rescued material alone can sustain the charge beyond reasonable doubt. If it cannot, the conviction must be set aside.
Question: What is the legal meaning of “constructive custody” and how does it affect the applicability of the discovery exception to the FIR in this case?
Answer: Constructive custody arises when a person, although not physically confined, is under the control of law‑enforcement authorities to such an extent that any statement made is deemed to have been given while in custody. The doctrine requires that the accused be in a situation where the police have the power to restrain his liberty, such as after arrest, during interrogation, or while being detained for any purpose. In the present facts, the accused was arrested, signed the FIR, and was subsequently released on bail before being re‑arrested on unrelated charges. The critical issue is whether the moment of signing the FIR falls within a period of constructive custody. The prosecution contends that the arrest and immediate filing of the FIR created a custodial environment, while the defence argues that the bail release broke the continuity of custody, rendering the accused free at the time of the statement. The discovery exception applies only if the accused was in custody when the confessional material was given. If the court determines that the bail order liberated the accused, the exception cannot be invoked, and the entire FIR must be excluded. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would emphasize that the statutory test focuses on the actual control exercised by the police, not merely the formal status of arrest. The High Court, in reviewing the police logbook and bail order, concluded that the accused was not in continuous custody at the time of the FIR, thereby disallowing the rescue of any portion. This finding is pivotal because, without the rescued discovery material, the prosecution’s case collapses, leaving only the inadmissible confession. The determination of constructive custody thus directly influences whether any part of the FIR survives the evidentiary bar and ultimately decides the viability of the conviction.
Question: Why is a revision petition the appropriate procedural remedy to challenge the trial court’s admission of the FIR, rather than a regular appeal on the merits?
Answer: The conviction rests primarily on the admission of the FIR, an evidentiary error that goes to the jurisdictional exercise of the trial court. A regular appeal on the merits permits the appellate court to re‑examine the evidence but does not allow it to revisit a fundamental legal error concerning the admissibility of a confession. The revision remedy, available under the inherent powers of the High Court, is designed to correct jurisdictional mistakes, illegal orders, or procedural irregularities that result in a miscarriage of justice. In this scenario, the trial judge misapplied the evidentiary rule by treating the entire FIR as admissible, ignoring the prohibition on confessions to police officers and the requirement of constructive custody for the discovery exception. Because the error is not merely factual but legal, the appropriate forum is a revision petition filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. This petition enables the High Court to scrutinise the trial court’s interpretation of the evidentiary provisions, to quash the conviction, and to order the release of the accused. Moreover, the revision petition can invoke the court’s power under the criminal procedure code to set aside an illegal order and direct the investigating agency to expunge the FIR from its records. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would stress that the revision route is the only avenue that permits a direct challenge to the trial court’s jurisdictional error, ensuring that the High Court can provide a definitive remedy without being constrained by the procedural limitations of a standard appeal.
Question: Could a collateral writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution serve as an alternative or supplementary remedy, and what strategic considerations would a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court advise?
Answer: A collateral writ petition under Article 226 is a constitutional remedy that addresses violations of fundamental rights or illegal actions by public authorities. In the present case, the accused could allege that the trial court’s admission of an inadmissible confession violated his right to a fair trial and the principle of due process. However, the writ jurisdiction is discretionary, and the court typically prefers that parties exhaust ordinary statutory remedies before invoking constitutional jurisdiction. The strategic advantage of a writ lies in its ability to obtain immediate relief, such as release from custody, if the court finds a grave miscarriage of justice. Yet, the High Court may dismiss the writ if it deems the revision petition an appropriate and sufficient remedy. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would counsel the accused to first pursue the revision petition, as it directly addresses the legal error and carries a higher likelihood of success. Simultaneously, the counsel might prepare a backup writ petition, emphasizing the violation of the right to life and liberty under the constitution, in case the revision is dismissed on technical grounds. The counsel would also highlight that the writ petition can be framed to seek a direction for the investigating agency to delete the FIR, thereby preventing future prosecution on the same facts. Nonetheless, the primary focus remains on the revision, with the writ serving as a safety net. The strategic plan would involve filing the revision, monitoring its progress, and, if necessary, promptly moving the writ to avoid undue delay in securing the accused’s liberty.
Question: What are the practical implications of the High Court’s decision to quash the conviction and expunge the FIR for the accused, the complainant, the prosecution, and the investigating agency?
