Case Analysis: Tarachand Damu Sutar vs The State Of Maharashtra
Case Details
Case name: Tarachand Damu Sutar vs The State Of Maharashtra
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: J.L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, Raghubar Dayal
Date of decision: 04 May 1961
Citation / citations: 1962 AIR 130; 1962 SCR (2) 775
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1960; Bombay High Court Criminal Appeal No. 488 of 1960; Bombay High Court Criminal Appeal No. 426 of 1960; Review Application No. 555 of 1960; Review Application No. 641 of 1960
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal by special leave (Art. 136)
Source court or forum: Supreme Court of India
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
Tarachand Damu Sutar married Sindhubai around 1950 and they lived together in a one‑room tenement with a child born about one and a half years before the incident. Their marital relationship had been normal initially but, two years before 2 November 1959, frequent quarrels began. On that date, between 1:30 pm and 3:30 pm, Sindhubai was sleeping when the appellant allegedly beat her, sprinkled kerosene on her clothes and set them alight. She fell near her cousin Shantabai’s house, was taken to the Civil Hospital, Dhulia, and gave three dying declarations – to her mother, to Dr Javeri (the attending physician), and to the magistrate Mr Mhatre – identifying her husband as the person who set fire to her clothes. She died later the same day.
The Sessions Court convicted Sutar under section 304 (1) IPC and sentenced him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The State appealed; the Bombay High Court set aside that conviction, convicted him under section 302 IPC and imposed the death sentence. The appellant filed review applications (Nos. 555/1960 and 641/1960), both of which were dismissed. He then filed Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1960 before the Supreme Court, seeking special leave under article 136 of the Constitution to challenge the High Court’s judgment and order dated 20 July 1960.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court examined two principal issues. First, whether the appellant possessed a statutory right of appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution, i.e., whether the High Court’s reversal of an earlier acquittal and subsequent conviction for a lesser offence constituted an “acquittal” within the meaning of the provision. Second, whether the conviction under section 302 IPC, based principally on the three dying declarations, should be sustained.
The appellant contended that he had been at work in the house of Mulchand Rajmal in Nehru Nagar at the material time and that the death was a suicide. He relied on an alibi witness and argued that the dying declarations were either prompted or insufficiently corroborated.
The State contended that the dying declarations were freely given, unprompted and reliable, and that they established the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It further argued that the term “acquittal” under article 134(1)(a) required a complete discharge of all charges, and therefore the appellant was not entitled to a certificate of appeal.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence of a High Court if the High Court “has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death.” Sections 302 and 304 (1) of the Indian Penal Code define murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder respectively. The law on dying declarations requires that such statements be made voluntarily, that the declarant understand the questions, and that there be no material suggesting coercion or fabrication. The Court relied on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision in Kishan Singh v. The King, which held that a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder constituted an “acquittal” for the purpose of article 134(1)(a).
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The majority held that the term “acquittal” under article 134(1)(a) did not require a total discharge of all charges; it also encompassed a situation where the accused was acquitted of the original charge but convicted of a lesser offence. Applying this construction, the Court concluded that the appellant’s earlier conviction for culpable homicide (section 304 (1) IPC) amounted to an acquittal of the murder charge, thereby triggering the appellant’s right to a certificate of appeal.
In assessing the dying declarations, the Court applied the established reliability test. It found that each declaration had been recorded promptly by reliable persons (the mother, the physician and the magistrate), that the deceased was conscious and understood the questions, and that there was no evidence of prompting or coercion. Consequently, the Court held that the declarations were admissible and sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder.
The Court evaluated the alibi defence and found it unsupported by any corroborative evidence. The claim of suicide was rejected as unsubstantiated, given the absence of any external evidence and the consistency of the dying declarations with the prosecution’s version of events.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal, upheld the conviction under section 302 IPC and affirmed the death sentence imposed by the Bombay High Court. While it recognized that the appellant was entitled to a certificate of appeal under article 134(1)(a), it found that the conviction and sentence were legally sound. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the death sentence was sustained.