Answer: The High Court’s order to set aside the conviction and delete the FIR has far‑reaching consequences for all parties. For the accused, the immediate effect is release from incarceration and restoration of his legal status, eliminating the stigma of a murder conviction. The decision also clears his criminal record, which is crucial for future employment and civil rights. The complainant, who sought justice for the victims, faces the disappointment of a failed prosecution; however, the court’s reasoning clarifies that the evidence was insufficient without the inadmissible confession, preserving the integrity of the criminal justice system. The prosecution is compelled to reassess its case and may consider whether any independent, admissible evidence exists that could support a fresh charge, though the expungement of the FIR limits the evidentiary base. The investigating agency must comply with the directive to remove the FIR from its registers, effectively erasing the formal accusation and preventing any future reliance on that document. This action also serves as a cautionary precedent, urging law enforcement to avoid recording confessional statements in FIRs, which are vulnerable to exclusion. Additionally, the decision reinforces the duty of trial courts to apply evidentiary rules rigorously, thereby enhancing procedural fairness. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would note that the ruling underscores the importance of safeguarding constitutional rights and may influence future investigations, prompting agencies to rely on separate statements before magistrates rather than embedding confessions in FIRs. Overall, the judgment restores legal balance, deters procedural missteps, and reaffirms the High Court’s role as a guardian of justice.
Question: Why does the procedural remedy for challenging the admission of the FIR lie before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than any other forum?
Answer: The factual matrix shows that the trial court’s judgment was predicated on the admission of a confessional FIR, an error that goes to the very legality of the conviction. Under the inherent powers of a High Court, a revision petition can be entertained when a subordinate court is alleged to have exercised jurisdiction incorrectly or committed a legal error that results in a miscarriage of justice. The accused’s conviction rests on a piece of evidence that, according to the law of evidence, should be excluded because it is a confession made to a police officer. The only avenue that permits a direct challenge to the trial court’s interpretation of evidentiary provisions is a revision under the criminal procedure code, which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court for matters arising in its territorial area. The High Court can scrutinise whether the trial judge correctly applied the rule that a confession to a police officer is inadmissible and whether the exception for discovery‑related material was validly invoked. Because the alleged error is not merely factual but legal, an ordinary appeal on the merits would not permit a fresh examination of the admissibility issue; the appellate court is bound by the trial record. Consequently, the appropriate forum is the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court can file a revision petition, argue that the trial court erred in its construction of the evidentiary rule, and seek quashing of the conviction. The High Court’s power to revise also enables it to direct the investigating agency to expunge the FIR from its register, thereby providing a comprehensive remedy that cannot be achieved through lower‑court mechanisms.
Question: In the present scenario, why would a purely factual defence at the appellate stage be inadequate to obtain relief?
Answer: The conviction was secured primarily on the basis of the FIR, which the prosecution presented as an admission of guilt. A factual defence—such as denying participation in the murders or challenging the identification of the bodies—relies on the premise that the evidential foundation is sound. However, the legal obstacle is the inadmissibility of the FIR itself under the rule that a confession to a police officer cannot be proved. Even if the accused were to produce an alibi or dispute the forensic findings, the trial court’s acceptance of the FIR means that the narrative of the crime is already established as part of the record. The appellate court is constrained to review the evidence that was admitted at trial; it cannot reopen the question of whether the FIR should have been excluded unless the legal basis for its admission is contested. Therefore, a factual defence alone cannot overturn a judgment that is fundamentally tainted by a procedural error. The remedy must target the legal flaw—namely, the misapplication of the evidentiary rule—by seeking a higher‑court intervention that can reassess the admissibility of the FIR. This is why the accused must engage a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court to file a revision petition that specifically raises the legal issue, rather than relying on a factual rebuttal at the appeal stage, which would be insufficient to dismantle the conviction.
Question: What motivates an accused to approach lawyers in Chandigarh High Court for advice on a collateral writ, and how does this complement the primary revision strategy?
Answer: While the primary route to relief is the revision petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused may also consider a collateral writ under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to safeguard fundamental rights, such as personal liberty, that may have been infringed by the unlawful detention. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can evaluate whether the denial of bail, the continued custody, or the failure to expunge the FIR constitutes a violation of constitutional guarantees. The counsel can advise on filing a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of certiorari under Article 226, which would directly challenge the legality of the detention and the procedural irregularities. Although the writ does not replace the need to quash the conviction, it provides an immediate remedy to secure release if the revision petition faces procedural delays. Moreover, the writ route can pressure the trial court to reconsider its stance on the FIR’s admissibility, creating a synergistic effect with the revision petition. Engaging lawyers in Chandigarh High Court ensures that the accused benefits from expertise in constitutional remedies, while the revision petition, prepared by lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court, tackles the substantive evidentiary flaw. This dual strategy maximises the chances of obtaining both immediate relief from unlawful custody and a permanent overturning of the conviction.
Question: How does the procedural sequence—from filing the revision petition to the High Court’s potential order—operate in the context of the facts, and what practical steps must the accused undertake?
Answer: The procedural trajectory commences with the preparation of a revision petition that sets out the legal grounds: the inadmissibility of the FIR as a confession to a police officer, the absence of constructive custody at the time of its recording, and the insufficiency of the remaining evidence. The petition is filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, where a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court ensures compliance with filing requirements, affixes the requisite court fee, and serves copies on the prosecution and the investigating agency. Upon admission, the High Court issues notice to the respondents, who must file their counter‑affidavits. The court may then schedule a hearing, during which the petitioner’s counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting the FIR and that the exception for discovery‑related material cannot be invoked because the accused was not in custody. The prosecution will likely contend that the accused was in constructive custody and that the FIR’s discovery elements satisfy the legal exception. The bench evaluates the police logbook, the thumb‑impression, and the bail order to determine custody status. If convinced, the High Court can exercise its inherent power to quash the FIR, set aside the conviction, and direct the immediate release of the accused. It may also order the investigating agency to delete the FIR from its register, thereby erasing the taint from the record. Practically, the accused must remain in custody until the order is pronounced, cooperate with the counsel to provide all documentary evidence, and be prepared to file any ancillary applications, such as a bail application, if the High Court’s decision is pending. This systematic procedural route, anchored in the factual backdrop, offers the only viable path to overturn the conviction.
Question: How can the defence demonstrate that the FIR, which forms the core of the prosecution’s case, should be excluded as a confession made to a police officer, and what procedural defect regarding “constructive custody” must be highlighted to support that argument?
Answer: The defence must begin by establishing that the FIR is a confession within the meaning of the evidentiary rule that bars any admission made to a police officer, irrespective of whether it directly describes the offence. To do this, the counsel will scrutinise the narrative of the FIR, showing that it contains not only a description of the murders but also statements of motive, planning, and the location of the bodies and weapon. By treating the entire narrative as a single confession, the defence can argue that the statutory bar applies to the whole document. The next step is to challenge the trial court’s finding that the accused was in “constructive custody” at the time of making the FIR. The defence will present the bail order, the time‑stamped police logbook, and any medical or hospital records indicating that the accused was released on bail shortly after the FIR was recorded and only later re‑arrested on unrelated charges. These documents demonstrate a break in physical custody, which defeats the requirement that the accused be in custody for the rescue provision to apply. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise that the prosecution must prove a continuous custodial nexus, which is absent here. By highlighting this procedural defect, the defence can move to exclude the FIR entirely, leaving only peripheral evidence that is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The strategic focus, therefore, is to file a detailed revision petition that points out the misapplication of the evidentiary rule and the erroneous finding of constructive custody, seeking quashing of the FIR and, consequently, the conviction. This approach not only attacks the evidentiary foundation but also leverages the High Court’s inherent power to correct a miscarriage of justice arising from a procedural oversight.
Question: Which documentary materials should the defence obtain and analyse to undermine the prosecution’s reliance on the FIR, and how can these documents be used to establish inconsistencies or procedural irregularities?
Answer: The defence should request the complete police logbook covering the day of the FIR, the original thumb‑impression sheet, the bail order, the re‑arrest warrant, and any internal police communications regarding the suspect’s status. The logbook will reveal the exact times of arrest, release, and re‑arrest, allowing the counsel to demonstrate that the accused was not under continuous police control when the FIR was recorded. The thumb‑impression sheet can be examined for any signs of tampering or for discrepancies between the impression and the accused’s known fingerprints, which may raise doubts about the authenticity of the FIR. The bail order is crucial to show that the accused was legally released, thereby breaking any claim of constructive custody. Additionally, the re‑arrest warrant, if issued on unrelated charges, can be used to argue that the later detention was not connected to the FIR and cannot retroactively validate the earlier confession. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would recommend filing a petition under the appropriate procedural rule to compel the investigating agency to produce these documents, emphasizing the right to a fair trial and the necessity of disclosure. Once obtained, the defence can juxtapose the timestamps from the logbook with the narrative of the FIR, exposing any temporal inconsistencies—for example, if the FIR mentions knowledge of the bodies before the police could have discovered them. Such inconsistencies undermine the credibility of the FIR and support the argument that the confession was fabricated or coerced. By meticulously analysing these documents, the defence creates a factual matrix that challenges the prosecution’s evidentiary narrative and bolsters the request for the FIR’s exclusion.
Question: What are the risks associated with the accused remaining in custody pending the outcome of the revision petition, and how should the defence structure a bail application to mitigate those risks?
Answer: Continued detention poses several dangers: it subjects the accused to the stigma of imprisonment, hampers the ability to gather further evidence, and may prejudice the High Court’s perception of the case if the accused is seen as a flight risk. Moreover, prolonged custody can erode the accused’s health and affect the preparation of a robust legal argument. To mitigate these risks, the defence should file an urgent bail application that emphasises the lack of substantive evidence beyond the inadmissible FIR, the fact that the accused has already been released on bail once, and the absence of any prior criminal record. The application must also highlight that the accused is cooperating with the investigating agency and is willing to comply with any conditions, such as surrendering his passport or reporting regularly to the police station. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would advise that the bail petition should reference the procedural defect in the trial court’s admission of the FIR, arguing that the conviction rests on an illegal foundation and therefore the accused should not be deprived of liberty while the High Court reviews the matter. The counsel can also request that the court impose a surety and impose restrictions on contacting witnesses to address any perceived risk of tampering. By presenting a clear factual matrix—showing that the accused is not a flight risk, that the primary evidence is tainted, and that the legal issues are purely procedural—the defence enhances the likelihood of securing bail, thereby preserving the accused’s liberty and enabling effective participation in the revision proceedings.
Question: Between filing a revision petition and pursuing a collateral writ under the constitutional jurisdiction, which remedy offers the most effective strategic advantage for the accused, and what factors should guide the choice?
Answer: The revision petition directly challenges the trial court’s legal error concerning the admissibility of the FIR and the finding of constructive custody, making it the primary and most focused remedy. It allows the High Court to scrutinise the evidentiary foundation and to quash the conviction if the FIR is found inadmissible. A collateral writ under the constitutional jurisdiction, such as a petition under Article 226, is broader and can address violations of fundamental rights, but it is generally considered a fallback when the revision route fails. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would counsel that the writ route may be appropriate if the revision is dismissed on technical grounds or if there is a clear denial of the right to a fair trial. However, the writ petition often requires demonstrating a breach of a specific constitutional right, which may be more challenging than showing a procedural error in the trial court. Additionally, the writ jurisdiction is discretionary, and the court may decline to interfere with the criminal process unless there is a clear miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the strategic advantage lies in first exhausting the revision remedy, which is tailored to correct the specific evidentiary defect. If the revision is denied, the defence can then pivot to a writ, using the High Court’s observations in the revision hearing to bolster the claim of constitutional violation. The decision should also consider the timeline; a revision petition may be heard more swiftly, preserving the accused’s liberty, whereas a writ could entail a longer procedural delay. By prioritising the revision, the defence aligns its strategy with the most direct avenue for relief while keeping the writ as a contingency plan.
Question: How can the defence effectively argue that the remaining physical evidence—such as the recovered weapon, blood‑stained cloth, and medical testimony—fails to meet the burden of proof for murder once the FIR is excluded?
Answer: Once the FIR is excluded, the prosecution’s case rests solely on the forensic and medical evidence. The defence must dissect each piece to demonstrate that, taken together, they do not establish the essential elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt. First, the recovered weapon should be examined for any forensic link to the accused, such as fingerprints, DNA, or unique markings that tie it to his possession. If the weapon was found at a location identified solely by the FIR, the defence can argue that without that confession, the chain of custody is broken and the weapon’s relevance is speculative. Second, the blood‑stained cloth must be subjected to forensic analysis to determine whether the blood belongs to the victims, the accused, or an unknown source. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would recommend obtaining an independent expert opinion to challenge the prosecution’s claim of a direct connection. Third, the medical testimony should be scrutinised for its scope; while it may confirm the nature of the wounds, it does not identify the perpetrator. The defence can argue that the medical evidence merely establishes that the victims suffered fatal injuries, not who inflicted them. By highlighting the lack of direct forensic linkage, the defence underscores that the prosecution’s case is circumstantial and insufficient for a conviction. Moreover, the defence can point out that the standard of proof in a criminal trial is “beyond reasonable doubt,” and the absence of any eyewitness or direct forensic tie creates a reasonable doubt. Emphasising that the only narrative linking the accused to the crime was the inadmissible FIR, the defence can request that the High Court dismiss the conviction on the ground that the remaining evidence does not satisfy the evidentiary threshold required for a murder conviction.